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Abstract: This target article presents a theory of human cultural learning. Cultural learning is identified with those instances of social
learning in which intersubjectivity or perspective-taking plays a vital role, both in the original learning process and in the resulting
cognitive product. Cultural learning manifests itself in three forms during human ontogeny: imitative learning, instructed learning,
and collaborative learning - in that order. Evidence is provided that this progression arises from the developmental ordering of the
underlying social-cognitive concepts and processes involved. Imitative learning relies on a concept of intentional agent and involves
simple perspective-taking. Instructed learning relies on a concept of mental agent and involves alternating/coordinated perspective-
taking (intersubjectivity). Collaborative learning relies on a concept of reflective agent and involves integrated perspective-taking
(reflective intersubjectivity). A comparison of normal children, autistic children and wild and enculturated chimpanzees provides
further evidence for these correlations between social cognition and cultural learning. Cultural learning is a uniquely human form of
social learning that allows for a fidelity of transmission of behaviors and information among conspecifics not possible in other forms of
social learning, thereby providing the psychological basis for cultural evolution.
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Many animal species live in complex social groups; only
humans live in cultures. Cultures are most clearly distin-
guished from other forms of social organization by the
nature of their products - for example, material artifacts,
social institutions, behavioral traditions, and languages.
These cultural products share, among other things, the
characteristic that they accumulate modifications over
time. Once a practice is begun by some member or
members of a culture others acquire it relatively faith-
fully, but then modify it as needed to deal with novel
exigencies. The modified practice is then acquired by
others, including progeny, who may in turn add their own
modifications, and so on across generations. This accu-
mulation of modifications over time is often called the
"ratchet-effect," because each modification stays firmly in
place in the group until further modifications are made.
No cultural products exhibiting anything like the ratchet
effect have ever been observed in the ontogenetically
acquired behaviors or products of nonhuman animals
(Tomasello 1990).
The very large difference in product between animal
and human societies may be most directly explained by a
small but very important difference in process. Simply
put, human beings learn from one another in ways that
nonhuman animals do not. In particular, human beings
"transmit" ontogenetically acquired behavior and infor-
mation, both within and across generations, with a much
higher degree of fidelity than other animal species. The
learning processes that ensure this fidelity serve to pre-
vent information loss (the ratchet) and thus, in combina-
tion with individual and collaborative inventiveness, form
the basis for cultural evolution. Human beings are able to
learn from one another in this way because they have very
powerful, perhaps uniquely powerful, forms of social
cognition. Human beings understand and take the per-
spective of others in a manner and to a degree that allows
them to participate more intimately than nonhuman ani-
mals in the knowledge and skills of conspecifics.
This overall perspective is not new, of course, but
echoes a central theme in the work of Lev Vygotsky. On a
number of occasions Vygotsky (e.g., 1978) contrasted
sharply the learning of human children in the "cultural
line" of development with their learning (and that of
Kohler's [1927] chimpanzees) in the "natural line" of
development. The cultural line is characterized not only
by the presence of culture, whose important role in
human ontogeny Vygotsky so clearly demonstrated, but
also by the uniquely human capacity to acquire cultural
products. The coevolution of culture and the capacity for
its acquisition is also a major theme of the newly emerging
paradigm of cultural psychology (e.g., Bruner 1990; Cole
1989; Rogoff 1990; Shweder 1990; Wertsch 1985b). But,
following Vygotsky, cultural psychologists have so far
chosen to focus almost exclusively on the important role of
culture, neglecting for the most part what the individual
organism brings to the process of enculturation.
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In this target article we attempt to focus on the individ-
ual capacity for acquiring culture, that is to say, on the
social-learning processes whereby human children ac-
quire the skills and conventions of those around them.
What is new in our account is an attempt to understand
social learning in terms of the most recent research and
theory on children's social cognition. We believe that as
children's understanding of other persons develops - as
they learn to understand other persons in terms of their
intentions and beliefs, or even in terms of a "theory of
mind" - new processes of social learning emerge. Be-
cause of their role in the transmission and creation of
cultural products, we refer to these uniquely human
processes of social learning as cultural learning.
1. Social learning and cultural learning
As typically conceived, social learning is individual learn-
ing that is influenced in some way by the social environ-
ment (e.g., Bandura 1986). In many cases this influence
may be minimal in terms of the actual learning processes
involved, however. For example, young animals may
follow their mother to a food source and then learn to
extract the food by themselves; or human adults may give
children objects which they then explore on their own.
In these cases the social environment provides exposure
only; the actual learning processes are wholly individual
in the sense that what is learned is learned through the
youngster's direct interaction with the physical environ-
ment.
In other instances the social environment may play a
more active role, most importantly by drawing the juve-
nile's attention to a specific object or location in the
environment that it otherwise would not have noticed (so-
called local or stimulus enhancement; Thorpe 1956). For
example, a chimpanzee mother's nut-cracking activities
may draw a youngster's attention to the rock-hammer and
the open nut, both left on the hard surface necessary for
successful cracking; or a human mother may set up a task
for the child in a simplified way that invites attention to
key elements. Such situations are undoubtedly instru-
mental in leading the immature organism to make discov-
eries and to learn things that it would not have learned on
its own, even if it were exposed to the proper physical
conditions, and this is clearly a very powerful form of
social learning. However, it is important that, once again,
the learning processes involved in actually acquiring the
new behavior may still be seen as individual in the sense
that the youngster does not learn anything from the
mother's behavior per se - that is, her particular approach
to the task (her specific method or behavioral strategies) is
not a part of what is learned (Tomasello 1990).
Social learning in the form of stimulus or local enhance-
ment plays an indispensable role in human development,
as it does in the cognitive development of many social
species. In some cases, however, human beings learn
from one another in a qualitatively different way. Human
beings sometimes engage in what we call cultural learn-
ing. In cultural learning, learners do not just direct their
attention to the location of another individual's activity;
rather, they actually attempt to see a situation the way the
other sees it - from inside the other's perspective, as it
were. In this case, learning is social in a way that individ-
ual learning enabled or supported by the social environ-
ment is not. It is learning in which the learner is attempt-
ing to learn not from another, but through another. This
qualitative difference is possible because human beings
are able, depending on one's choice of theory and termi-
nology, to take the role of the other (Mead 1934), to take
the perspective of the other (Piaget 1932), to attribute
mental states to the other (Premack 1988), to simulate the
mental states of the other (Harris 1991), to engage in joint
attention with the other (Bruner 1983), to engage in
mindreading of the other (Whiten 1991), to understand
the other as a "person" (Hobson, in press), or to partici-
pate with the other intersubjectively (Trevarthen 1979b).
We will speak of "perspective-taking" when the learner is
attempting to see the situation from another person's
point of view and of "intersubjectivity" when both the
learner and other person are doing this simultane-
ously and reciprocally. In all cases, the nature of the
perspective-taking attempt depends, in a way that we will
spell out later, on how the other "person" is conceived.'
It is also important in our definition of cultural learning
that what is retained by the learner after the social
interaction has terminated is still in essence social. Thus,
in all cases of cultural learning the learner must internal-
ize into its own repertoire not just knowledge of the
activity being performed by another person, but also
something of the social interaction itself- the demonstra-
tion or instructions given by an adult, for example. This
process of internalization (or, in Rogoff's 1990 preferred
terminology, "appropriation") is not something myste-
rious or magical, in our view, but simply a special mani-
festation of basic processes of learning. The difference is
that in internalization an important part of what is being
learned is the point of view of another person (the "voice'
of the other, in Bahktin's terminology; cf., Stone, in press;
Wertsch 1991) - which may sometimes be intentional,
and thus refer to some entity outside that person. The
important point for current purposes is that the cognitive
representation resulting from cultural learning includes
something of the perspective of the interactional partner,
and this perspective continues to guide the learner even
after the original learning experience is over. This inter-
nalization or appropriation of perspectives does not, by
definition, occur in noncultural forms of social learning.
This definition of cultural learning will, it is hoped,
become clearer and more fully developed as we proceed.
Our plan is this: In the section that follows, we lay out the
fundamentals of our argument about the relation between
social cognition and cultural learning by tracing the on-
togeny of cultural learning in the human species. We
focus on what we consider the three main types of cultural
learning and the social-cognitive concept of person on
which each of them depends. We then attempt to bolster
our argument by reviewing what is known about the social
cognition and social learning of autistic children, followed
by a similar analysis of our nearest primate relative, the
chimpanzee. In both cases we find that there is something
acultural about their learning and social lives. We con-
clude by discussing the central role of cultural learning in
the evolution of human culture and cognition.
2. The ontogeny of cultural learning
In virtually all discussions of the psychological bases of
culture and cultural transmission the focus is on imitation
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by immature organisms and teaching by mature organ-
isms (e.g., Boyd & Richerson 1985; Galef 1992). We agree
with this starting point, but we also feel that it is some-
what incomplete. The first type of cultural learning is
clearly imitative learning, in which the learner internal-
izes something of the demonstrator's behavioral strate-
gies. This may occur either inside or outside a pedagogical
context. But when teaching is involved, another form of
cultural learning may also occur, what we propose to call
instructed learning. This is essentially Vygotskian learn-
ing in which learners internalize the instructions of the
teacher and use them subsequently to self-regulate their
own attentional, mnemonic, or other cognitive functions.
This ensures that the instruction lives on after the original
learning situation. We would also like to add a third type
of cultural learning to the discussion: collaborative learn-
ing does not involve transmission from mature to imma-
ture organism in the classic sense because, by definition,
the situation consists of peers collaborating to construct
something new that neither had before the interaction
began. It is clear such a process enhances the individual
inventiveness that is the leading edge of cultural evolu-
tion, but it is also true that in some minority of cases
collaborative learning may contribute to the maintenance
of cultural traditions, as immature organisms in genera-
tion after generation of a particular culture are exposed to
similar situations that call forth similar collaborative ef-
forts and solutions. In either case, collaborative learning
is, in our view, an important part of the total picture of
cultural learning and evolution.
Though highly oversimplified, Figure 1 presents the
three basic interactional situations just described: (i) imi-
tative learning, with the single arrow depicting the
learner's efforts at perspective-taking and learning; (ii)
instructed learning, with the reciprocal and asymmetrical
arrows depicting the instructor's efforts at perspective-
taking and instruction and the learner's efforts at
perspective-taking and learning (together leading to an
asymmetrical form of intersubjectivity); and (iii) collab-
orative learning, with the reciprocal and symmetrical
arrows depicting each of the collaborator's efforts to take
the perspective of and to learn through the other (in this
case in a symmetrically intersubjective fashion). Our
major ontogenetic claim is that the three types of cultural
learning emerge in a highly predictable order in human
ontogeny, dependent in each case on the development of
specific social-cognitive underpinnings (i.e., the develop-
ment of specific concepts of "person"). This order, how-
ever, is only clear if each type of cultural learning is clearly
differentiated from the social learning processes that
resemble it. We discuss each of the three in turn.
Model
 Instructor









Figure 1. Direction of intentionality in the three cultural
learning situations.
2.1. Imitative learning. Human infants are social crea-
tures. They smile at human faces and engage in rhythmic
interactions with other human beings practically from
birth. They also reproduce some behaviors they observe
being performed by other persons (e.g., tongue protru-
sions and head turnings) within the first few weeks of life
(Meltzoff & Moore 1989). Impressive though they may
be, however, and even if they are necessary for cultural
learning later in ontogeny, these social matching behav-
iors are not instances of imitative learning qua cultural
learning quite simply because nothing new is being
learned. Neonatal imitations all involve behaviors that
infants produce spontaneously with some regularity;
none involve the acquisition of new behaviors.
Also not qualifying as clear cases of cultural learning are
the attempts of infants to attain goals after adults have
attained them (e.g., Kaye 1982), but using their own
methods of execution - what Wood (1989) calls emulation.
The problem is that what is often happening in such cases
is that the child is learning about the affordances of an
object or situation, not about the adult's goal or perspec-
tive. Thus, an infant might see an adult open a jar and
then do the same, using established behavioral strategies,
because it now sees that the jar affords opening. Con-
versely, if the infant reproduces the precise form of the
adult's behavior but does not understand its goal, we may
say that the infant is only mimicking the adult; for exam-
ple, the infant might make twisting motions on the lid as
the mother did, but without applying pressure, not know-
ing that the goal is to open the jar. Again, in this case
nothing is learned about the adult's goal or perspective.
True imitative learning in our definition involves the
infant's reproducing the adult's actual behavioral strate-
gies in their appropriate functional contexts, which im-
plies an understanding of the intentional state underlying
the behavior.2
True imitative learning first emerges in the second half-
year of the infant's life, primarily in two domains: object-
directed actions and the use of communicative symbols.
In the case of object-directed actions, the first imitative
learning of novel actions occurs at 9-14 months of age,
with the precise age depending on the particular tasks
used and the criterion of novelty in effect (e.g., Abravonal
& Gingold 1985; Masur & Ritz, 1984; McCall et al. 1977;
Meltzoff 1988a; 1988b). The problem in identifying imita-
tive learning in object-directed actions is that infants have
preexisting proclivities to manipulate objects in particular
ways. The actions modeled must therefore be clearly
novel for the child and there must be a control group of
subjects to further ensure that the modeled actions are
not ones that children would perform spontaneously with
that object or in response to generic adult attention to the
object (thus ruling out stimulus enhancement and/or
emulation as potential learning processes). Perhaps the
best example is that reported by Meltzoff (1988b), who
found that 14-month-old infants could learn to activate a
light by bending at the waist to touch a panel with their
foreheads, as they had seen a model do. This seemed a
clearly novel action for most infants; not one child in a
control condition spontaneously performed it. This dem-
onstration, and several others in various other experi-
ments, strongly suggests that in the months immediately
before their first birthday human infants are able to
imitatively learn novel object-directed actions on the
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basis of only one or a few observations of adult perfor-
mance. The fact that in some instances they go on to use
these behaviors in appropriate novel circumstances ar-
gues that they are not simply mimicking them.
The imitative learning of conventional linguistic sym-
bols provides further support for this conclusion. Infants
typically begin to acquire conventional symbols during
this same developmental period, the final quarter of their
first year of life (e.g., Bates 1979). This is important
because the appropriate use of a conventional symbol can
only be learned imitatively; it is unlikely to the point of
impossible that infants will discover for themselves the
same arbitrary connection between sound and referent
that adults have conventionalized (i.e., learning by means
of stimulus enhancement and emulation is not possible
with conventional behaviors and thus experimental con-
trols are not necessary). The first use of conventional
symbols - in appropriate novel circumstances to rule out
mimicking — is thus important corroborating evidence
that infants' imitative learning skills are beginning in the
months just prior to their first birthdays.
To understand this newly emerging ability we must
look at what other new things infants are doing at this age.
We do not have to look very hard. At around 9 months of
age infants begin to engage in a number of new behaviors
that herald the emerging ability to coordinate attention to
people and objects (Trevarthen & Hubley 1978). During
this period infants begin for the first time to follow into the
perspective of adults: They look at objects the adult is
looking at, even participating in extended bouts of joint
attention (Bakeman & Adamson 1982), and they also
begin to look to adults for their emotional reaction to
novel people and objects, often using them as social
reference points (Uzgiris & Kruper 1992). At this age they
also begin trying to get others to tune into their focus of
attention by means of various communicative gestures,
often accompanied by alternation of gaze between person
and object (Bates 1976). What all these behaviors have in
common is a reliance on understanding persons as inten-
tional agents that are clearly different from inanimate
objects. Infants do not attempt to look where their doll is
looking, they do not attempt to use a chair as a social
reference point, and they do not request actions from
their bottle. They do these things only when they are
interacting with another person, and this is because they
understand the behavior of other persons in terms of
underlying perceptions and intentions. In fact, only if the
infant has some notion of intentional agent, we would
argue, do these behaviors make any sense at all.
It does not require great insight to see that this emerg-
ing ability to treat others as intentional agents also under-
lies the 9-month-old's emerging ability to imitatively
learn novel instrumental behaviors from them: just as
infants can follow into the adult's visual focus of attention,
so they can follow into the adult's behavior and reproduce
it. Reproducing an adult's novel behavior in both its form
and appropriate function (i.e., imitative learning) clearly
requires some understanding of what the adult is perceiv-
ing and intending because without such understanding
the child cannot know which aspects of the adult's behav-
ior are relevant or irrelevant. In flying the toy airplane is it
necessary to throw it overhand, as the model has done, or
can it be thrown underhand? In blowing bubbles, is it
necessary to blow them in an upward direction, as the
model has done, or will any direction do? In using a fork
must one stab the food, as the model has done, or may it
be used as a spoon? In each of these cases the child must
understand the adult's behavior in intentional terms in
order to determine what is the purpose of the behavior
and how one goes about accomplishing that purpose.
Without such understanding the best the child can do is
either to reproduce the adult's behavior blindly (i.e.,
mimic) or else to devise some idiosyncratic way of at-
taining the result observed (i.e., emulate it). When chil-
dren can attempt to see a situation from the perspective of
another person, on the other hand, they can at that point
reproduce both means and ends in one imitative act for
themselves.
The situation is even clearer in the child's acquisition of
conventional linguistic symbols. A child in Quine's (1960)
famous "Gavagai" situation has no way of figuring out for
itself the referent of a novel linguistic item. But in the real
world young children learn new pieces of language almost
always in highly contextualized, often routinized, mutu-
ally understood (i.e., intersubjective), nonlinguistic for-
mats such as the feeding situation, diaper changing, book
reading, taking a walk, or playing a game of peek-a-boo
(Bruner 1983; Ninio 1985; Tomasello & Farrar 1986).
These contexts are so replete with information about adult
intentions - from the child's past experience in similar
situations, as well as from the adult's current direction of
gaze, tone of voice, and specific behaviors toward objects
- that they even support the acquisition of words for
referents that are not perceptually present. Thus, chil-
dren in their second year of life learn most of their words
for actions (verbs) as adults are either telling them what to
do or anticipating their impending actions (Tomasello
1992a). Even though no action is perceptually present
when the adult utters the word, young children learn
words in these situations nonetheless, and in some cases,
better than they do in ostensive contexts (Tomasello &
Kruger 1992). Some very powerful skills of perspective-
taking are clearly at work here, as children in these
situations must understand the adult's intentions in a way
that allows them to determine the adult's focus of atten-
tion outside the immediate perceptual context. Strong
evidence for this view is the positive correlation between
young children's joint attentional skills and their imitative
learning of new linguistic symbols during the second year
of life (Tomasello 1988; Tomasello & Farrar 1986;
Tomasello & Todd 1983). The overall point is that there are
a number of new behaviors that emerge at around 9
months of age that rely on the infant's ability to take the
perspective of a person considered as an intentional agent
- in terms of its perceptions and intentions - and imita-
tive learning is just one manifestation of this skill.
The nature of the cognitive representation that results
from imitative learning is, like other representations, at
this point only a matter of speculation. In some cases in
which children imitate a novel behavior they internalize
their understanding of the model's behavior or behavioral
strategy. This is especially apparent when infants repro-
duce object-directed actions and linguistic symbols only
well after adults have demonstrated them (deferred or
delayed imitation), which they do from the age of 9
months (Meltzoff 1988a). Deferred imitation of this type
would seem to indicate that something of the model itself,
not just the child's immediate reaction to the model, is
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internalized and retained. Our hypothesis, for which we
have no evidence at this time, is that internalization of the
adult model occurs in those cases in which children have
made a special effort to take the perspective of the adult -
most probably when the child is not succeeding as desired
while the adult is succeeding, or else when the model
surprises the child by doing something cognitively novel.
The internalization of learning that takes place on such
occasions results in a cognitive representation in which
the child represents adult behavior in terms of the simple
perspective of an intentional agent.
2.2. Instructed learning. Adults attempt to instruct chil-
dren practically from birth and children learn more and
better in many situations because of this instruction. Not
all of these interactions, however, are cultural learning as
we define it. Much of children's learning in pedagogical
contexts at all ages is really social learning; that is, the
child learns about the task individually, with assistance
from the fact that the adult has structured and drawn
attention to it in ways that facilitate learning. For exam-
ple, an adult may place a puzzle piece directly adjacent to
its appropriate location, helping the child make the indi-
vidual discovery. The product of this "scaffolding" process
is in many cases the child's improved understanding of the
task, and there are many ways adults may scaffold chil-
dren to facilitate their understanding and performance
(Gauvain & Rogoff 1989; Goncu & Rogoff 1987; Heber
1981; Ratner 1984; Wood & Middleton 1975; Wood et al.
1978).
Instructed learning as we define it involves more than
the child's learning by means of adult task simplification.
Whereas in scaffolded learning children learn about the
task, with the adult in the background providing help, in
instructed learning children learn about the adult specifi-
cally, about the adult's understanding of the task and how
that compares with their own understanding. As the adult
regulates the child's performance, usually through inten-
tional speech acts that occur at critical decision-making
junctures, the child tries to understand that regulation
from the adult's point of view, that is, to enter into an
intersubjective understanding of the task. The cognitive
operations children engage in to relate the adult's under-
standing to their own task understanding are represented
in the cognitive product, and are later reenacted in other
situations as a Vygotskian dialogue between the two
perspectives. In some cases it may be difficult or impossi-
ble to distinguish instructed learning from scaffolded
learning, because in both cases there is social interaction
and juvenile learning. In many cases, however, they may
be distinguished by the fact that in instructed learning
children later reenact the adult's instructions overtly in
regulating their own behavior when faced with the same
or a similar situation. This takes the form of such things as
performance monitoring, metacognitive strategies, or,
most clearly, self-regulating speech. The child's reenact-
ment of the adult instructions would seem to indicate
without question that he has attended to and understood
them in the original learning context, and that in so doing
he and the adult have achieved some form of intersubjec-
tivity in the task situation.
It is important to emphasize that self-regulating behav-
ior is not simple mimicking of adult instructions as an
accompaniment to behavior. Self-regulation represents a
flexible functional system that involves decision-making
processes reflecting at least two perspectives. Thus, a
2-year-old child who reaches toward the electrical outlet
but then inhibits that reach and shouts "No!" to itself is
actually avoiding the outlet for other reasons (e.g., past
punishment) and the speech does nothing to actually
regulate the behavior. The utterance "No!" is thus not the
coordination of two perspectives, or true self-regulation,
but simply the performance of two parallel activities, each
elicited by the current context (Diaz et al. 1991). In a
series of studies directed specifically at the self-regulating
function of children's self-directed speech, Luria (1961)
found that the self-directed speech of 2- and 3-year-old
children was not well coordinated with their behavior in
difficult problem-solving situations. It was in fact not
regulating their behavior at all but only accompanying it,
as demonstrated by children's repeated disregard of their
own self-directed speech. From around their fourth or
fifth birthdays, however, children in Luria's studies did
demonstrate an ability to use their speech to actually
regulate their behavior; they coordinated their self-
regulating speech with their task behavior in a dialogic
manner.
The simple presence of metacognitive strategies or self-
regulating speech is not direct evidence of instructed
learning, of course, if we do not have evidence that the
regulation was appropriated from an instructor. Despite a
lack of clear correlations between adult instruction and
child learning in all cases, there is some evidence that in
this same age range, 4 to 5 years, children are in some
contexts capable of internalizing adult behavior and in-
structions. Ratner and Hill (1991), for example, found that
children of this age are able to reproduce the instructor's
role in a teaching situation weeks after the original peda-
gogy. There is also evidence of a correlation between
instructor and learner behavior in preschool children.
Kontos (1983) found that children who were instructed in
how to solve a problem by their mothers showed increases
in the amount of self-regulating speech (strategy verbaliz-
ations) in their subsequent individual problem solving
(relative to children who are not instructed). There is
even some experimental evidence that manipulating the
style of adult instruction may lead to changes in the
amounts of self-regulating speech children use in their
subsequent individual attempts in the same problem
situation (Goudena 1987).
In our view, then, it is not until children reach approx-
imately 4 years of age that they show evidence of in-
structed learning, if what is meant by this is the internaliz-
ation of adult instructions. Recent studies have shown that
a variety of self-monitoring and metacognitive skills in
cognitive tasks emerge near the end of the preschool
period and play an indispensable role in the child's acqui-
sition of many of the most valued skills of Western culture,
such as reading and mathematics (DeLoache et al. 1985;
Diaz et al. 1991; Palincsar & Brown 1984; Saxe 1991). It is
also interesting that during this same age range informal
observations reveal children first showing evidence of
spontaneous efforts to teach or regulate the learning of
others, behaviors of relevance here because self-
regulation is, in a sense, teaching oneself.
The social-cognitive bases of instructed learning can be
seen in a number of other new behaviors that emerge at
around this age. Around 3 to 4, children do things in a
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variety of settings (including experimental ones) that
demonstrate their nascent understanding of other per-
sons as mental beings with their own individual beliefs,
which may be either correct or incorrect and which may
be either the same as or different from their own beliefs.
The first tentative evidence of this is at around 3 years of
age when children first begin to use words that refer to the
thoughts and knowledge of others (Shatz et al. 1983). But
close inspection of the early use of these terms shows that
they do not really refer to mental states at all but simply
reflect rote formulae such as "you know" and "I think so"
(Shatz et al. 1983). Three-year-olds also begin trying to
deceive others, apparently displaying their understand-
ing that others may have beliefs that differ from their own
(Chandler et al. 1989). Subsequent research, however,
has shown that children of this age often do not under-
stand the effect of their deception on the mental states of
the one being deceived; what is going on is something
simpler than true deception, something that does not rely
on the attribution of mental states to others at all (Sodian
et al. 1991).
By 4 years of age children are producing language that
clearly refers to mental states and they are deceiving
others with full knowledge of its effect on their mental
states. More important for current purposes, it is at
around this same age that children also begin to behave in
adultlike ways in the false-belief task by successfully
predicting what another child will do when given infor-
mation the subject child knows to be false. This demon-
strates even more clearly children's newly emerging abil-
ity to understand that others have mental states differing
from their own and, possibly, diverging from the real
situation as well (Wimmer & Perner 1983). The 4-year-old
child in the false-belief task clearly conceives of other
persons as mental agents who have, in addition to the
perceptions and intentions of intentional agents, their
own individual thoughts and beliefs that guide their
behavior, and which, in some circumstances, may be
compared and contrasted to the child's own thoughts and
beliefs. This is what current theorists mean when they say
that the 4-year-old child has for the first time a "represen-
tational theory of mind" (see, e.g., the papers in Astington
et al. 1988).
Again, it does not require great insight to see that to
learn from an instructor culturally - to understand the
instruction from something resembling the instructor's
point of view - requires that children be able to under-
stand a mental perspective that differs from their own,
and then to relate that point of view to their own in an
explicit fashion. Without some such cognitive processes,
children will only be able to learn individually or socially
from, or perhaps to imitate, an adult instructor; they will
not be able to engage in instructed learning. Both the
false-belief task and instructed learning require the un-
derstanding and comparison of the perspectives of two
mental agents (one of whom is the self) with differing
perspectives on the same situation. The difference is
simply that in the false-belief task these perspectives are
in conflict with different information, whereas in self-
regulated learning they are in dialogue with different
roles. It is thus only at around 4 years of age, at the same
time they are learning to deal effectively with the false-
belief task, that children begin to internalize their under-
standing of an alternating and coordinated dialogue of
mental perspectives and use this dialogue to self-regulate
their ongoing cognitive activities.3
What is internalized in instructed learning is, as
Vygotsky emphasized, a dialogue. In the learning interac-
tion children understand the adult regulation (instruc-
tion), but they do so in relation to their own task under-
standing, which requires a coordinating of the two
perspectives. The cognitive representation that results,
therefore, is not just of the instructions but of the inter-
subjective dialogue. This dialogue does not occur at all
task junctures in most cases; at many points the child is
simply learning about the task with the assistance of adult
scaffolding. Our hypothesis is that the adult regulations
most likely to be appropriated by the child into an internal
dialogue are those that come at difficult points in the task,
that is, when the child and adult are not mutually focused
on the same aspect of it. This discrepancy becomes
apparent to the child through his attempts to understand
the adult's instructions. The attempt to reinstate inter-
subjectivity in this way takes the form of a dialogue; it is
this dialogue that the child internalizes and retains for use
in future encounters with the same or a similar task. At
least some evidence for this hypothesis is provided by the
finding that self-regulating speech is used most often by
children at difficult points in problem-solving tasks
(Goodman 1984). And as in the case of delayed imitation,
the delayed reproduction of adult instructions, as evi-
denced by self-regulating speech that occurs only some
time after the original pedagogical interaction, is powerful
evidence of internalization.
We should also mention at this point that imitative and
instructed learning often interact in very powerful ways.
Thus, in many cultures, and on many occasions in West-
ern cultures, children are instructed by means of nonver-
bal demonstrations. Our depiction of instructed learning
in terms of dialogues and self-regulating speech would
thus seem somewhat inappropriate for these cases (e.g.,
Greenfield & Lave 1982; Rogoff 1990). But it must not be
forgotten that adults are still instructing youngsters in
most of these cases by something like the directive to
"watch this," either explicitly or implicitly conveyed, as
they perform some activity. The adult then highlights,
perhaps by nonverbal means, those aspects of the perfor-
mance that the child is to attend to and monitors the
child's attention (redirecting it to the task at hand if
necessary): The child understands, at least to some ex-
tent, those attentional directions. Our contention in these
cases is that the child attends to and internalizes the
nonverbal instructions, even if these are simple indica-
tions of the "watch this" variety, where there is an implicit
and growing understanding of what the "this" refers to,
which in turn constitutes the intersubjectivity involved.
When the child then engages in the skill on his own, he
uses the nonverbal directives of the instructor to guide his
own performance in the same way that he might use the
instructor's verbal instructions on other occasions.
2.3. Collaborative learning. Imitative learning and in-
structed learning are means of cultural transmission: By
modeling or instruction the adult passes to the child
valued elements of the culture. Collaborative learning is
different. Collaborative learning takes place when nei-
ther interactant is an authority or expert; the intersubjec-
tivity is symmetrical. Two peers work together to solve a
500 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1993) 16:3
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00031277
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:48:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
common problem and, in arriving jointly at a solution,
they coconstruct knowledge, as in most cases of scientific
collaboration. They then individually internalize this co-
construction. Collaborative learning is thus distinct from
the other two processes of cultural learning in that it is a
process of cultural creation or coconstruction rather than
transmission.
There are many situations in which children of pre-
school age collaborate. Young children can play coopera-
tively with peers, often by imitating each other (Ecker-
man et al. 1989), and they may jointly construct a theme
for their play (e.g., Eckerman & Stein 1982). Preschoolers
may even coordinate their actions with each other to solve
a problem (Brownell & Carriger 1990). It is not clear in
any of these contexts, however, that the children are
learning anything from the collaboration per se. That is,
though the children may be learning individually about
how to play with each other or how to solve a particular
task, they are not coconstructing new knowledge about
the task which is then individually internalized. Collab-
orative interactions of the type performed by pre-
schoolers thus do not constitute collaborative learning as
we define it.
In support of this view, it is well-known that pre-
schoolers experience little if any specific cognitive benefit
from peer interaction in such shared tasks as computer
program use (Perlmutter et al. 1989) or block building
(Azmitia 1988). This is often because rather than collab-
orating, preschoolers tend to simply act in parallel or, at
best, to divide the labor. A variety of studies have shown
that young children who learn from peer interaction are
not those who act in parallel or divide responsibilities but
rather those who share with their partners in the task:
engaging in joint planning, responding to each other's
ideas, asking for clarification when necessary, and engag-
ing in more discussions of the effects of their joint activity
(Azmitia 1989; Behrend & Resnick 1989; Phelps &
Damon 1989).
Collaborative learning in school-age children, on the
other hand, is a well-established phenomenon. Studies
have demonstrated repeatedly that for children of this age
problem solving with a peer, even one who is no more
knowledgeable than oneself, often leads to greater task
understanding than problem solving alone or in the con-
text of instruction. In the case of Piagetian conservation
tasks, for example, peer interaction between two noncon-
serving children results in an understanding of the princi-
ple of conservation far more often than the situation in
which the child works on the problem alone (Ames &
Murray 1982; Doise & Mugny 1979; Glachan & Light
1982). This is possible because the nonconserving peers
are often focusing on different aspects of the problem -
one saying that the water in the new beaker is higher and
the other noting that it is thinner, for example - which
together provide a sufficient solution. These competing
perspectives come to light in the interaction, and in an
effort to reach a consensus the children integrate the
perspectives, coconstructing a new perspective, and
achieve a greater task understanding (Perret-Clermont &
Brossard 1985). A similar process occurs in the social-
conventional domain when school-age children discuss
moral issues with peers. Compared to their discussions
with adults, which tend to be asymmetrical discussions
directed by adults, when interacting with peers children
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engage much more in symmetrical conversations that
feature reasoning used to analyze the other subject's
thinking and perspective, so-called transactive discus-
sions (Kruger & Tomasello 1986). There is also good
evidence that the transactive discussions typical of peer
conversations are essential to the development of school-
age moral reasoning skills (Kruger 1992).
It is important in establishing the distinct style of
intersubjectivity characteristic of collaborative learning
that in neither the conservation nor the moral reasoning
cases do subjects know the final solution ahead of time,
nor can they discover it, in most cases, on their own. The
learning is thus not a matter of imitative or instructed or
individual learning. In the case of conservation, for exam-
ple, children's explanations are typically not duplications
of those offered by their partners; they each construct
their own understanding of the task based on, but not
directly reflecting the content of, the collaboration. And
in the case of moral judgment, Kruger (1990) found that
the transactive discussion of solutions that are ultimately
rejected by dyads is more important to cognitive growth
than the discussion of accepted solutions (cf. Bearison et
al. 1986; Dimant & Bearison 1991; Forman & Kraker
1985). The coconstruction characteristic of collaborative
learning is thus in many cases the result of sociocognitive
conflict, which is manifestly neither imitative, instructed,
nor individual learning.4
The social-cognitive bases of collaborative learning are
manifest in children's changing conception of a person
that emerges at around 6 or 7 years of age. It is not until
this age that they become able to understand more
complex, second-order mental states,5 for example, the
fact that "Mary thinks that I think John is cute" (Perner
1988; 1991). This relies on the ability to simulate mental
agents embedded within one another reflexively, that is,
on the concept of persons as reflective agents. Collabora-
tive learning as we conceptualize it relies on precisely this
kind of thinking in which the partner's acts toward me and
mine toward the partner are simulated recursively at the
same time in an integrated fashion, not in alternating
dialogue as in instructed learning. In collaborative learn-
ing children must be able to criticize another child's
criticism of their previous suggestion if they are to engage
in a coconstruction process. Such recursive interaction is
also necessary if the perspective of both reflective agents
are to be synthesized into a single overarching cognitive
representation that includes the perspectives of both
participants. Although there are no studies that precisely
affix the age at which children are first able to engage in
collaborative learning, we do know that they can engage
in reflective and recursive dialogues and coconstruction
from at least 6 or 7 years of age (Kruger & Tomasello 1986;
Mugny & Doise 1978), around the same age when they
begin to use reflective and recursive language sponta-
neously. These two sets of skills emerge together, in our
analysis, because the social-cognitive foundation of col-
laborative learning is the child's ability to understand in
an integrated fashion the mental perspectives of two or
more reflective agents.
As with the other forms of cultural learning, we hypoth-
esize that in collaborative learning individual subjects
appropriate into their own cognition a representation of
those parts of the learning experience that require active
efforts at perspective-taking. Collaborative learning
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would seem to be special in this regard, however, because
virtually the whole of a collaborative-learning experience
involves, by definition, coconstructions in which both
participants make specific efforts at intersubjectivity. Re-
tention of the coconstruction from the original learning
situation, therefore, always involves to some degree re-
taining the partner's perspective. The resulting cognitive
representation thus involves an integration of all perspec-
tives from the collaborative interaction, none of which is
individually sufficient, into one intersubjective conceptu-
alization that meets all the task demands simultaneously
(and this may be accomplished in different ways). It is
important that this single conceptualization is in some
instances not used by the child at all during the original
learning interaction, but only in subsequent individual
performance. This is once again strong evidence that
internalization has taken place.
Note also that in addition to its role in the creation of
cultural novelties there are some interesting cases of
collaborative learning in which the conditions of cocon-
struction are so similar for the children within a culture
(and conceivably across cultures) that normal peer inter-
actions lead them to coconstruct very similar conceptual-
izations, and this in a way contributes to cultural "trans-
mission." It is thus possible, for example, as Piaget
argued, that Western moral concepts are coconstructed
by children with peers, but that given their similar start-
ing places as members of the same culture at the same
developmental period, most children construct roughly
the same concepts, and this may even persist to some
degree across generations. (It is just this inevitability of
outcome given certain initial conditions that many
teachers exploit as they encourage children to engage in
collaborative learning activities with peers.) In this way,
then, collaborative learning, in addition to its role in
facilitating the innovation of cultural novelties, may also
contribute to the maintenance of cultural traditions -
albeit in a different way than the other forms of cultural
learning.
2.4. Social-cognitive bases of cultural learning. We would
argue from this brief review that children's social-
cognitive and cultural learning abilities are intimately
related. The form of cultural learning that children are
capable of engaging in depends on the form of social
cognition they are capable of engaging in, quite simply
because when children are learning through another
person, how they conceive of that person is an integral
component of the basic learning process. And though it is
likely that the cultural learning experiences that depend
on the concept of person in this way comprise only a small
minority of all learning experiences in human ontogeny, it
is our contention that they are absolutely crucial for the
acquisition of many of the most important cultural skills,
including language and many of the basic skills in which
youngsters receive intentional instruction from adults.
In order to make our argument we have elaborated a
three-step ontogenetic sequence involving increasingly
adultlike concepts of person. Because this view does not
match precisely with any of the theoretical formulations
currently available in the literature on children's social-
cognitive development, we must say a word in its defense
by comparing it with them. First, although we have found
the classic "theory-of-mind" findings immensely useful
(e.g., Astington et al. 1988; Gopnik 1993; Whiten 1991),
we have not found it particularly useful to theorize in
those terms. This is mainly because the theory-of-mind
view does not have a strong developmental basis in
children's understanding of other persons as it changes
from infancy through childhood: The theoretical vocabu-
lary only allows for a transition from "no theory of mind" to
"theory of mind" at around age 4, with perhaps some
"precursors" prior to that (see, e.g., Meltzoff& Gopnik
1993; Wellman, in press). This view of development is
simply too restrictive for current purposes, placing alto-
gether too much emphasis on the transition at age 4. Nor
have we found particularly useful the closely related
metarepresentational view (e.g., Leslie 1987) in which
developmental changes in social cognition are attributed
to developmental changes in the computational power of
human cognition at age 4. In addition to the exclusive
focus on the single age change, there is also in this view a
serious neglect of the social dimension of the cognitive
processes involved.
Theories based on the child's simulation of the mental
states of others (e.g., Gordon 1986; Harris 1991) have the
advantage that different levels of simulation might be
described and related to development. Although this has
not been done in any systematic fashion, what we have
been referring to as perspective-taking could easily be
described as the simulation of the perspective of other
persons, who might be conceived of in different ways at
different developmental periods. We like this formula-
tion. The problem is that the simulation view is often
understood to mean that children must first understand
their own intentional states before they may use them to
simulate the perspective of others. This is clearly not the
case empirically - children do not understand their own
mental states before they understand the mental states of
others (Gopnik 1993) - and, in any case, our view is much
more consistent with the opposite, more Vygotskian view
that it is the understanding of other persons through
social interaction that underlies the understanding of the
self (Tomasello, in press). If the simulation view is under-
stood only to claim that children imagine what another
person is intending or thinking - and this imagining is not
necessarily analogous to children's experience with their
own mental states - then the simulation view is fully
compatible with our view of social-cognitive develop-
ment.
Even if the simulation view is compatible with our
needs in the current context, however, to be fully ade-
quate it would still need to be supplemented with an
account of the child's developing concept of person such
as the one we have offered here. Hobson (1987; in press)
has been responsible for arguing most forcefully that the
essence of human social-cognitive development consists
in the changing concept of person. He argues that it is
only by keeping this in focus that we can integrate find-
ings from the developmental literature, including all ages
from infancy through adolescence, with findings from
research on children with social-cognitive disabilities
such as autism. Using a variety of lines of evidence,
Hobson reveals many of the inadequacies and unneces-
sary complications of the theory-of-mind and metarepre-
sentational views. He does not have much to say, how-
ever, about precisely how the concept of person might
change during human ontogeny.
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We have thus been forced to explicate for ourselves the
different concepts of person with which children at differ-
ent developmental periods operate. What we have come
up with is intentional agent, mental agent, and reflective
agent. In each case, the key is the psychological construct
the child uses to understand and explain the behavior of
other persons: intentions, beliefs, and reflective beliefs,
respectively. In each case, there is independent evidence
of the same psychological construct at work in other
behaviors the child engages in at the same developmental
period. Thus, to engage in imitative learning the child
must understand the demonstrator in terms of his inten-
tions toward things (i.e., as an intentional agent) in order
to distinguish the relevant and irrelevant aspects of the
demonstrator's behavior. The same understanding would
also seem to underlie the child's early attempt to make
social reference, to engage in joint attention, and to
communicate intentionally with others. To engage in
instructed learning children must understand instructors
in terms of their thoughts and beliefs (i.e., as mental
agents, what other theorists call a "representational
theory of mind") in order to compare the beliefs of
instructors with their own. This same understanding
would also seem to underlie the child's ability to deal
successfully with the false-belief task, which, in our anal-
ysis, involves these same comparison processes. Finally,
to engage in collaborative learning the child must under-
stand the collaborator in terms of his reflective thoughts
and beliefs (i.e., as a reflective agent whose intentional
states may refer to the child's own intentional states) in
order to carry on the reflective dialogue necessary for true
collaboration, as well as to engage in the recursive
mental-state language also characteristic of this age.
Our summary of the proposed developmental se-
quence is presented in Table 1. The sequence is stagelike,
but it is only meant to apply within the social-cognitive
domain and any other domains that depend on basic
processes of social cognition. Thus, a social-cognitive
representation in terms of simple perspective-taking
would seem to be a necessary precondition for a represen-
tation in terms of alternating/coordinated perspectives,
which would seem to be a necessary precondition for a
representation in terms of integrated perspectives. To put
it another way, a reflective agent is a special type of mental
agent, who is a special type of intentional agent. The
developmental ordering depicted thus results in some
sense from the logical dependence of these concepts on
one another.
In addition to the developmental synchronies between
the different forms of cultural learning and their associ-
ated social-cognitive concepts of person (as just re-
viewed), there are two other important lines of evidence
for our claims. The first involves the social cognition and
social learning of children who do not engage in social-
cognitive activities in the normal human way, that is to
say, autistic children. The second involves our nearest
primate relative, the chimpanzee, who also engages in
social cognition and social learning in its own unique way.
We discuss these each in turn.
3. Autistic children
Further evidence regarding the developmental relation-
ship depicted in Table 1 is provided by cases in which
these abilities do not develop in the normal way. Most
apposite is the unfortunate case of autistic children. Al-
though persons diagnosed with childhood autism are a
diverse group, the common denominator among all who
share this diagnosis is problems in relating to other
persons (Schopler & Mesibov 1986). Autistic children
thus show little or no evidence of cultural learning; we
believe that this is due to the absence, or seriously
diminished quality, of human social cognition in this
population.
Beginning with the clearest case, it can be stated with
confidence that the vast majority of autistic children do
not engage in collaborative learning. Although we are
aware of no studies that specifically test for their collab-
orative learning abilities per se, one robust and recurrent
finding is that throughout their development autistic
children show significant deficits in their ability to inter-
act with and relate to peers (see Lord 1984, for a review);
we are not aware of any observations of autistic children
that demonstrate anything beyond very minimal behav-
ioral coordinations with peers. In our hypothesis, the lack
of collaborative learning occurs because autistic children
do not conceive of others as reflective agents. Evidence
that they do not do so is provided by their lack of reflective
mental-state language (Loveland 1991) and their inability
even to understand reflective mental-state language (Per-
ner 1991).
A similar conclusion may be reached in the case of
instructed learning. Autistic children are certainly capa-
ble of learning many things from adult instruction, but
there are no observations we are aware of that show any
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evidence of the internalization of this instruction in the
form of a dialogue between the self and the instructor. We
have seen no reports of self-regulatory speech in autistic
children (which is not the same thing as simply talking to
oneself, which they do) or any other forms of metacogni-
tion or self-monitoring. In fact, it is a general observation
that autistic children are not facile at following social rules
and, a fortiori, at using rules to regulate their own
behavior (Hermelin & O'Connor 1970). In terms of social
cognition, instructed learning relies on conceiving of
others as mental agents, as best diagnosed by perfor-
mance in the false-belief task; it is well known that autistic
children as a group do not perform well in this task,
indicating an atypical conception of others as mental
agents (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985).
Imitative learning presents a slightly more complex
case and may depend on the autistic child's level of
functioning. A basic finding is that autistic children have
much difficulty in reproducing any behavior that is novel
(Dawson & Adams 1984; Jones & Prior 1985; Stone et al.
1990).6 It is thus not surprising that roughly half of the
children diagnosed as autistic never learn to use language
at all, and few if any use language normally (Boucher
1976; Sigman & Ungerer 1984). In general, although their
echolalic (mimicking) tendencies are well known, autistic
children have great difficulty in imitating meaningful
symbolic behaviors in appropriate contexts (Hammes &
Langdell 1981), belying in many cases a superficial under-
standing of how people use language to achieve communi-
cative goals (Tager-Flusberg 1993). Thus, for example,
they use their language much less than do normal chil-
dren simply to show or indicate an object to another
person (Baron-Cohen 1991), and they show serious defi-
ciencies in providing adequate descriptions of situations
for naive interlocutors in novel situations (Loveland et al.
1990). Perhaps most telling of all are autistic children's
notorious difficulties with / and you (e.g., Loveland 1991),
which require a special adaptation of imitative learning.
Consistent with their difficulties with imitative learn-
ing, autistic children also have significant problems with
joint attention and perspective-taking. They show a num-
ber of deficits in the ability to jointly attend to objects
with others (Loveland & Landry 1986), and they engage
very little in symbolic or pretend play, which in many
cases involves adopting the role of another (Wulff 1985).
Some high-functioning autistic children can follow the
gaze of another (Hobson 1984), indicating some degree
of perceptual role-taking in this subgroup, but lower-
functioning autistic children are very poor in accom-
modating to another's perceptual perspective (Loveland
et al. 1991). Langdell's overall conclusion (cited in Baron-
Cohen 1988) is that autistic children as a group have
"difficulty in taking another person's point of view."
The most significant finding relevant to the current
hypothesis is that individual differences in joint atten-
tional abilities of autistic children are systematically re-
lated to their ability to learn new linguistic symbols, in the
same way that these two abilities are related in normal
children. Two independent teams of investigators have
found that autistic children who showed greater abilities
in joint attention with an adult have more advanced
language skills (Loveland & Landry 1986; Mundy et al.
1990). It has also been observed that autistic children who
are better at perspective-taking display more pragmat-
ically appropriate social skills of all types, including lan-
guage (Dawson & Fernald 1987). Because autistic chil-
dren differ from one another so greatly in their various
abilities and disabilities, these very specific correlations
would seem to indicate quite strongly that the imitative
learning of a particular autistic child is in large measure a
function of his ability to take the perspective of the person
from whom he is learning.
The deficits in the social-cognitive and cultural learning
capacities of autistic children are thus intimately related.
Autistic children have deficits in the way they conceive of
other persons; as a consequence they do not learn from or
through them normally. Most autistic children do not
simulate mental or reflective agents, and thus do not
engage in instructed and collaborative learning at all.
Autistic children vary in their ability to take the simple
perspective of intentional agents and in their ability to
imitatively learn from others. These findings are consis-
tent with Loveland's (1991) overall characterization that
most autistic children are basically acultural, reflecting a
general deficit in the ability to acquire culturally conven-
tional human behaviors.
4. Chimpanzees
A third line of evidence concerning the relation between
social cognition and social learning is provided by our
nearest primate relatives. The case of chimpanzees has
some similarities to that of autistic children in that neither
has certain social-cognitive and cultural learning abilities
that normal human children have, and these seem to be
selectively present or absent in general conformity with
our developmental account. The case of chimpanzees
presents an interesting twist, however, because chim-
panzees that have been enculturated by human beings in
various ways (including exposure to humanlike systems of
communication) seem to have more humanlike social-
cognitive and cultural learning abilities.
To begin again with the most clearcut case, it may be
said with confidence that chimpanzees do not engage in
collaborative learning. Chimpanzee youngsters may
learn to pull together on a rope to obtain out-of-reach
objects too heavy to be pulled in by either alone (Nissen &
Crawford 1936; Yerkes 1943), and chimpanzees in a group
often take on different roles when hunting and chasing
colobus monkeys (Boesch & Boesch 1989). But neither of
these is a case of true collaboration if what we mean by this
term is a kind of coordination among animals in which
each is aware of the role being played by the other(s). In
the two reported cases, it does not seem to be the case
that one animal ever monitors the efforts of another and
gauges its own behavior accordingly, simultaneously as-
sessing the effects of that behavior on the problem-
situation of the other. The most plausible interpretation
in both these cases is that each participant has determined
what to do in the situation to increase its own chances of
success in obtaining the object or capturing the prey,
without specific regard for the other and its behavior. In
any event, even if these are cases of true collaboration,
there is certainly no hint in either case of collaborative
learning in which two individuals coconstruct something
new.7
Nor do we see clear cases of collaborative learning by
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chimpanzees who have been enculturated by humans.
Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1978) report that their subjects
were able to collaborate in solving a complex task requir-
ing different roles for each performer (one had to decide
what tool was needed and communicate this to the other,
who had to retrieve the designated tool). But what is
important for current purposes is that before engaging in
this task both subjects were first trained by humans in
each of the two collaborative roles; the test was simply to
see whether they could play the roles with each other.
Thus, all of the task learning occurred as a result of human
training, not as a result of chimpanzee collaboration.
Neither wild nor enculturated chimpanzees learn col-
laboratively from other chimpanzees or humans, in our
hypothesis, because they do not conceive of others as
reflective agents - they do not mentally simulate the
perspective of another person or chimpanzee mentally
simulating their perspective. The problem, of course, is
that this reflective ability is made manifest in human
children mostly through linguistic formulations such as
"She thinks that I think that . . ." It is therefore not clear
what a nonenculturated, nonlinguistic chimpanzee could
do to demonstrate such an ability, nor is it clear that
enculturated chimpanzees have been given the linguistic
tools or communicative opportunities to construct such
linguistic expressions. Nevertheless, at this point in time
there is no known evidence that chimpanzees, whatever
their background and training, are capable of thinking of
other interactants reflectively, or hence of collaborative
learning.
With regard to instructed learning, it may be said quite
simply that in their natural habitats chimpanzees do not
actively instruct their young. The most one can say is that
they prevent them from doing certain things, and, in
some cases, they behave in ways that serve to facilitate
certain juvenile behaviors. For example, Nishida et al.
(1983) observed chimpanzee mothers taking poisonous
foods away from their youngsters; Goodall (1986) ob-
served that when mothers walk away from youngsters
they often turn and wait for them, which seems to encour-
age attempts at independent locomotion; and Boesch
(1991) recently observed two instances of mothers in the
wild seeming to slow down their tool use when infants
were watching. It does not seem in any of these cases,
however, that the adult is intentionally attempting to
instruct the young, as they do not persist in their behav-
iors until the youngster has reached a critical level of
performance (cf. also Bard & Vauclair 1984).
Nor does there seem to be much (if any) intentional
teaching among enculturated chimpanzees (Savage-
Rumbaugh, personal communication). The one reported
case of a chimpanzee who uses sign language to "teach"
signs to its offspring (Fouts et al. 1989) is based on only a
few anecdotal and potentially ambiguous observations of
one adult chimpanzee. Regardless of the interpretation of
these "teaching" behaviors, however, there is certainly no
evidence in any of these cases that young chimpanzees are
internalizing anything social or intersubjective from these
interactions. Although there is no question that they can
learn many things from human instruction, as can other
animals, we are aware of no reports of self-regulating
language in chimpanzees, or any other forms of cognitive
self-monitoring that would suggest they have internalized
the instructions of another chimpanzee or human. The
Tomasello et al.: Cultural learning
only hints of this are in the well-known films of Washoe
practicing her signs in a room by herself. It does not
appear in any of the filmed cases, however, that she is
using these signs to direct her own attention or behavior.8
Chimpanzees cannot internalize instruction and use it
to regulate their own behavior, in our view, because they
cannot conceive of others as mental agents having
thoughts and beliefs that may be contrasted with their
own. The most compelling evidence against this view is
the observation of chimpanzees deceiving both con-
specifics and their human caregivers (de Waal 1986;
Woodruff & Premack 1979). [See also Whiten & Byrne:
"Tactical Deception in Primates" BBS 11(2) 1988.] The
interpretation of these observations is far from straightfor-
ward, however, as what are called deceptive behaviors
may simply be behaviors learned associatively in specific
circumstances as a way of bringing about or avoiding
particular reactions from others (e.g., a fear grimace has
in the past evoked aggression from others, and its hiding,
discovered fortuitously, has deflected aggression from
others). In either case, however, we would argue, as we
have argued in the case of human children, that deceptive
behaviors do not by themselves reflect social-cognitive
abilities sufficient to support instructed learning; only a
more stringent test such as the false-belief task provides
such support. The closest approximation to such a test was
conducted by Povinelli et al. (1990), who found that their
human-reared chimpanzees were able to discriminate,
after training, between a person who had acquired infor-
mation about a food's location by watching its being
hidden, from a person who had no such information
because he was out of the room or had a bag on his head.
Successful performance in this task, however, is not
comparable with successful performance in the false-
belief task: subjects in this task are not required to
alternate between and compare two discrepant beliefs
about the same situation. They are merely required to
learn the cue (and huge amounts of training were re-
quired) as to which human is most reliably associated with
the food. Until they can alternate and coordinate mental
perspectives on the same situation, they will not be able
to engage in self-regulated (i.e., instructed) learning.
The imitative learning of chimpanzees presents a com-
plex and very interesting picture, and one that requires us
to differentiate sharply between wild chimpanzees in
species-typical environments and their human-reared
and enculturated conspecifics. First with regard to wild
chimpanzees, a number of behaviors in their natural
habitats suggest the possibility of imitative learning
(Goodall 1986). None of these survives close scrutiny,
however, as other explanations based on individual learn-
ing and stimulus enhancement are possible in every case
(Galef 1988; Tomasello 1990). Moreover, studies in more
controlled environments have produced uniformly nega-
tive results. With respect to object-directed actions,
Tomasello et al. (1987) and Nagell et al. (in press) found
that nonenculturated chimpanzees did not learn tool-use
behaviors by imitation. In both these studies chimpanzee
subjects did benefit from observing a demonstration of
tool use, but they did not learn the precise methods used
by the demonstrator that would clearly show imitative
learning; in both studies the chimpanzees used the tool in
the same way regardless of the type of demonstration they
observed. Human children also participated in the more
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recent of these two studies and did learn the methods of
the demonstrator, as evidenced by the different methods
they learned to use in the two different modeling condi-
tions. In both studies, the chimpanzees simply were
learning that the goal could be obtained with the tool -
they were emulating - whereas the human children were
learning something about the demonstrator's strategies in
using the tool - they were imitating.
Other observations of less complex behaviors suggest a
more optimistic appraisal of the imitative learning of
nonenculturated chimpanzees. For example, de Waal
(1982) reported instances of youngsters walking like an
injured groupmate; there are also some communicative
gestures that suggest the possibility of imitative learning
(McGrew & Tutin 1978; Nishida 1980). The most serious
problem for current purposes is that these are all natu-
ralistic observations in which it is impossible to tell
whether two animals behave similarly for reasons other
than imitative learning, for example, they experienced
similar environmental learning conditions in the past. It is
also impossible to tell whether the behavior involved is a
novel one for the learner or an already known one that is
simply evoked by the sight of its performance by another
animal (and thus not imitative learning). Moreover,
Tomasello et al. (1989; 1992) found that most, if not all, the
intentional gestures of chimpanzees are learned through
the individual learning process of conventionalization,
involving the "shaping" of gestures through repeated
interactions with others; few, perhaps none, are learned
through the imitation ofconspecifics (cf. also Tomasello et
al. 1985). Finally, it is telling that almost every one of the
anecdotal observations judged to be a case of true imita-
tion by Whiten and Ham (1992) concerns chimpanzees
enculturated in various ways by human beings. Gur
overall conclusion, therefore, is that in general imitative
learning is not a social learning process that chimpanzees
engage in with regularity in their species-typical en-
vironments.9
The case of imitative learning in enculturated chim-
panzees provides a very interesting contrast. There are
two experimental studies of the imitative abilities of
enculturated chimpanzees (cf. also the anecdotes summa-
rized in Whiten & Ham 1992). Hayes and Hayes (1952)
showed their enculturated chimpanzee Viki and a nonen-
culturated chimpanzee Frans behaviors that they knew to
be novel for them. Although the control conditions re-
quired to rule out other forms of social learning were
somewhat weak in this study, the Hayeses concluded that
Viki's behavior indicated the imitative learning of various
object-directed actions, whereas Frans's behavior did
not.Tomasello et al. (in press) performed a similar experi-
ment with not only enculturated chimpanzees and nonen-
culturated chimpanzees but human children as well. In
this study, novelty of behavior (and thus learning) was
insured both by a priori judgments (some very unusual
activities were demonstrated) and by the fact that each
action was paired with a control action with the same
object; there was also a baseline free play period with each
object. The coding of subject behavior (only actions not
produced in the free play or control conditions were
counted) indicated whether subjects reproduced the re-
sults of the action and whether they reproduced the
demonstrator's means of execution. Overall, it was found
that the enculturated chimpanzees were as successful as
2-year-old children - and much more successful than
nonenculturated chimpanzees, who were successful very
infrequently - in reproducing both the ends and means of
experimental demonstrations of novel object-directed be-
haviors. Moreover, these chimpanzees had received no
specific training directed at imitative learning earlier in
their lives; they had just been brought up in humanlike
environments with a great deal of social and linguistic
interaction around objects (which did, of course, include
some social encouragement and reinforcements for doing
things that were modeled for them). It is also important
that the pygmy chimpanzee Kanzi (and at least one
common chimpanzee since) has acquired humanlike sym-
bols through observation, with little direct training of any
kind, suggesting skills of imitative learning in this domain
as well (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1986).
To be consistent with our hypothesis, the perspective-
taking skills of enculturated and nonenculturated chim-
panzees should show distinct differences. The problem is
that there is very little solid research. With regard to
nonenculturated chimpanzees in species-typical environ-
ments, it should first be noted that wild chimpanzees
perform a number of behaviors suggestive of an ability to
take the simple perspective of others, for example, they
routinely use the gaze direction of others to discover
interesting things in the environment (de Waal 1982;
Menzel 1971). As in cases of deception, however, simpler
explanations are possible, that is, the gaze direction of
others may be used as a simple associative cue; individ-
uals have learned that looking in the direction in which
another is looking is often rewarding. However, following
the gaze direction of others is manifestly not sufficient to
support imitative learning - to learn from another imi-
tatively the learner must take the perspective of the other
as an intentional agent with perceptions and intentions,
not just use the other's gaze direction as a cue. It should
also be noted that chimpanzees' use of gaze following is
extremely limited as compared with its use by human
infants (Bard & Vauclair 1984). (Preliminary results from a
more systematic ongoing investigation corroborate this
result; MT and collaborators.)
Chimpanzees enculturated by human beings seem to
show more sophisticated skills of perspective-taking. This
is documented daily by Kanzi and other enculturated
chimpanzees as they routinely anticipate the goals and
intentions of their human caregivers (personal observa-
tions - MT; cf. also reports on the joint attentional skills of
enculturated gorillas by Gomez 1991). In line with this,
and in a more experimental vein, Premack and Woodruff
(1978) found that their enculturated chimpanzee Sarah
was able to choose correct solutions to the videotaped
predicaments of other human beings which required her,
in their analysis, to take the human's point of view.
Although there may be disagreement about what was
required of chimpanzees in this task, it would certainly
seem that more than simple gaze following was required.
Once again, preliminary results currently in progress
(MT and collaborators) from a direct comparison of the
joint attentional abilities of enculturated and nonencultu-
rated chimpanzees suggest that the joint attentional abili-
ties of enculturated chimpanzees far outstrip those of
their nonenculturated counterparts.
There are very difficult methodological issues embed-
ded in all of this, and we must be careful not to use a
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double standard, one with humans and another with
chimpanzees. However, using a common set of standards
we believe that enculturated chimpanzees meet the main
criteria used with human children in demonstrating
simple perspective-taking skills, relying on the conceptu-
alization of others as intentional agents, but that nonen-
culturated chimpanzees do not. As a result of these
different social-cognitive abilities, the two types of chim-
panzees show very different skills of imitative learning,
with enculturated chimpanzees showing much greater
skill in simulating the intentional states of others. This
difference may be attributed, in our interpretation, to the
fact that enculturated chimpanzees have been subjected
to what Vygotsky calls the "socialization of attention":
They have been raised in an environment in which joint
attention to objects is a regular and important part of their
social lives with their human caregivers. This has led
them to develop more fully their latent capacities for
engaging in joint attention and for taking the perspective
of intentional agents. Their abilities of imitative learning
are thus nothing more than the expression of their normal
abilities of individual learning (which are presumably the
same as those of their nonenculturated conspecifics) in
combination with the skills of social cognition that have
developed as a result of their human enculturation. The
difference between chimpanzees raised in species-typical
and humanlike environments thus provides another line
of evidence for the correlation we are postulating: When
chimpanzees are raised in ways that enhance their social-
cognitive abilities, their imitative learning abilities are
enhanced as a result.
Although we cannot review all of the evidence here, it
is also important to note in this context that the correla-
tion we have hypothesized between specific social-
cognitive and cultural learning abilities holds up quite
well when the behavior of our more distant primate
relatives is examined. A variety of monkey species have
shown something less than human or even chimpanzee
abilities in terms of both social cognition (Cheney &
Seyfarth 1990 [see also multiple book review, BBS 15(1)
1992]) and cultural, specifically imitative, learning (Vis-
alberghi & Fragaszy 1990).10
5. Cultural learning and human culture
No one piece of evidence we have adduced is decisive.
The synchronies between social-cognitive and cultural
learning abilities in human ontogeny may be explained in
more than one way, and the precise ages of emergence are
not available for all key behaviors. The correlated impair-
ment of social-cognitive and cultural learning abilities in
autistic children may be explained in a number of ways as
well, and once again the data are not as complete as we
might like. The differences in the behavior of encultu-
rated and nonenculturated chimpanzees clearly have
multiple potential explanations, with more data on the
social-cognitive abilities of chimpanzees of both types
sorely needed, but we believe that together these three
lines of evidence are telling. Children acquire a particular
cultural learning skill at around the same time they are
showing evidence of the logically related social-cognitive
skill; when a form of cultural learning is missing in a child
or other animal the corresponding form of social cognition
is typically missing as well; and when the social-cognitive
skills of chimpanzees are purposely enhanced in early
ontogeny, new cultural learning skills become evident as a
result.
With this argument in mind, we return to our original
observation: Many animal species live in complex social
groups, but only humans live in cultures. We must ac-
knowledge at this point, however, that not everyone
agrees with this claim when it is stated so baldly. A
number of primate researchers, in particular, systemat-
ically downplay the differences between human social
organization and the social organization of other species,
using the terms "culture" and "cultural transmission" for a
wide variety of primate behaviors (e.g., Goodall 1986;
McGrew 1992; Nishida 1987). It is in fact widely believed
in the scientific community that a number of primate
species have "cultural traditions" that are, in all important
respects, like human cultural traditions. In the best-
known case, for example, a Japanese macaque invented a
potato-washing behavior and then others in the group
followed suit, with her close acquaintances acquiring the
behavior first (Kawamura 1959). Similar observations have
been made of a number of chimpanzee behaviors, for
example, the termite fishing of the Kasakela group in the
Gombe National Park (Goodall 1986).
In both of these cases the behaviors are learned,
population-specific traditions, in the sense that they per-
sist across generations in the population. But they are not,
we would claim, cultural - at least not in the human sense
of that term. They are not cultural in our view because
they lack three essential characteristics. First, all human
cultures have some cultural traditions that are learned by
virtually all group members; any child who did not learn
them would simply not be considered a normal member
of the group. This is true of such things as language and
religious rituals in many cultures, as well as more mun-
dane subsistence behaviors having to do with food, dress,
and the like. In the case of potato washing by monkeys or
termite fishing by chimpanzees, on the other hand, there
are many group members who never engage in the
practice. In a period of over four years, barely half of the
Japanese macaques learned to wash potatoes, and al-
though no systematic data on the termite fishing of indi-
vidual chimpanzees have been published, Goodall (1986)
reports her general impression that not all group mem-
bers participate. To our knowledge, there is not a single
case of a primate behavioral tradition that is practiced by
all group members (e.g., the chimpanzee grooming hand-
clasp reported by McGrew & Tutin [1978] was practiced
by 9 of 17 adults/adolescents observed - 9 of 27 group
members when juveniles are included); in fact, in a recent
survey of the behavioral innovations of primates, two
prominent researchers concluded that across many pri-
mate species including chimpanzees: "Of the many [inno-
vative] behaviors observed, only a few will be passed on to
other individuals, and seldom will they spread through
the whole troop" (Kummer & Goodall 1985, p. 213).
Second, the methods used by human children in ac-
quiring cultural skills are highly similar to the methods
used by adults. Children tend to accomplish concrete
tasks in the way they have been shown, in using a hoe or
weaving cloth, for example, with perhaps some individual
idiosyncrasies. In the case of social-conventional behav-
iors such as linguistic symbols or religious rituals, individ-
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1993) 16:3 507
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00031277
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:48:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Tomasello et al.: Cultural learning
ual discovery and idiosyncratic use are not viable options
- these behaviors would not be functional unless the
methods of the mature users were reproduced rather
faithfully. Systematic observations on the similarity of
potato-washing and termite-fishing techniques among
individuals in the two primate groups are unfortunately
not available, but many keen observers have noted that
individual chimpanzees often use their own idiosyncratic
techniques in all kinds of "cultural" behaviors from ter-
mite fishing (Goodall 1986), to nut cracking (Hannah &
McGrew 1987), to grooming hand-clasp (McGrew & Tutin
1978), to communicative gesturing (Tomasello etal. 1989;
1992). Experimental results corroborate these observa-
tions (Nagell et al., in press).
The third unique characteristic of human cultural tradi-
tions derives from the second and is perhaps most telling.
Human cultural traditions often show an accumulation of
modifications over generations (i.e., the ratchet effect).
Thus, for example, the history of hammerlike tools shows
a gradual increase in complexity over time in human
prehistory; the evolution of modern hammers in Western
culture up to and including steam-driven pile drivers
shows a similar increase in complexity over time (Basalla
1988). Although an increase in complexity is perhaps not
the best way to characterize the history of human lan-
guages in the modern era, languages have presumably
also become more complex during human phylogeny; and
it is certainly true that in modern times they remain
capable of substantial modification in only a few genera-
tions to meet the changing communicative needs of their
speakers (Bates & MacWhinney 1979). The point is that
although cultural traditions are generally passed on rather
faithfully from one generation to the next, if a modifica-
tion is made it is the modified version that is passed on to
the next generation, just as faithfully as the original was
passed on in earlier generations. The result is that human
children are born into a world in which most of the tasks
they are expected to master are collaborative inventions -
either explicitly so because they were created by contem-
poraries who engaged in collaborative learning, or in the
derived sense that many individuals over time have con-
tributed to the current form of an artifact, convention, or
skill. Other species of animal, including our nearest
primate relatives, do not have behavioral traditions show-
ing the ratchet effect, quite simply because they do not
learn collaboratively in either of these two senses, thus
precluding the possibility of humanlike cultural traditions
that have "histories."11
These large differences in human and primate behav-
ioral traditions may plausibly be attributed to differences
in the social learning process. Thus, it is likely for a
number of reasons that Japanese macaques do not learn to
wash potatoes through imitative learning; rather, they
learn to do so individually, as the original inventor did,
after following a conspecific into the water while holding
potatoes or while reaching for potatoes that are underwa-
ter (see Galef 1990, for more details of this analysis).
Similarly, it is likely that chimpanzees learn to fish for
termites individually by following their mothers to the
termite mound where they are exposed to propitious
learning conditions (e.g., a stick on the ground, termites
crawling on the stick, holes to poke the stick into, etc.)
along with the attention-enhancing effects of their
mother's behaviors directed at the mound (see Tomasello
1990, for more details of this analysis). These interpreta-
tions are supported by the generally negative findings of
laboratory studies of imitative learning in monkeys
(Whiten & Ham 1992) and chimpanzees (Tomasello et al.
1987; Nagell etal., in press). Although nonimitative social
learning processes may be perfectly effective for these
species in these contexts, what it means for cultural
learning is that there will be very little sharing of tech-
niques among individuals and thus very little cultural
transmission, strictly defined. Nonhuman animals main-
tain their behavioral traditions with social learning pro-
cesses that are different from those used by human
beings.
We thus answer Galef's (1992) question as to whether
the behavioral traditions of nonhuman primates are actu-
ally homologous with human cultural traditions in the
negative. We believe they are only analogous, with differ-
ent evolutionary origins, not only because human and
nonhuman primate behavioral traditions differ in the
three general organizational characteristics outlined
above, but also because they are maintained by different
proximate mechanisms of social learning. It is our view, in
agreement with Galef (1992), that cultural traditions of
the human kind evolved only some time after humans and
other apes began their distinctive phylogenetic histories.
We should also record at this point our skepticism that
chimpanzees who have been raised within a human cul-
ture, if suddenly placed in a single group and left to their
own devices, could or would create cultural traditions of
the human kind. The problem is that their cultural learn-
ing skills are confined to imitative learning, and imitative
learning by itself can accomplish only so much. The
acquisition of many humanlike cultural skills necessarily
involves extended pedagogical encounters in which the
learner is instructed and internalizes the instruction, or,
at the very least, it involves interactions in which the adult
scaffolds the child's individual learning. This is true even
of some skills that are acquired primarily through imita-
tive learning - in many cases experts intentionally dem-
onstrate behaviors for novices to imitate within an ex-
tended instructional interaction, sometimes in modified
form or speed intended to assist the learner. Even in cases
such as language acquisition, in which intentional teach-
ing would seem to play a minor role, adults nevertheless
speak to children in simplified ways that make the child's
task of acquiring linguistic skills a more manageable
one. It is therefore likely, in our view, that imitative
learning by itself- without assistance from mature mem-
bers of the culture who desire to instruct and learners
capable of internalizing those instructions - could only
lead to cultural traditions of some limited kind in some
limited situations, and that in many cases they would not
be stable over time because of the unreliability of encoun-
ters between learners and practitioners for many cultural
tasks (cf. Bullock 1987). Thus adults' desire and skill to
teach - an aspect of the cultural learning process that we
have not highlighted here - is clearly an essential ingre-
dient in the human evolutionary scenario; and the ability
to teach depends, as we have argued previously, on an
understanding of others as mental agents. Chimpanzees,
even those who have been raised in humanlike cultural
environments, do not, in our view, understand others in
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this way. This means that they can neither teach nor
internalize the instructions of others, not to mention
learning from one another collaboratively.
Like many behavioral biologists, we believe that the
primary evolutionary context in which primate cognition
evolved was a social one and that most of the unique
features of primate cognition are therefore adaptations to
social problems such as communication, cooperation,
competition, deception, and social learning (see the pa-
pers in, e.g., Byrne & Whiten 1988 and Whiten 1991; see
also Whiten & Byrne "Tactical Deception in Primates"
BBS 11(2) 1988). Primates are social strategists without
equal in the animal kingdom. Our contention is simply
that in this context human beings evolved species-specific
social-cognitive abilities to understand the psychological
states of conspecifics in terms of their perceptions and
intentions, their thoughts and beliefs, and their reflective
thoughts and beliefs, which allowed them to take the
perspective of others and to participate with them inter-
subjectively. These processes of social cognition then led
humans to the species-specific ways of learning from one
another that we call cultural learning, which then kicked
off the evolutionary and historical processes that led to the
species-specific form of social organization known as hu-
man cultures.
6. Conclusion
Following the overall proposals of Tooby and Cosmides
(1989), our goal has been to investigate the psychological
mechanisms that underlie human cultures (cf. also Hinde
1987). We have focused on the processes of social cogni-
tion and social learning that make human cultures possi-
ble. To do this we have drawn not only on recent work in
cultural psychology, which is based explicitly on the
premise that human cognition is social and cultural to its
core, but we have also drawn on recent work in the
behavioral biology of primates, which is coming increas-
ingly to recognize the decisive role played by processes of
social cognition and social learning in the evolution of
primate intelligence in general. It is also true, however,
that many of the unique cognitive abilities of humans do
not seem to have social foundations at all. Although it is of
course possible that this is the case, and that human
cognition is a complex admixture of social and nonsocial
components, given the current working hypotheses of
cultural psychology and the behavioral biology of pri-
mates it would be that much more exciting if it were found
that many seemingly nonsocial human achievements
have, in one way or another, social or cultural bases, as
Vygotsky argued many years ago.
One relevant observation is that in many domains of
human cognition we see systems, for example, the various
systems of mathematics and the various grammars of
human languages that have been created by human cul-
tures. In the theory of Piaget (1985), and even more
clearly in the theory of Karmiloff-Smith (1986), these
systems are made possible by the fact that human beings
have the seemingly unique capacity to treat their own
behavior and cognition as "objects of contemplation" in
their own right, a process Piaget calls reflective abstrac-
tion. Karmiloff-Smith has presented a very convincing
theory of the dialectic of action and reflection in human
ontogeny and has shown in a quite detailed manner how
this process forms the basis for the human system-making
ability in many diverse cognitive domains: The child
behaves, and then observes and "redescribes" at a
"higher" level his behavior and the cognitive organization
it makes manifest. Systems of thought emerge from this
reflective activity because self-observation uses all of the
categorization and analytic skills that are used in perceiv-
ing, understanding, and categorizing the outside world.
The result is thus the construction of more efficient and
abstract cognitive systems as ontogeny proceeds.
We believe that this reflective process may be seen as
another manifestation of the processes of social cognition
and cultural learning we have been describing; it is
cultural learning turned on the self. Thus, in some cases
in which I am simulating the point of view of another
person, that person is focused on me. I may attempt to
learn through this simulation in the same way I attempt to
learn through other simulations, and indeed this may be
the major way in which I come to construct a concept of
myself as an object in the world (Mead 1934; Tomasello, in
press). In combination with human capacities for pretense
and representation, however, I might also simulate the
point of view of a "virtual other" looking at my behavior or
cognition. In this case, I am not simulating a real perspec-
tive of another person, but simply "looking back" at some
behavior just produced or at some cognitive organization
already constructed as ifl were another person looking at
it. Thus, as Piaget has argued, basic mathematical con-
cepts are most probably derived from subjects' reflections
on their own actions on objects, such things as placing
objects in groups based on perceptual or functional char-
acteristics, ordering them in terms of some physical
characteristic, or mapping them onto culturally provided
counting systems. Tomasello (1992a) has argued similarly
that children construct their early grammars as they
reflect on their productive use of individual linguistic
symbols, especially those with inherently relational con-
tent (e.g., verbs) that can serve as raw material for the
construction of the basic grammatical categories that
underlie the productivity of language as a communicative
system.
Our speculation is thus that the evolutionary adapta-
tions aimed at the ability of human beings to coordinate
their social behavior with one another might also underlie
the ability of human beings to reflect on their own behav-
ior (cf. Humphrey 1983); the human system-making abil-
ity is, in Gould's (1982) terms, an "exaptation" from
human social-cognitive abilities. And there may even be
further cognitive manifestations of these basic social-
cognitive processes. For example, the ability to consider
simultaneously more than one perspective on a situation
or object is a key human ability in many school-age skills
such as conservation, seriation, and hierarchical classifi-
cation. Perret-Clermont and Brossard (1985) have specu-
lated that the crucial ability in these skills, at least in some
derivative sense, may be social as well, in the sense that
the children are taking multiple perspectives on things as
if they were different people looking at them from differ-
ent vantage points. This ability too, then, may be an
exaptation of a social-cognitive process for more strictly
cognitive purposes.
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1993) 16:3 509
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00031277
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:48:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Tomasello et al.: Cultural learning
The overall point is that what are manifestly not social
or social-cognitive domains of human intellect or activity
may still be seen as emanating from a process that, in
some sense at least, has its origins in social and social-
cognitive adaptations. Human perception works very
much like the perception of other primates, and in many
ways the most basic processes of human categorization do
as well (Oden et al. 1990). Where humans display their
unique and most powerful cognitive abilities is in learning
from others, in taking multiple perspectives on a situa-
tion, or in building cognitive systems based on self-
reflection, and all of these rely, ex hypothesis, on the
fundamentally social-cognitive process of taking the per-
spective of other persons and learning from that
perspective-taking. This conjecture may thus be viewed
as a kind of biological extension of Vygotsky's original
hypothesis of the social origin of all of the "higher" human
psychological functions. Whereas Vygotsky focused on
the important role of the tools provided by the culture in
the development of many human skills, we are focusing
on the fact that individuals bring to ontogeny very pow-
erful social-cognitive capacities that allow them not
only to acquire those skills, but also to take multiple
perspectives on things, including their own behavior and
cognition.
We conclude, therefore, with a plea for more attention
to the social and cultural dimensions of human cognition
and learning. In the field of developmental psychology
this is mostly preaching to the converted, as life after
Piaget reflects a growing consensus that the social-
cultural dimensions of human cognition cannot be ig-
nored. But, with a few exceptions (e.g., Neisser 1991),
most of the nondevelopmental theories of human cogni-
tive psychology do not explicitly recognize social cogni-
tion in any but the most trivial ways. It is our view,
however, that theories ignoring social cognition and fo-
cusing solely on "information processing" will never be
able to account for the truly unique characteristics of
human cognition and cognitive development, including
the acquisition of language (Tomasello 1992b). It is to be
hoped that a corrective force will soon be supplied by the
emerging paradigm of cultural psychology. The theoret-
ical accounts in this new approach have so far been very
general, however, and have mostly focused on the defi-
ciencies of accounts that ignore the contributions of cul-
ture and social context. Our attempt in this target article
has been to give a more positive and specific account
emphasizing the kinds of learning that are involved in the
ontogenetic processes whereby individual human beings
become members of cultures. We have thus focused more
on the psychological side of the paradigm and less on the
cultural side. It is noteworthy that our attempt is also
relevant in the broader context of the behavioral biology
of primates. We hope we are contributing to a Zeitgeist.
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NOTES
1. All of these terms carry theoretical baggage, but we should
make clear that by perspective-taking we do not mean to refer
specifically to the spatial perspective-taking of the Piagetian
three-mountains task or to the conceptual perspective-taking of
referential communication tasks, but more broadly to all the
attempts of one person to understand or perceive a situation in
the way that another person understands or perceives it. By
intersubjectivity we mean the situation in which this takes place
in both directions - but without the implication of Trevarthen
(1979) that this occurs any time after birth that two human
beings look at one another.
2. As Vygotsky has pointed out, if a mimicked behavior is
responded to in certain ways by others it may acquire the
function of the behavior originally observed. This would consti-
tute a different route to the acquisition of a cultural skill:
mimicking plus individual learning (see Pepperberg 1990 for an
account of this type of learning).
3. Another way of viewing what is happening here is to say
that the child is imitatively learning the instructor's instructions,
and the use of those instructions at a later time is simply a case of
deferred imitation. We would not quarrel with this interpreta-
tion, but would merely point out that what is special here is that
the child must not only direct those instructions to himself, but
he must also compare the perspective embodied in those in-
structions with his own perspective on the situation on a
moment-by-moment basis as his engagement with the task
proceeds. This requires social-cognitive skills beyond mere
imitative learning.
4. Several theorists have speculated that certain cultural
tasks are best acquired through instruction and others through
collaboration (e.g., Damon 1984; Rogoff 1990). The key factor
seems to be whether the task is a straightforward "skill," for
which instruction seems best suited, or a task that requires a
shift of perspective, in which case collaborative interaction
seems most effective. This is an issue that needs further re-
search, however.
5. We do not wish to embroil ourselves in the controversy
over what should be considered a representation versus a
metarepresentation or, what comes to the same thing, what
"order" are the various types of social cognition. We would
simply like to adopt the more conservative views of Perner
(1988) in which first-order intentional states do not begin until
the child attributes a mental state to another person; second
order is thus the attribution to others of first-order mental states
that happen to concern other mental states.
6. The use of modeling as a training technique for autistic
children has enjoyed some success (e.g., Charlop et al. 1983),
but the tasks used in these studies are in all cases very simple
ones in which the child merely reproduces a known behavior.
7. A careful reading of the primary sources reveals that this
same analysis also applies to the well-known example of the
group hunting of wolves (Murie 1942).
8. The most impressive pedagogical performance of animals
in their natural habitats is that of various cat species who bring to
their offspring half-dead prey for them to chase and kill; this
does seem to be intentional instruction in some form because
mothers persist in this behavior until their youngster has ac-
quired the target skill (Caro 1980). It is unclear in such cases of
nonverbal instruction, however, what the learner takes away
from the learning situation. See Caro and Hauser (1991) for a
more generous interpretation of animal teaching.
9. It is interesting to note that the most convincing cases of
chimpanzee imitation in the wild all involve behaviors not used
in an instrumental way. Mimicking thus remains a very real
possibility in all these cases - and mimicking may be based on
much simpler learning mechanisms than imitative learning of
behaviors directed toward some outside goal.
10. We clearly recognize the anthropocentric bias in all of
this. Cultural learning and its three subtypes were taken di-
rectly from an analysis of human ontogeny; there are undoubt-
edly other social and cognitive skills nonhuman primates have
that humans do not. All we can say is that the bias results from
our primary interest with human beings in this target article. We
are using other primates for comparison in order to understand
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the human case more clearly. This strategy is becoming more
widely accepted in the study of cognitive ethology (see, e.g., the
papers in Parker & Gibson 1990). [See also Parker & Cibson, "A
Development Model for the Evolution of Language and Intel-
ligence in Early Hominids" BBS 2(3) 1979; and Chevalier-
Skolnikoff, "Spontaneous Tool Use and Sensorimotor Intel-
ligence in Cebus Compared with Other Monkeys and Apes"
BBS 12(3) 1989.]
11. We have left out of account here the institutionalization of
many human practices. It is often the institutionalized structure
that the developing child encounters and the adult relies on.
Unfortunately, this is a dimension of the problem that would
take us far beyond our current aims.
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A developmental theory requires
developmental data
Kim A. Bard
Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center, Emory University, Atlanta, GA
30322
Electronic mall: bard@rmy.emory.edu
One of the strengths of the cultural learning hypothesis is the
developmental perspective. Developmental changes in social
learning and in perspective-taking are detailed for humans. Age
simply ceases to be considered, however, when comparing
"normal humans" to other subjects. In apparent zeal to confirm
their theoretical stance, Tomasello et al. seem to apply a double
standard. In fact, if all the human subjects were 4 years of age or
less, the target article's title would not refer to cultural learning.
It is a double standard to consider primarily 4-year-old chim-
panzee subjects and conclude that chimpanzees do not have
cultural learning.
The study of cooperation in pulling together to obtain a box
was conducted with five chimpanzee subjects, all less than 6
years of age (Crawford 1937). Contrary to the view presented, all
the chimpanzee subjects did learn how to cooperate. Moreover,
four subjects, without tuition, watched their partner and mod-
ified their behavior in response to that of their partner. Two
subjects indicated their knowledge of the necessary role of the
partner by spontaneously soliciting action from them. The
example of cooperation in a symbolic request task, with two
chimpanzees, aged 3.5 and 4.5 years, also documented coopera-
tion, but Tomasello et al. objected to the training.
The human infant is enmeshed in a teaching environment.
From its birth, parents imitate the infant's actions and vice versa
(Meltzoff & Moore 1977), and provide tutorial feedback (Pa-
pousek & Papousek 1987), attributing intentional communica-
tion before the infant communicates intentionally (e.g., Bard
1992a). These interactions must be recognized as the intensive
teaching experiences they truly are. When a behavior occurs as a
result of a program designed to provide learning experiences to
chimpanzees, it is totally inappropriate to conclude that the
chimpanzees' behavior is a product of extensive training
whereas comparable behavior in humans is spontaneously
learned. Chimpanzee infants rarely receive as much training as
human infants. Although it is true that the social environment,
more than species membership, influences neonatal orientation
(Bard 1992b), it is equally important to learn how chimpanzees
become enculturated into chimpanzee society. The double
standard applied by Tomasello et al. reflects their indefensible
position that humans are unique. The comparative develop-
mental evolutionary perspective (e.g., Parker & Gibson 1990;
see also Parker and Gibson "A Developmental Model for the
Evolution of Language and Intelligence in Early Hominids'
BBS 1(3) 1979) concludes that differences between human and
chimpanzee subjects are of degree rather than of kind. Just for
the record, chimpanzees are neither mentally retarded nor
autistic.
In addition, Tomasello et al.'s conclusions from the chim-
panzee literature differ markedly from those of the cited studies.
To begin with collaborative learning, it is appropriate that the
search begin with adult chimpanzee behavior. The level of
collaboration among chimpanzees of the Tai Forest was evalu-
ated by Boesch and Boesch (1989). Individuals adjusted their
behavior in time and with spatial orientation to others. Almost
70% of the time, individuals adjusted their behavior in relation
to the others' role. Individuals took roles that were complemen-
tary to the roles of others (the definitive characteristic of collab-
orative hunts and of collaborative learning according to
Tomasello et al.). The hunting behavior of chimpanzees there-
fore qualifies as a true instance of collaborative learning.
It is interesting to reread Menzel's experiments on leadership
in 4- to 6-year-old chimpanzees. In these descriptions, one can
see how perspective-taking abilities develop and thus how
collaborative learning can emerge in a chimpanzee group. An
individual led the group to a goal, sometimes in competition
with another who knew of a goal in a different location. Menzel
concluded tha1 sophisticated and subtle information was com-
municated in order for the group to end at the "better" goal. The
leader monitored the behavior of others and changed his own
behavior according to their behavior, indicting knowledge of the
complementary role of the followers. These experiments clearly
highlight the 4- to 6-year-old chimpanzee subjects' ability to
attribute knowledge to others: The followers knew that the
leader(s) knew the location of the food. Moreover, the leader was
able to compare "the perspectives of two mental agents (one of
whom is the self) with differing perspectives on the same
situation," the defining characteristic of instructed learning
according to Tomasello et al. Further evidence of chimpanzees'
ability to coordinate perspectives, equivalent to that of 4-year-
old humans, was found in these chimpanzees' ability to deceive.
Repeated observations of "lying" were the "clearest evidence
that the chimpanzees know what effect their own behavior was
having on others (and varied it accordingly)" (Menzel 1974, p.
134). [See also Whiten & Byrne: "Tactical Deception in Pri-
mates" BBS 11(2) 1988.]
The second main point I wish to take issue with concerns
instructed learning. It is not true that chimpanzees do not
actively instruct their young. Goodall (1968), Plooij (1984), and
Rijt-Plooij and Plooij (1987) all describe chimpanzee mothers
teaching their infants the meaning of a communicative signal.
The most detailed account of the mother's active teaching of a
communication signal is the following:
FD was walking on a rock (about 50 cm high) while FF was sitting
out of contact but within arm's reach. Then FF stood up slowly, turned
her back towards him and approached him while flexing her knees
slightly and looking back at him with her lowered back closest to him.
FD did not cling immediately and FF waited motionless while
looking at him. Finally, he clung and FF walked a few paces to turn
around and come back to the same rock to return him to the rock.
Over and over she started travel in this way and when FD did not walk
onto the rock himself, she placed him there. Finally, FD clung
immediately whenever FF "signalled" by flexing her knees and
looking back.
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Next, FF started the whole procedure again, with FD on the
ground. She lowered her back by crouching onto the ground in front
of him while looking back at him over her shoulder. Whenever FD
seemed not to be looking at FF she would wait and, ultimately, gain
his attention by touching him. When touched in this way he always
responded by clinging immediately. "Signalling" in this context was
also repeated several times and gradually slight variations were
made. (Rijt-Plooij & Plooij 1987, p. 25)
Observations of Washoe engaging in "very subtle tutorial
activity" (Fouts et al. 1982, p. 183) illustrate exactly the same
adult chimpanzee capacity for instructed learning. The differ-
ence is that Washoe was teaching the ASL sign rather than the
behavioral signal.
For example, when Loulis was first introduced to Washoe, Washoe
would sign "come" to Loulis and then physically retrieve him. Three
days later, she would sign "come" and approach him but not retrieve
him and finally, 5 days later she would sign "come" while looking and
orienting towards him without approaching him (Fouts et al. 1982, pp.
183-84)
The cultural learning hypothesis integrates information from
two theoretical perspectives, social learning and theory of mind.
When applied as a developmental theory it appears to be quite
powerful. There is a necessary requirement, however, that the
developmental application be considered equally important for
equally long-living species, such as chimpanzee and human.
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Are children with autism acultural?
Simon Baron-Cohen
Departments of Psychology and Child Psychiatry, Institute of Psychiatry,
University of London, London SE5 8AF, England
Electronic mail: spjtsbc@ucl.ac.uk
Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner open their target article with the
provocative statement: "Many animal species live in complex
social groups; only humans live in cultures," and repeat the
claim at the end of their article (sect. 5). They define "culture" as
having certain characteristic products (material artefacts, social
institutions, behavioural traditions, and languages) that accumu-
late modifications over time and across generations. They call
such modifications the "ratchet effect," arguing that "cultural
learning" is necessary to live in a culture and that cultural
learning requires degrees of mindreading or "theory of mind"
ability, the developmentally earliest expression of which would
be in joint attention. In section 3, they review some of the
evidence that children with autism illustrate the cognitive links
between early joint-attention skills and later, more sophisti-
cated, theory of mind abilities, these children being impaired in
both. This leads them to the claim that children with autism
"show little or no evidence of cultural learning." The implication
from their argument is that children with autism therefore do
not live in cultures; they are, in Loveland's (1991) phrase, "acul-
tural." I devote my commentary to this claim.
It is important to discuss this claim because, if it is true, it may
teach us a great deal about the cognitive (and ultimately, the
biological) prerequisites of the capacity to be cultural. If it is
false, then we had better expose it as false, before it causes
further upset to the long-suffering parents of children with
autism. Let us begin, then, by considering evidence that ap-
pears to support the claim that children with autism are
acultural.
Evidence in support of the claim.
(a) Children with autism do not spontaneously establish joint
attention (Baron-Cohen 1989; Loveland & Landry 1986; Sigman
et al. 1986). Indeed, when Scaife and Bruner's (1975) paradigm
is used, the majority of children with autism do not follow an
experimenter's direction of gaze (Leekam et al. 1993). They
mostly do not succeed in establishing a common topic on which
to comment, either nonverbally or verbally (Baron-Cohen 1988)
- presumably a prerequisite for the transmission of culture.
(b) From my own observations, the majority of children with
autism neither invent nor acquire nor continue traditional play-
ground games and folklore, unlike even normal 4- to 5-year-olds
(Opie & Opie 1969). In this sense, they show no signs of peer-
appropriate transmission of culture.
(c) Clinical descriptions suggest that children with autism are
oblivious to the pressure to conform to cultural norms (Kanner
1943). Although they may insist on routines being adhered to,
these are arguably different from cultural norms. Reports of
teenagers with autism undressing in public or shouting in
church, and so on, with no signs of embarrassment, are exam-
ples of such "norm-blindness."
(d) There are no reports providing convincing evidence of
spontaneous collaborative interaction by children with autism,
which Tomasello et al. suggest is one important component of
what it is to be cultural.
(e) The interests of most children with autism tend to be
highly idiosyncratic (e.g., collecting types of bottle-tops) rather
than shared.
(f) Finally, they tend not to check whether their speech is
actually succeeding at communicating, nor do they show any
curiosity as to why a dialogue has broken down (Baron-Cohen
1988; Tager-Flusberg 1993). Such pragmatic deficits are pre-
sumed to reflect deficits in their theory of mind, specifically in
their possession of the concept of (mis)understanding (Baron-
Cohen 1993).
We could continue this list of evidence in support of the
notion that such children are acultural, but I think the point is
clear from the examples above.
Evidence against the claim. What evidence is there against the
claim that children with autism are acultural?
(a) Children with autism do produce material artefacts, such
as drawings, music, and poems (e.g., Selfe 1977). However,
closer examination suggests that these are usually not designed
for an audience. As such, these may not in fact count as cultural.
(b) Approximately 50% of children with autism acquire lan-
guage which, on the face of it, should be a sign of an impressive
cultural achievement. However, again, a close examination of
their language shows that although syntactic and semantic
development may proceed normally, pragmatic development is
markedly abnormal (Baron-Cohen 1988; Tager-Flusberg 1993).
Since the pragmatics of language encodes the cultural use of
language (consider the differences in pragmatics between En-
glish spoken in London, New York, and Melbourne), language
acquisition in autism may actually be evidence for insensitivity
to cultural norms.
(c) One very able man with autism (a graduate, now working as
a research assistant) told me that he viewed people with autism
as a subculture akin to any other minority, to which the domi-
nant culture had as yet failed to extend full civil liberties: to
tolerate their right to be different. The analogy that springs to
mind is the deaf community, which has all the hallmarks of being
a subculture in its own right. Although I'm sure that this young
man was right that people with autism have less than their full
rights, from the preceding list the evidence that people with
autism comprise a cultural community seems thin.
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Exceptions. The evidence presented here weighs in support
of the notion that children with autism are indeed acultural.
However, there may be some exceptions to this.
(a) Some adolescents with autism do begin to show an interest
in fashions (e.g., girls wearing lipstick, etc.), suggesting a partial
awareness of some cultural norms and a desire to conform to
these (Schopler & Mesibov 1986). I say "partial,' in that these
same individuals may still show a blindness to many other
cultural norms, for example, the appropriate distance to stand
from someone else so that their "personal space" is not invaded,
or the appropriate use of eye contact (Argyle & Cook 1976;
Baron-Cohen et al. 1993; Mirenda et al. 1983).
(b) Some adults with autism develop hobbies that lead them
into special interest groups, which may have their own cultural
norms (e.g., chess clubs, etc.). Such cases of apparent cultural
participation would merit closer investigation.
(c) If children with autism really were acultural then one
would expect to see few if any cross-cultural differences in
behaviour between children with autism in, say, India, and
those in, say, France. The relevant cross-cultural studies remain
to be done.
In summary, autism may provide a model of what is needed in
order to be cultural. Tomasello et al. suggest that this requires
the capacity for cultural learning, for which a theory of mind
seems to be the main prerequisite. As they point out, this
probably has its origins in joint attention (Baron-Cohen 1989;
1991). The biological basis of joint attention and theory of mind
may therefore hold the key to the biological basis of the capacity
to be cultural.
Sharing a perspective precedes the
understanding of that perspective
John Barresi and Chris Moore
Department of Psychology, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia,
Canada B3H 4J1
Electronic mail: jbarresi<u.ac.dal.ca
In their target article, Tomasello et al. identify three processes of
cultural learning (imitative, instructed, and collaborative) which
are linked to three concepts of agency that appear developmen-
tally at 9 months, 4 years, and 6 years (i.e., intentional agent,
mental agent, and reflective agent, respectively). In the present
commentary we focus on the relationship between cultural
learning processes and the concepts of agency and suggest that
although Tomasello et al. have provided a generally accurate
characterization of the different types of cultural learning and
the social-cognitive concepts of agency, they have misconstrued
the relationship between these two components of the model.
In brief, Tomasello et al. assert that each of the identified levels
of cultural learning relies on a social capacity to share a perspec-
tive with another individual, usually of the same species. They
further assume that in order to share a perspective, one must
understand that the other is the type of agent that can have such
a perspective. It is this latter assumption that we believe is
unnecessary and mistaken. In what follows we suggest that the
formation of a concept of person as intentional, mental, and
reflective follows as a consequence of sharing a perspective at
these three levels, but that it is the formation of the concept of
agency at one level that allows the child to become an agent at
the next level and thereby come to share perspectives at that
level.
At the first level of cultural learning, the 9-month-old child
may be capable of sharing an intentional perspective with
another individual, through imitation, for example. However,
such sharing does not require a concept of a person as an
intentional agent. All that is required is that the infant be able to
enter into intentional relations with objects and that, through
the imitative process, the infant be capable of adopting the same
intentional relation as the other. For example, the infant can
share a visual perspective with another, by imitating the action
of the other in looking in a particular direction and then noting
the object that is found in that direction. For such sharing to
occur, the infant need not be aware that a perspective is being
shared (Moore & Corkum 1992).
Empirically, a concept of an intentional agent can only be said
to be unambiguously in place when the child is able to recognize
that the other is in a different state from the self and vice versa,
or, in other words, that diversity is possible in the intentional
relations of self and other. We suggest that this concept is not
fully acquired until around 18-24 months. It is only at this time
that infants can distinguish their own intentional attitudes to-
ward objects from the attitudes of others and learn to respond
differentially to the attitudes of others. For example, it is at
about 18 months that infants know that another may see an
object that they cannot see because it is behind them (Butter-
worth & Cochran 1980). Infants can also recognize differences in
emotional attitudes toward objects at this time and can respond
with sympathy to others, whereas earlier in development in-
fants share, through contagion, the same emotion as the other
(Hoffman 1977). Self-recognition with a mirror also occurs at this
time, providing evidence that infants have developed a concept
of self as an object of the same kind as other individuals (Lewis et
al. 1989). Together, these phenomena suggest that the infant's
concept of intentional agent, which can be applied equally to self
and other, first appears at 18-24 months, not, as Tomasello et al.
claim, at 9 months.
We believe that a similar developmental sequence occurs for
the age 4 transition involving the concept of mental agent. The
results reviewed by Tomasello et al. (e.g., on false belief,
Wiminer & Perner 1983) indicate that the concept of mental
agent occurs at about 4 years, because it is at this point that the
child understands the possibility of diversity among mental
states. We also agree with Tomasello et al. that instructed
learning requires the child to have the capacity to enter into
shared mental relations. However, in this case we differ about
when instructed learning involving the sharing of a mental
attitude first begins. In our view, once children have formed a
concept of an intentional agent, they have then in effect become
a mental agent, that is, they can think about the intentional
activity of an agent. The 2- or 3-year-old child is in a position to
share a mental attitude with an instructor; otherwise, the
instructions of the other could not regulate behaviour. As in the
case of sharing a perspective at the earlier level, however, the
child need not yet have a concept of a mental agent. All that is
required is the ability to adopt the mental relation of the other.
Hence we again contend that the sharing of perspective pre-
cedes the appearance of the concept.
The formation of a concept of a mental agent at about 4 years
allows the child to become a reflective agent in the sense
described by Tomasello et al. At this level the child can share a
perspective. In this case, what is shared is a reflective awareness
of the mental activity of an agent, whether it be about self or
another. Collaborative learning requires this sharing of perspec-
tive. However, at this stage the child merely acts as a reflective
agent. It is only later, at about 6 to 7 years, that the child can
form a concept of the activity of a reflective agent.
In sum, our view is that the sharing of perspectives is a
precursor to the formation of the concept of a person as an agent
having a perspective of that kind, and that this applies to all
three of the levels described by Tomasello et al. Furthermore,
we claim that there is a reason for this sequence. To develop a
concept of a particular type of agency that can be applied
uniformly to self and others, it is necessary to appreciate the
equivalence of two qualitatively distinct types of information of
the agency, namely, the information of the agency from a first-
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person perspective and the information of the agency from a
third-person perspective (Barresi & Moore 1992; Moore &
Barresi 1993). Without a sharing of perspective at a particular
level of agency between self and other, the individual could not
come to appreciate the equivalence of the perspective of self and
other at that level of agency. It is the cases where a pair of agents
share an instance of a perspective at a certain level that provide
the concurrent source of self and other information that can be
integrated to grasp conceptually that level of perspective. Such
conceptualization therefore only follows the sharing of perspec-
tive, as one becomes aware of similarity and diversity of perspec-
tive between self and other.
Towards a new image of culture in wild
chimpanzees?
Christophe Boesch
Institute of Zoology, University of Basel, 4051 Basel, Switzerland
Electronic mail: boesch@urz.unibas.ch
Tomasello et al.'s three levels of cultural learning are presented
as strictly human because captive chimpanzees do not perform
them in tests. "Encultured" chimpanzees are recognized as
capable of imitation and the authors propose that human lan-
guage training has allowed new dormant abilities to be ex-
pressed. Besides noting the impossibility of explaining how such
abilities could have been favoured by natural selection if they
have no use, I suggest that we could just as convincingly propose
that captive chimpanzees live in strongly impoverished condi-
tions. Any enrichment is badly needed and so the language
training that some captive individuals were lucky to get im-
proved their cognitive development along lines similar to those
occurring in human populations; the higher the educational
level, the more complete the cognitive development (Dasen &
Heron 1981). I suggest that wild chimpanzees live in a perma-
nent training condition where survival and reproductive success
are the teachers and I would expect them to be more intelligent
than their captive counterparts.
Contrary to what Tomasello et al. suggest, the teaching
instances in Tai chimpanzees were performed by mothers who
changed their behaviour when they noticed their infant's diffi-
culties (they were not cracking nuts themselves at the time),
specifically performing in front of their infant an action that was
directly related to the technical problems faced (they did not
merely slow down their tool use, as Tomasello et al. state),
letting the infant crack further while they waited nearby. In at
least one instance it was clear that the infant learned from the
mother's demonstration (Boesch 1991). Thus, Tai' chimpanzees
are capable of instructed learning.
I have not yet published detailed observations of the collab-
orative hunting in Ta'i chimpanzees but I can confirm here that
some hunters do precisely monitor both the actions of other
hunters and their effect on the movement of the prey. This is
especially obvious with hunters closing an encirclement; this
can only be done after such monitoring because they must
anticipate the other movements in order to reach the strategic
position in time. Thus, collaborative learning is at work in Ta'i
chimpanzee hunting behaviours.
Tomasello et al. hypothesize that human cultural learning can
only occur if imitative, instructed, or collaborative learning is at
work. However, everyone can think of a typical cultural behav-
iour in humans that does not require the acquisition of a new
behaviour (which is part of their definition of imitation). For
example, hand shaking, embracing, or hat lifting to greet some-
body in some cultures does not require the acquisition of any
movement that cannot be seen being used by young children
when playing. It is the context in which this behaviour is
produced that is new and could be learned through social
facilitation (or local enhancement). I do not deny that imitation
plays a role in human cultures but I wish to emphasize that lower
forms of social learning are also part of cultural transmission
processes in humans. Thus, Tomasello et al.'s presentation of the
three essential characteristics of human culture (sect. 5) are
more relevant than the more limited scope of the analysis of
some of the transmission mechanisms.
These characteristics are that cultural behaviour should be
performed by all group members, that its form should be a
faithful reproduction of that of the model, and that an accumula-
tion of modifications must exist. These points are very important
and deserve a fair review of the knowledge on chimpanzee
traditions. First, besides termite fishing, activities such as ant
dipping, nut cracking, leaf clipping, leaf grooming, and others
have been proposed to be cultural. I shall discuss here the
behaviours I have observed myself. In Ta'i chimpanzees, the nut-
cracking behaviour was performed by all group members over 2
years of age (N = 99 chimpanzees), the only exception being one
juvenile female whose hands were both badly impaired and
unable to hold a hammer. Similarly, the leaf-clipping was for
years performed by all adult males, and only them, because it
was a component of the drumming display performed com-
pletely only by adult males (Boesch, in preparation). Ant dip-
ping was observed in 4 males out of 7 and 17 females out of 22.
This is a rare behaviour but on all occasions the females present
dipped for ants whereas males tended to take them directly with
the hand. The differential use of ant dipping represents a sex
difference in feeding on ants (Boesch & Boesch 1990). Thus, in
Ta'i chimpanzees cultural behaviours are learned by virtually all
group members.
Concerning the second point, it is important to realize that
this is a question of the level at which one compares interin-
dividual performances. At a general level, all French people
shake hands in a very similar and standardized way but if one
looks at a finer level it would probably be difficult to find two
individuals that present the hand, press the other's hand, and let
go afterward in exactly the same way. Obviously, if one looks at
the finest details, Ta'i chimpanzees show individual variations in
nut cracking, such as the positions of the fingers holding the
hammer, but at a higher level of comparison the most striking
feature is that all group members crack nuts exactly the same
way, holding the hammer in the same way, hitting with the same
part of the hammer, and so on. Even throughout ontogeny I
rarely observed young chimpanzees attempting to crack nuts
with another movement, or trying other material or positions, or
hitting the nuts with some part of the body or even throwing
them against a hard surface. This standardization in form is also
observed in ant dipping; in this case this is important because
the form of ant dipping is different in the two chimpanzee
populations performing it (Gombe and Tai') but the same within
each one (Boesch & Boesch 1990). Similarly, leaf clipping is
performed by all males exactly in the same way (Boesch, in
preparation). Thus, copying the precise movement of the model
is very strong in the cultural behaviours of Tai chimpanzees.
The third point is a very important one: Do chimpanzees have
fashions like humans that spread rapidly in the group and appear
independently of any ecological stimuli? Recently two appear-
ances of fashion-like behaviour have been observed. The leaf
clipping that was used for years only by males in the drumming
context started within a month to be used in an additional and
new context - resting. Not only did all males do it but other
age/sex classes also started to perform leaf clipping for the first
time in this new context (Boesch, in preparation). Second, in
Gombe chimpanzees the leaf grooming was for years performed
as a kind of redirected behaviour without any specific purpose
(Goodall 1986). Lately, I observed that all group members I saw
performing it (N = 24) did so in order to squash small ecto-
parasites before eating them (Boesch, in preparation). These
observations not only show that chimpanzees can accumulate
modifications over generations but that the function of some of
these behaviours are pure social conventions: Leaf clipping in
514 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1993) 16:3
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00031277
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:48:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Commentary/Tomasello et al.: Cultural learning
Tai is part of the drumming display, whereas it is part of the
courtship display in Mahale chimpanzees (Nishida 1987). Ecto-
parasites are squashed on leaves in Gombe, whereas Tai chim-
panzees squash them on their forearms.
Thus, some of the cultural behaviours known in wild chim-
panzees do fulfil all three criteria for human culture proposed by
Tomasello et al.
Social-emotional and auto-operational roots
of cultural (peer) learning
Stein Braten
Department of Sociology, University of Oslo, 0317 Oslo 3, Norway
Electronic mail: sbratenQlkah.uio.no
In approaches to cognitive development and enculturation
there has been a gap between those who assume with Piaget the
autonomy of the individual mind, and those who assume with
Mead and Vygotsky the priority of interpersonal mediation.
Tomasello et al. are to be congratulated for bridging part of that
gap. The target article does not specify, however, how cultural
learning depends on prior primitive capacities in the learner,
even though they are partly implied by the rich comparative
evidence offered. I shall indicate how capacities for (i) immedi-
ate affective engagement in others and for (ii) auto-enclosed self-
engagement discriminate between chimpanzees and autistic
children and permit an added form of symmetric learning in
peer interaction before the age of 6.
Capacity (i) for social-emotional engagement. The capacity to
engage feelings with others in a direct, nonreflective sense is
manifest in early infancy. Normal human infants engage activity
and effortlessly in mutually attuned affective contact with adults
(Stern 1985; Trevarthen 1990a). Even in peer contact, when
opportunity arises, 3-month-olds have been found to engage in
reciprocal gazing, smiling, vocalization, and sometimes reach-
ing for each other (Field 1990).
The formation of the means for perspective-taking in repre-
sentational mediacy appears to be nurtured by prior direct
perception of others, in which the other's perspective is felt in
presentational immediacy (Braten 1988; Neisser 1988; Trev-
arthen 1990b). Learners will not succeed in imitative learning if
they have to divide their effort between attending to the model
activity and attempting to get "inside" the other's perspective.
Since the latter, however, is immediately felt in virtue of (i), no
divided attention need interfere with the process.
Capacity (II) for auto-enclosed self-engagement. The capacity
to self-engage in coherent operational cycles upon disengage-
ment from others is manifested in perturbed infant-adult con-
tact. Upon disengagement from the adult, 2-month-olds turn to
themselves in a coherent, auto-enclosed manner (Murray 1991;
Trevarthen 1990b). Later in ontogeny, infants self-engage in
"dialogue" with some bodily part or "transitional object" (Braten
1992a; Stern 1985; VVinnicott 1986). Thus, rudimentary proto-
instances of self-dialogical cycles, which in more advanced form
characterize self-regulated (instructed) learning, appear to be
manifested during the first year.
Chimpanzees and autistic children. Chimpanzees are capable
of (i), but apparently not (ii). They can relate emotionally to
others, even to the trainer, who may experience differences in
rapport with the various trainees. Verbal praise sometimes
suffices as a reward (distance et al. 1992). Their capacity for (i)
facilitates imitative learning.
In spite of difficulties in this respect, about one in two autistic
children somehow learn to talk, even if deviantly. Why? They
appear capable of (ii), but deficient or impaired with respect to
(i), that is, their internal auto-enclosed cycles in self-talk operate
without the social-emotional nurture of others' perspectives.
Such auto-enclosed cycles appear to be manifested even when
autistic children go into ecstatic states, "floating off" and reach-
ing out their arms (Trevarthen 1990a), whereas they fail to lift
their arms when offered to be lifted by others. Preconceptual
forms of affectively toned communication in felt immediacy are
profoundly aberrant in autism (Hobson 1990). Hence, the auto-
enclosed operational cycles in the autistic child do not give rise
to what Neisser (1988) terms an "interpersonal self," and cannot
evolve into a self-regulative dialogue that involves actual others'
perspectives as taken in virtue of having been felt.
Symmetric peer learning. Unlike encultured chimpanzees and
autistic children, the normal child brings both (i) and (ii) to bear
on processes of peer interaction. Tomasello et al. imply that
symmetric (collaborative) learning does not occur before the age
of 6. Before that age, however, children bring products of
imitative or instructed learning to bear on processes of peer
interaction in which neither is model or instructor. For example,
when two 4-year-olds sing a song or dance together, or play
mother and father, or doctor and patient, or even Batman and
his adversary, they symmetrically constitute a cocreative dyad in
which they are mutually attuned. This is not just delayed
imitation or self-regulated instruction reenacted after the origi-
nal learning situation. Even if learning is not mediated by a
reflective agency concept of "person," something new in a
cultural sense is cocreated and acquired in such symmetric peer
interaction that adds to the products of asymmetric learning
situations. A recursive kind of intersubjectivity, albeit in an
immediate sense in virtue of (i), is involved in such situations of
joint imitation or reenactment by peers, which permits new
cultural acquisitions to be yielded before the age stipulated for
collaborative learning.
The learner's virtual other. Such symmetric peer learning
depends on the ability to mutually complement each other in a
dialogue in which children can engage directly in each other's
perspectives "from inside the other's perspective, as it were"
(sect. 1, para. 3). Elsewhere, this has been accounted for in
terms of the child's primary self-other organization with a
"virtual other,"' a virtual companion perspective which invites
and permits fulfillment by actual companion perspectives
(Braten 1988; 1992a; 1992b). Having the operational efficiency
of an actual other, the learner's virtual other later in ontogeny
serves inter alia the inner observing function described in the
target article conclusion (sect. 6, para. 3). But equally relevant,
posited as inherent, not constructed, it permits the learning
mind to recreate and transform itself in the form of the dialogi-
cal, whether in (i) affectively tuned engagement with actual
others, or(ii) in self-engagement (with the virtual other). This, I
propose, is the common base for the social-cognitive capacities
for cultural learning examined in the target article.
NOTE
1. Proposed in my talk at The Gordon Research Conference on
Cybernetics of Cognition, 1986 (Braten 1986/1988).
Do we "acquire" culture or vice versa?
Jerome Bruner
School of Law, New York University, New York, NY 10012
Electronic mail: bruner@nyuacf.bitnet
I am cheered and, indeed, much enlightened by Tomasello et al.
Their theory of the processes involved in the "acquisition' of
human culture provides needed psychological underpinning for
the argument that human cognitive capacities evolved in re-
sponse to the demands of an evolving social-political way of life
in the primate order rather than, say, as a spin-off from the
evolution of tool use. The authors present a strong case for the
view that a powerful mediating process in this evolution was
the emergence of cognitive means for registering and represent-
ing the intentions and mental states of conspecifics (Whiten
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1991). The three forms of cultural learning that such a system of
representation makes possible - imitative, instructed, and col-
laborative learning - are rich and detailed enough to stimulate a
decade of research on how culture gives shape to mind, both
phylogenetically and ontogenetically. Tomasello et al.'s hypoth-
eses might even sharpen our understanding of the nature of
human culture itself. I propose to offer some elaboration of that
in the comments following.
Let me begin by explaining the scare quotes around "acquisi-
tion" in the preceding paragraph. It is an encumbering word
inherited from old-fashioned learning theory (rats acquired
habits, etc.), a term deeply rooted in the individualistic account
of "social learning" that Tomasello et al. are trying to go beyond.
Only in the most banal sense does one "acquire" culture: One
enters it or is enabled by it or, to borrow Geertz's (1973) term, is
constituted by it. Culture is not a set of responses to be
mastered, but a way of knowing, of construing the world and
others. To enter culture is not to add some element to one's
"natural" repertory, but to be transformed. Obviously, such
readiness to be transformed is dependent upon the requisite
biological capacities, as Edelman (1990) and others argue, but it
also depends upon social transactions that are accessible only to
those who have, as it were, already crossed the divide into
culture - who can, for example, construe others as intentional
agents, mental agents, or reflective agents. Once they can do
any or all of those things, the culture literally provides them a
vast, readily accessible toolkit of devices for elaborating their
mental powers and their effectiveness: enriched exchange ar-
rangements, obligated allies and mentors, politically useful
mates, instructive narratives of possibility, and the like. All of
which leads in turn to situating the participant's cognitive life in
an institutional network that, as Seeley-Brown et al. (1988) have
noted, makes human intelligence "supra-organic" in Kroeber's
(1952) sense.
That culture situates and amplifies cognitive life is a matter
that Tomasello et al. note in passing; they as much as offer a
promissory note for later return. For it is through cultural
institutionalization that the most enduring "ratchet effect" is
assured. Without such institutionalization, Kawamura's (1959)
Japanese macaques do not pass on potato washing as a culture-
wide tradition; it could easily disappear in a generation. For
traditional cultural transmission requires not only an apprecia-
tion of "other minds." It also requires such intrapsychic support
as guilt and shame for noncompliance, as well as such putatively
external ones as the compulsion of legal systems, the un-
avoidability of rites of passage assuring universal participation
(e.g., van Gennep 1960), incest taboos, and so forth.
I am concerned that such crucial matters as these may get
overlooked in implementing and elaborating the Tomasello et al.
account. For theirs is (in spite of their valiant efforts) too
individualistic an account, too caught up in the problem of
individual conceptual "acquisitions." Far more needs to be said
about how collectivities of people operate to empower, sustain,
pattern, and enforce these acquisitions. An example: Tomasello
et al. acknowledge that human mothers become enormously
diligent and skillful in "teaching the culture," as illustrated in
their management of imitative, instructed, and collaborative
activity in their children's language acquisition (e.g., Ninio &
Bruner 1978). But Tomasello et al. tend to ignore the fact that
mothers also impose strong normative expectations on their
children in the process. What "should' be done or said becomes
as important in the child's conception of agency as the act itself.
Felicity conditions are usually imposed more rigorously than
syntactical rectitude. The representation of the intentions and
beliefs of others is as deontic as it is epistemic: full of oughts,
musts, and notions like "good manners" and "helpfulness" (e.g.,
Dunn 1988). Of course, these reflect institutional demands as
well: what society "decrees." Not surprising, then, that narra-
tives, embodying the drama of deontic violations, early become
such an important vehicle of cultural transmission (Bruner
1990), for they carry the message not only of agentivity but of
what is normatively canonical. A deficit in narrative ability may
even account for some of the difficulty experienced by autistic
children in entering culture (Bruner et al. 1993).
So, although Tomasello etal. are compelling as far as they go, I
sorely miss a discussion of the normative, deontic side of
participating in human culture. What "ratchets" culture is not
only that others are seen to intend and have thoughts and
reflections on thoughts, but that they are expected to have them,
or else. Such canonical expectations are justified to the child
from the start by reference (more implicit than explicit, more
micro- than macro-) to the institutional structure of the culture.
These are matters that are in no way in conflict with the
Tomasello et al. account. Indeed, they are offered in the spirit of
buttressing it, for their target article represents a real step ahead
in the effort to create a cultural psychology.
Hierarchical levels of imitation
R. W. Byrne
Scottish Primate Research Group, Department of Psychology, University of
St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9JU, Scotland
Electronic mall: rwb@st-andrews.ac.uk
Compared with any premodern human societies, animal behav-
ior shows relative uniformity between populations of the same
species. When carefully examined, those population differences
that do occur usually turn out to be consequences of subtle
differences in ecology. Even in the well-studied and widely
distributed common chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), behavioral
variations deserving the name "cultural" are slight (see McGrew
1992) and unlikely to leave traces in fossil forms, whereas many
of the cultural differences between premodern peoples would
be detectable in their debris. To judge from fossil evidence, this
sort of cultural variation is rather new: Australopithecines,
Homo habilis, Homo erectus, and even the Neanderthals give
no convincing evidence of it. The question of which attribute of
modern humans gives rise to cultural variation is an important
one and is not yet settled.
Tomasello et al. offer a package of three candidate skills as an
answer and argue that no animal untutored by humans shows
any of them. The latest skill to emerge in children's develop-
ment, collaborative learning, is not a method that serves to pass
on behavioral variations to other generations, so in fact we are
left with instructed and imitative learning as real possibilities for
the source of culture. However, instructed learning as the
authors define it can only safely be identified by the reenact-
ment in the child of the adult's earlier instructions. This leaves
little scope for nonverbal animals, and indeed Tomasello et al.
do not accept any evidence of such instruction by animals. (They
thus place considerable faith in verbal reports of young children
as evidence of mental process, whereas the literature on verbal
reports of adults would suggest caution; see Byrne 1983; Nisbett
& Wilson 1977). The use of verbal instruction may of course be a
unique and sufficient reason why premodern human societies
show cultural variation and animals do not; this would accord
neatly with the lack of evidence for culture in Neanderthals, if
they also lacked modern speech, as argued by Lieberman
(1984). Tomasello et al. go further, however, in advocating the
cultural importance of an ability to learn imitatively, denying
any true imitative ability is found in wild animals.
In order to differentiate true imitation from individual learn-
ing aided by a social environment, it is necessary to adopt strict
criteria (see Galef 1988). Tomasello et al. do so, requiring
behavior that (a) is novel for the imitator, (b) reproduces the
actual behavioral strategies of the model, and (c) is directed
toward the same goal as was the model's. Proviso (a) ensures that
responses already in the repertoire are not simply brought forth
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by seeing another using them; this was originally called "social
facilitation" by Spence (1937), but "response facilitation" may be
a better term now, as social facilitation has been used in at least
two other senses since (Byrne, in press). Proviso (b) rules out the
kind of social learning that is so important in animals, individual
learning efficiently channeled toward just the crucial environ-
mental features by the sight of a companion's behavior ("stim-
ulus enhancement,' Spence 1937); it also excludes an additional
possibility of learning the "affordances of objects and situations
by observation, which Tomasello et al. describe as "emulation,"
but which could be seen as learning the correlational structure of
the environment by classical conditioning (Dickinson 1980).
Proviso (c) excludes what the authors call "mimicking" — new
behavior for the sake of novelty alone - which parrots and myna
birds are so good at in the vocal modality. I believe Tomasello et
al. should be commended for this careful adherence to strict
criteria. However, I think that proviso (b) brings additional
problems in its wake and I would like to suggest a way of looking
at imitation that may help to avoid them.
Behavior is hierarchically organized (Dawkins 1976a; Lashley
1951; Miller et al. 1960). The very simplest sorts of behavior can
be adequately approximated by the one-level descriptions of
S-R psychology and the ethology of "sign stimuli" and "fixed
action patterns. " Most behavioral sequences, however, and
certainly those complex enough to need imitation for efficient
acquisition, have clear hierarchical structure and can be de-
scribed with equal validity at several levels.
Consider a manual task. A low level of description might
specify the muscle groups that operate to move hands or fingers,
a temporal patterning as detailed as a symphony's score; at a
level above that in the hierarchy would be a specification of
whether a grip was precision or power, whether right or left
hand was used, and whether a movement was slow or fast; higher
still, only the sequence of movements achieved, such as opening
a hatch or pulling a lever would be explicit; and at the very
highest imaginable level, the behavior would be coded as a
single entity. Which of these levels is "best" for describing
behavior depends largely on whether the animal can permute
and modify elements at a given level; if not, a higher level is
sufficient. If no modification at all is possible, the behavior really
is a "fixed action pattern," and only a physiologist would need to
dissect the fine detail.
It is much easier to identify imitation that occurs at a very low
level in a hierarchy: The preservation in the learner's behavior of
idiosyncratic details of the model's grip-type, hand used, and
precise movements is a dead giveaway. But that is not neces-
sarily the most useful or "intelligent" level at which to imitate.
We humans are not proud of having to imitate at low hierarchical
levels, describing this as "slavish," "plodding," and "mindless."
It therefore cannot be assumed that this is the only level at
which animals would imitate, if they can. Indeed, we have found
rapid acquisition of complex, multistage techniques of plant
feeding in wild mountain gorillas (Gorilla g. beringei; Byrne &
Byrne 1991), and these techniques are idiosyncratic at low
hierarchical levels of detail but standardized at a more organiza-
tional, "program-level" (Byrne & Byrne, in press). This leads me
to suspect that dismissing the imitative capability of "unedu-
cated" apes may be premature.
Whence the motive for collaboration?
John Collier
History and Philosophy of Science, University of Melbourne, Parkville,
Victoria, Australia 3052
Electronic mail: jcollier@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au
In the target article, Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner argue that
collaborative learning is a peculiarly human characteristic.
Their argument focuses on the capacity for collaborative learn-
ing, which depends on other capacities that must develop prior
to the capacity for collaboration, in particular, the capacity to
recognise other humans as subjects. The authors do not, how-
ever, consider either how the capacity for collaborative learning
evolved or how it is motivated. Consideration of these issues can
shed some light on why collaboration is a human trait and how it
came to be. The evolutionary origins of collaboration and certain
similarities between reproductive strategies of humans and
other primate species suggest that collaboration might not be as
unique as the target article claims.
There are certainly many people who could gain from collab-
orative learning but prefer to learn alone. The capacity for
collaboration is not sufficient for collaborative learning; the will
to collaborate must be there as well. One possibility is that the
will to collaborate has social origins and is otherwise a conse-
quence of general curiosity and intelligence. This aetiology is
doubtful, however, since the rewards of collaboration can be
experienced only after the complex task of collaboration has
been performed. We still need an explanation of why collabora-
tion should occur in the first place. It can be maintained by social
forces, but they cannot explain its origin.
One common explanation of the development of collaboration
makes it an adaptation for hunting. Certainly collaboration in
hunting has the potential to make hunting more successful. The
main problem with this explanation is that it is unlikely that
hunting played a major role in the diet of early hominids. Aside
from lack of evidence that early hominids hunted, bipedality is
not well adapted to hunting unless a fairly complex technology is
utilised (Lovejoy 1981). Early artefacts do not appear to be
hunting implements. Even later hominids did not gain much of
their food from hunting (although this minimal contribution may
have been critical), so it is unclear that hunting had a strong
adaptive value. If hunting underlies collaboration, then collab-
oration would probably have been a late adaptation. Further-
more, success at hunting would have been greatly enhanced by
collaboration, especially among relatively inefficient bipeds.
This suggests that the capacity and motives for collaboration
appeared prior to the adoption of hunting.
A rather different origin for collaboration is suggested by
primate reproductive strategies. Primates, especially the Pon-
gidae, have a long gestation period and an especially long period
of infancy and subadulthood. This trend is most marked in
humans. Infants and subadults require considerable care and
socialisation; reproduction is a major project, involving five or
more years in chimpanzees, and fifteen or more years in hu-
mans. Chimpanzees and a number of other primates form
matrilineal groupings in which related females cooperate in
child rearing (though I know of no solid evidence that this
cooperation is collaboration in the sense of the target article).
Things are somewhat more complicated than this because of
competition among females in the group carried out with the
framework of an inherited (but not genetically inherited) domi-
nance network. Nonetheless, the sharing of nurturing tasks is
widespread, including features like adoption and foster care.
With the particularly long prereproductive phase in humans,
reproductive capacity can be greatly enhanced by having males
contribute directly to child care. This is likely only if the male
can be reasonably sure of parenthood. This likelihood is in-
creased by monogamy. Lovejoy (1981) suggests that human
sexual dimorphism, which is distinct from that of other charac-
teristics, is an adaptation for monogamy. Pair bonding would
enhance the survival of offspring, given the huge investment of
care required. This investment is immediately profitable in
terms of fitness, and Lovejoy suggests that uniquely human
characteristics are largely due to human reproductive strategy.
It is reasonable to assume that cooperation between females for
the nurturing of offspring became refocused into cooperative
behaviour between mates. Even in lower primates males are
capable of extraordinary acts of infant care. Hrdy (1981) de-
scribes a case of a male baboon who rescued an infant baboon
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being born on a ledge who would otherwise have fallen to its
doom. More commonly, however, the male contribution to child
care among primates is restricted to a protective role.
There is a distinct advantage in flexibility of nurturing behav-
iour in a species that must nurture their young over many years.
The problem that protohuman pairs faced was to engage over
many years in a joint project whose requirements cannot be
specified completely in advance. Clearly, there would be a
major advantage to those who could maintain flexibility at the
same time as major commitment to the project. I suggest that
humans have developed the capacity to take on mutual projects
that transcend their self-interests, identifying with the project,
and thereby being able to see their own role in perspective. In
short, it seems likely that collaborative learning, whether
unique to humans or not (and it is certainly unique in its degree),
has its origins in human reproductive strategy. Nonetheless, its
roots can be found in similar species. More recent evidence
suggests that the human reproductive strategy is not as unique
as Lovejoy believed (Hrdy 1981, pp. 136ff). If my hypothesis is
correct, we can expect to find a correlation between the length
and degree of nurturing behaviour on one hand and the amount
of nonspecific collaboration on the other.
What is the difference between cognitive and
sociocultural psychology?
Ellice A. Forman
Department of Psychology in Education, University of Pittsburgh,
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
Electronic mail: ellicefwpittvms.bitnet
If the aim of the target article by Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner is
"to understand social learning in terms of the most recent
research and theory on children's social cognition" (Introduc-
tion), then they have attained this goal to my satisfaction. Their
integration of theory and research across a broad range of
disciplines manages to make a convincing case for the interrela-
tions between cultural learning processes, social-cognitive abili-
ties and concepts, and cognitive representations. If their goal is
instead to argue for "more attention to the social and cultural
dimensions of human cognition and learning" (sect. 6, para. 6)
then I am less satisfied that this goal has been accomplished. In
citing recent work in sociocultural theory (either Vygotskian
psychology or cultural psychology) as their theoretical frame-
work, Tomasello et al. force us to ask whether they advocate a
fundamental reconceptualization of the interrelations between
cultural institutions, practices and tools, communication, and
cognition. My comparison of their model of cultural learning
with sociocultural theory is based in part on a metatheoretical
argument by Lave (1991). The purpose of this comparison will be
to show that cultural learning is closer to cognitive psychology
than it is to sociocultural psychology.
Lave has identified three different versions of cultural theo-
ries of learning: the "cognition plus" view, the "interpretive"
view, and the "situated social practice" view. In the cognition
plus version, social interaction and everyday activities are recog-
nized as having an important influence upon the process of
thinking but not upon its result. Social and nonsocial cognition
are also distinguished in this version. For example, the solitary
individual engaged in self-reflection would not be using social
cognition.
In Laves interpretive version, thinking involves the negotia-
tion of meaning in the context of sociocultural activity. There is
no objective world "out there" to be understood. Instead, this
approach focuses on explicating the temporary understandings
of intentional agents about the intersubjective world. All cogni-
tion is seen as fundamentally social and cultural; learning is a
communicative process through which children and adults co-
construct a shared task definition. Consistent with Vygotskian
theory,' changes in semiotically mediated social interaction are
viewed as the source of individual developmental change (For-
man 1989; Stone 1993; VVertsch 1985b).
In the third version, situated social practice, learning is an
emergent property of people's participation in communities of
practice. Lave uses examples drawn from studies of apprentice-
ship and Alcoholics Anonymous to illustrate how changes in
social participation patterns index changes in knowledge of the
skills valued by a particular community of practice (see also Lave
& Wenger 1991). In this version, all cognition is socially and
culturally specific.
Laves situated social practice category seems closest to Shwe-
der's (1990) characterization of cultural psychology. Cultural
psychology attempts to go beyond Platonic approaches to under-
standing cultural learning where the content of actual social
activity is regarded as noise and framed out of the theoretical
models. "Indeed, in the land of cultural psychology all of the
action is in the noise. And the so-called noise is not really noises
at all; it is the message" (Shweder 1990, p. 24).
Which of these three theoretical versions does the Tomasello
et al. article approximate? Their position seems farthest from
the situated social practice approach articulated by Lave and
Shweder. Tomasello et al. have taken an abstract, decontex-
tualized perspective on social interaction and thought. For
example, their typology of cultural learning processes, social-
cognitive abilities, and cognitive representations (Table 1) is an
instance of the kind of Platonism that Shweder sees as typical of a
psychology which reduces the actual content of specific cultural
practices to abstractions.
It seems to me that Tomasello et al. would like to be charac-
terized as interpretive in their approach. For example, they
argue that "the cognitive representation resulting from cultural
learning includes something of the perspective of the interac-
tional partner, and this perspective continues to guide the
learner even after the original learning experience is over" (sect.
1). Thus, they seem to feel that even self-reflection by a solitary
individual can be characterized as social cognition.
Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons Tomasello et al.'s
perspective does not go beyond the "cognition plus" position.
First, they take a restricted view of the role of semiotic media-
tion in cognitive development. The causal mechanism in their
model is perspective-taking or intersubjectivity, not semiot-
ically mediated communication.2 They also ignore the essential
similarities and differences between cultural tools and signs.
Both tools and signs, according to Vygotsky (1978), are cultural
inventions that mediate activity. When tools are directed inter-
nally, they become signs that enable humans to reflect upon and
control their own behavior. Thus, the social-cognitive skills that
Tomasello et al. discuss in detail would be reconceptualized by
Vygotskians in terms of semiotic mediation (Stone 1993;
Wertsch 1991).
Second, Tomasello et al. view changes in cognition as causing
changes in sociocultural practices and not vice versa. For exam-
ple, "these processes of social cognition then led humans to the
species-specific ways of learning from one another that we call
cultural learning, which then kicked off the evolutionary and
historical processes that led to the species-specific form of social
organization known as human cultures" (sect. 5, para. 9). In
contrast, Vygotskian theory holds that changes in thinking
(intrapsychological regulation) begin with changes in social
practices (interpsychological regulation; Vygotsky 1978;
Wertsch 1985b). This does not imply sociocultural determinism,
however, because, as Shweder puts it, "psyche and cul-
ture . . . dynamically, dialectically, and jointly make each other
up" (1990, p. 1).
Thus, I am forced to conclude that Tomasello et al. have been
arguing for a more prominent role for social factors in learning
and development but not for a fundamental change in the way
we conceptualize culture, communication, and cognition. I find
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it difficult to see how one can omit semiotically mediated
communication or specific cultural practices from one's model
and still end up with a theory of cultural learning in which
culture is taken seriously. Perhaps an integration of two or more
of the theoretical positions in Laves typology is possible. Unfor-
tunately, the model of cultural learning presented by Tomasello
ct al. has not accomplished this task.
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S
I would like to thank Rick Donato and Addison Stone for their remarks
on an earlier draft of this commentary.
NOTES
1. Vygotskys theory, especially the aspects of it that have been
further developed as activity theory by Leont'ev and others, could also
be characterized as Laves (1991) situated social practice approach. In
brief, sociocultural theorists who are closer to Laves interpretive view
emphasize semiotic mediation and individual psychological processes
(reasoning, motives, goals), whereas those closer to the situated social
practice view emphasize cultural praxis. Recent writings by socio-
cultural theorists further articulate these two aspects of Vygotskys
original framework (Forman et al. 1993; Rogoff 1990; Wertsch 1981;
1985a).
2. Tomasello et al. refer to "voice" (sect. 1, para. 4) when discussing
the internalization of the perspective of the other. Yet they do not appear
to view voice as an example of semiotic mediation, as Wertsch (1991)
does.
Cultural learning as the transmission
mechanism in an evolutionary process
Liane M. Gabora
Department of Biology, University of California at Los Angeles, Los
Angeles, CA 90049-1606
Electronic mall: lianetilcs.ucla.edu
A central thesis of the target article is that (a) individuals must
view each other as intentional agents and be able to adopt one
another's perspective for cultural learning to take place, and (b)
cultural learning is necessary for the emergence of cultural
evolution, wherein the cultural products or memes (Dawkins
1976b) "accumulate modifications over time" and exhibit the
ratchet effect. Tomasello et al. argue that cultural learning and
cultural evolution are uniquely human and that this is because
we alone are capable of intersubjectivity. To illustrate a possible
flaw in this argument, consider the evolution of an understand-
ing of the relationship between the phases of the moon and the
height of the tides. (This example is borrowed from Hutchins
and Hazelhurst 1992). Some individuals look at the moon night
after night, chart the rise and fall of the tides and explore the
notion that the two are correlated - they learn directly by
assimilating observations of the natural world. They pass this
knowledge on toothers. However, if the individuals that initiate
the cultural evolutionary process do not necessarily need to
conceive of the source of their knowledge as an intentional
agent, why must their students think of them in this way?
Tomasello et al. present convincing evidence that intersubjec-
tivity facilitates learning, but it should be pointed out that it is
possible for complex information to be learned without it. Fur-
thermore, there is no theoretical reason why intersubjectivity is
necessary for cultural evolution; genetic evolution proceeds
nicely without it. Evolution simply requires (1) imperfectly
replicated patterns and (2) selection (differential reproduction of
patterns according to their fitness in the current environment).
In a computer model of cultural evolution that I have devised
(Cabora 1992) a society of neural networks store, exchange, and
embellish memes. These "meme hosts" cannot yet develop
models of one another - they do not adopt one another's
perspective, etc. - but their interactions give rise to the emer-
gence of complex memes, and the dynamics of the system has
much in common with human cultural evolution.
Tomasello et al. make two claims that appear to contradict one
another. The first is that cultures are most clearly distinguished
from other forms of social organization by the nature of their
products, a critical feature of which is the accumulation of
modifications over time. The second is the claim that humans
transmit information with higher fidelity than any other species,
and that this, in combination with inventiveness, forms the basis
for cultural evolution. The first claim suggests that it is the
susceptibility of human memes to mutation that enables them to
evolve, whereas the second suggests the opposite, that it is
resistance to mutation that permits their evolution. This appar-
ent contradiction can perhaps be reconciled with a clarification:
The rate at which human memes mutate is high enough to bring
about diversity (the raw material of evolution) but low enough to
safeguard against excessive disintegration of the information
content.
A second thesis of the target article is that there is an
ontogenetic progression from imitative to instructed to collab-
orative learning. The distinction between these forms of learn-
ing is insightful; however, instead of three categories we might
just as well have two: imitative and collaborative. The goal of the
first is to produce a copy of the original meme, the goal of the
second is to produce a new meme, and instruction can play a role
in either. In discussing the role of instruction, I am not con-
vinced that the rather vague notion of intersubjectivity need be
brought in. With simple imitative learning the meme fits readily
into the learner's conceptual framework, whereas with in-
structed learning it does not; the necessary "precursor memes'
must first be put in place. (It is useless to attempt to teach matrix
algebra to someone who does not know how to multiply, much as
it is useless to insert into an organism's DNA the genes that code
for the manufacture of the last enzyme in a pathway until it
possesses genes that code for the other enzymes.)
The authors' suggestion that children progress from imitative
to collaborative learning parallels the progression from nonsex-
ual to sexual reproduction in genetic evolution. In each case,
there is a transition from a conservative mode of pattern replica-
tion in which accidental mutation is the only source of variation,
to a more exploratory mode, involving not only mutation but the
combination of relatively successful patterns to create novel
ones. This transition is generally beneficial because it produces
a creamier "cream of the crop"; we can leap across the fitness
landscape and find optima more quickly. In genetic evolution,
the cream is creamier because there is more variation to choose
from. In cultural evolution, the cream is creamier because we
use background knowledge to guide our combining of memes,
biasing the outcome in favor of potentially fruitful combinations.
Thus it makes sense that collaborative learning appears later in
life than other forms of learning, when a knowledge base has
been built up. The exploratory mode of reproduction is useful to
both contributors only when their contributions are approx-
imately equally fit, otherwise the less fit pattern merely dilutes
the fitter pattern. Hence, from an optimization standpoint, the
authors' claim that collaborative learning takes place when the
participant's level of expertise is symmetrical also makes perfect
sense.
In summary, the target article presents an interesting analysis
of cultural learning, which can be enriched by viewing cultural
learning as the transmission mechanism in an evolutionary
process. Since intersubjectivity is not a prerequisite to evolu-
tion, its role in cultural evolution should be viewed as facilitative
only. The distinction between imitative and collaborative learn-
ing is useful and makes sense in the context of optimization.
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Learning stages and person conceptions
Alvin I. Goldman
Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721
Electronic mail: goldman@ccit.arizona.edu
As a staunch defender of the role that perspective-taking, or
simulation, plays in interpreting the mental states of others
(Goldman 1989; 1992a; 1992b; 1993), I am perhaps predisposed
to sympathize with any attempt to apply this phenomenon in
various domains. Still, I don't think my fascination with
Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner's conjecture can be chalked up
entirely to a prior interest in the simulation theory. They make a
convincing case for the thesis that human cultural learning is a
distinctive kind of learning, and they marshall an impressive
range of evidence in support of the proposal that simulation, or
perspective-taking, plays a critical role in this learning. Their
tripartite division of types of cultural learning, however, is not
entirely persuasive, and their precise characterization of this
division has some conceptual problems.
One problem concerns the distinction between imitative and
instructed learning. In the imitative learning stage, according to
Tomasello et al., the child conceives of the adult as an intentional
agent, that is, an agent who has perceptions and intentions. By
contrast, at the instructed learning stage, the child conceives of
adults as mental agents, who also have thoughts and beliefs,
which may be compared and contrasted with the child's own
thoughts and beliefs.
What critical difference distinguishes intentional and mental
agents? Are thoughts and beliefs more mentalistic than percep-
tions and intentions, or somehow different in kind? In the
philosophical literature, thoughts and beliefs are not regarded
as more mentalistic than perceptions and intentions. Intentions
can also be misdirected at the world in roughly the same way as
beliefs. For example, one might intend to move an object from
place X to place Y although the object is not initially at place X at
all. So what is the significant difference between persons con-
ceived as intentional agents and as mental agents?
Perhaps the crucial contrast is not between perceptions and
intentions, on the one hand, and thoughts and beliefs, on the
other, but lies in the fact that at the later stage the child
compares or relates the adult's perspective to his own. If this
interpretation is right, however, what justifies the claim that two
different "conceptions of a person" characterize the first two
stages or types of cultural learning?
The relation between the second and third types of learning
stages is not problematic in the same way. The view of a person
associated with collaborative learning is that of a reflective agent
who engages in second-order mental states such as "thinking
that I think John is cute." This recursive thinking is clearly a
different type of phenomenon from first-order mental states, but
why it is essential for collaborative learning? Why wouldn't a
mere dialogue of the sort Tomasello et al. associate with in-
structed learning suffice for the coconstruction process charac-
teristic of collaborative learning? The authors say that in collab-
orative learning children must be able to criticize another child's
criticism of their previous suggestion. This shows that the child
must recall the contents of the respective proposals and must be
able to compare and contrast them, as in the instructed learning
stage. But why is second-order thinking essential? Why must a
child represent the other as having a recursive mentalistic
representation?
Another feature of the collaborative learning process
Tomasello et al. emphasize is that neither interactant is an
authority or expert. They work together as peers, arriving
jointly at a solution that neither has at the beginning. This
feature suggests a difference along a further dimension: a will-
ingness on the part of each child to think of himself as an
independent contributor to the knowledge construction pro-
cess, ready to come into sociocognitive conflict with his partner.
This seems quite distinct from the recursive dimension. If the
authors mean to identify two entirely different elements as
distinctive of the collaborative form of learning, well and good.
Their discussion suggests, however, that the two elements are
necessarily connected with each other, and that has not been
persuasively argued.
On a different point, Tomasello et al. try to guard the simula-
tion approach against the implication that children must first
understand their own intentional states before they may use
them to simulate the perspective of others. They cite Copnik
(1993) in support of the claim that, empirically, this implication
does not appear to hold. They accordingly endorse the
Vygotskian view that an understanding of other persons through
social interaction underlies the understanding of the self. But if
the understanding of another's mental states consists (primarily)
of projecting states of your own into their situation, don't you
need some prior and independent grasp of those states? Other-
wise, how could you even represent them as being in the other
person? So the simulation approach does invite the idea that one
understands mental state concepts "from one's own case" (Cold-
man 1989). This position, however, may well comport with the
current empirical evidence, contrary to what Tomasello et al.
assert. For example, Cassidy (1993) cites studies of Smiley and
Huttenlocher (1989) and Povinelli and deBlois (1992) in support
of the hypothesis that self-application of mental state concepts
(or words) comes first, or is easier than application of these
concepts to others.
Although I have raised a few problems for the target article,
these are comparatively minor worries or disagreements about a
generally quite attractive set of ideas.
Agents, intentions and enculturated apes
Juan Carlos G6mez
Departamento de Psicologia Bdsica, Universidad Autdnoma de Madrid,
28049 Madrid, Spain
Electronic mail: jgomez(accuam3.sdi.uam.es
The target article is a source of mixed feelings to anyone engaged
in comparative research involving humans and anthropoids. A
first feeling is of satisfaction to see a general framework - in this
case Tomasello et al.'s cultural learning theory - where so many
things can be put together and compared. The other feeling,
however, is of frustration, even disappointment, to realize that
so many gaps and uncertainties emerge from the picture. Is the
target article a premature attempt at a synthesis? I had this
feeling at several points. But this feeling was countered by
another, namely, that a first attempt at a synthesis may help to
highlight the gaps that need to be filled. In what follows I try to
offer a contribution on two points addressed by the target article:
the concept of "enculturated ape," and the "person concept.
What is an enculturated ape? My first comment has to do with
the authors' concept of "educated" or "enculturated" ape. They
seem to suggest that any anthropoid infant reared by humans
should be included in the category. Tomasello et al., therefore,
seem to equate "hand-reared" and "enculturated." For example,
they refer to the subject of my study on joint attention (Gomez
1990; 1991) as an "enculturated gorilla." I find it difficult,
however, to identify my subject as enculturated in the same
sense that famous anthropoids such as Washoe, Sarah, Koko, or
Kanzi can be said to be encultured. I think it is important to
distinguish between educated or enculturated apes, who have
been subjected to symbolic training or have been reared in an
experimental environment specially designed to enhance inte-
gration with humans, and merely hand-reared apes, who have
been reared in contact with people but without receiving formal
"education."
For example, my own subject, a female gorilla called Muni,
whose joint-attentional skills are mentioned by Tomasello et al.,
showed this joint-attentional ability before receiving any formal
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training in symbol use (Cdmez 1990; 1991).' She had been hand-
reared in a zoo nursery environment in contact with humans and
a monkey partner for a year (when she was about one year old).
From the second year, her contact with humans became more
restricted when she was integrated with three other gorillas. It
is true that at first she was bottle-fed, wore nappies for a time,
and had access to a variety of human objects and companions for
about 10-12 hours a day during her first year in the zoo. Perhaps
that experience with humans was enough to "socialize her
attention" (whatever this process involves) to some human
degree; but is this enough to consider her to be enculturated in
the same sense as apes subject to long-term home-rearing and
symbol-teaching conditions?
I do not think the term "enculturated" represents adequately
the status of merely hand-reared apes - especially if they are
hand-reared in zoo nurseries. Even if it is clear that their infant
experiences differ in important ways from those of the typical
zoo-born gorillas raised by their mothers (not to mention the
typical gorilla infancy in the wild), I don't think their experience
can be equated with that of Washoe, Sarah, Koko, or Kanzi. I
think the distinction between hand-reared and educated or
enculturated is an important one. As Tomasello etal. point out in
the target article, evidence about the sociocognitive abilities of
captive apes (including both hand-reared and educated) is
scarce and difficult to evaluate. Even so, I think there are cues
that point to possible important differences between symbol-
trained anthropoids and (merely) hand-reared ones. For exam-
ple, Premack and Premack (1983) report differences in problem-
solving abilities between both kinds of chimpanzees. I suggest
that the distinction between hand-reared and enculturated apes
will prove to be useful in the comparative assessment of their
sociocognitive abilities.
Person concepts. The other point upon which I will comment
concerns "person concept." I will concentrate on the person
concept that appears at around 9-12 months in human children
- what Tomasello et al. call the "intentional agent' concept. I
think there may be a problem with the use of the term "inten-
tional." It is necessary to distinguish between understanding
intentions and understanding goal-directedness.2
Understanding an organism as goal-directed involves seeing
it as capable not only of self-propulsion but also of directing its
movements toward particular targets. A goal-directed agent can
be understood in terms of movements, without reference to
internal or mental states. However, one can also understand that
the goal is represented by the organism, and this would properly
be an understanding of the intention held by the other. But note
that this understanding would already imply some reference to
the mental life of the other, thereby qualifying as an understand-
ing of persons as mental agents. Probably this is only a termi-
nological problem, but it would be interesting to try to further
clarify what is meant by understanding others as intentional
agents.
In this connection, another possible problem has to do with
the characterization of the intentional agent concept as "0
order." I assume - but perhaps my assumption is wrong - that
the authors refer to something similar to Dennett's orders of
intentionality (Dennett 1983). However, in Dennett's scheme,
considering the other as an intentional agent would qualify at
least as first-order intentionality, if not as second-order (after all,
this level involves the ability to understand other people's
behavior as intentional). I do not mean that Tomasello et al.
should adopt Dennett's conceptions and terminology, but per-
haps it would be wise to clarify a potential source of misunder-
standing.
Finally, I would like to call Tomasello et al.'s attention to an
important dissociation found in the development of preverbal
intentional communication in normal human infants, autistic
children, and hand-reared apes. Our studies (G6mez etal. 1993)
have shown an important difference between the spontaneous
joint-attentional skills of gorillas and those of normal human
infants. Briefly, human infants at around 12 months of age are
capable of using gestures both to request things from people and
to point out things to people apparently for the sake of sharing
with them the attention on that particular object. These two
kinds of gestures have come to be known as protoimperatives
and protodeclaratives, respectively (Bates 1976). A study con-
ducted on a hand-reared gorilla (G6mez 1992; G6mez et al.
1993) has shown that although this animal developed complex
joint-attentional skills in request situations, she never engaged
in protodeclarative gesturing (she never showed objects to her
human caretakers unless she wanted them to perform some-
thing with them).3 The absence of protodeclarative behaviors
has also been reported or suggested in chimpanzees (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al. 1983). On the other hand, several studies have
demonstrated that in autistic children there is an absence of
protodeclarative gesturing too, whereas they seem to be able to
engage in request behaviors by means of gestures (see G6mez et
al. 1993, for a summary of results). It is interesting to note that
protodeclarative behaviors have been related to later theory-of-
mind abilities. Furthermore, there is at least one study demon-
strating a correlation between protodeclaratives and imitative
skills (San-id & Riviere 1991). One interesting question that
immediately comes to mind concerns whether enculturated
chimpanzees and gorillas develop protodeclarative gestures as a
consequence of their "education," as well as they seem to
develop more elaborate imitative skills. This pattern of dissocia-
tion between communicative behaviors involving joint-
attentional skills suggests that the concept of person identified
by Tomasello et al. as "intentional agent" may have different
components that could relate differently to cultural learning.
NOTES
1. Our gorilla eventually received a limited amount of experimental
sign-learning sessions when she was about 3-4 years old. The training
sessions were very restricted in scope and frequency and far from the
thorough and massive education reported in most ape language experi-
ments. Not surprisingly, she never achieved the results reported in
proper language training experiments (e.g., Patterson 1978).
2. It was Simon Baron-Cohen who first alerted me to the need to
keep this difference in mind.
3. See Gdmez (1992) for a discussion of some candidates for
protodeclarative-like behaviors in this subject. Even these examples
seem to be far from full-fledged protodeclarative behaviors as described
in humans.
Imitation, cultural learning and the origins of
"theory of mind"
Alison Gopnik3 and Andrew Meltzoff"
'Department of Psychology, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley,
CA 94720 and "Department of Psychology, University of Washington,
Seattle, WA 98185
Electronic mail: 'gopnik@cmsa.berkeley.edu;
bmeltzoff@max. u. Washington, edu
This target article argues for a connection between two aspects
of development: cultural learning and cognitive conceptions of
the person. Tomasello et al.'s presentation of this connection is
novel and interesting and we think they are right that these two
areas of development are related. However, it is not clear to us
exactly what developmental story Tomasello et al. are propos-
ing. It could be that there are general underlying changes that
allow both the development of new social-cognitive skills and
new forms of cultural learning. Alternatively, the independent
development of the social-cognitive skills could underlie the
new forms of cultural learning. Tomasello et al. also write in
some places as if it were the cultural learning abilities them-
selves that allowed the new understanding of social cognition
(this is implicit, for example, in their discussion of the data on
enculturated chimpanzees, and their endorsement of "cultural
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psychology"). In short, although Tomasello et al. have admirably
sketched a plausible connection between two areas of develop-
ment, we need to develop a clearer account of the causal and
developmental relations that underpin this connection.
These problems are not unique to Tomasello et al., of course.
Our interactions with children and even young infants have a
richness and intimacy that seems to require interpersonal un-
derstanding, and at a broad ecological level we can identify the
sorts of general changes that Tomasello et al. describe. Yet it is
difficult to find any single behavior that justifies those impres-
sions, or to imagine just what cognitive mechanisms could
sustain them. The developmental problem is even more acute.
What kinds of mechanisms are responsible for the changes in
understanding that Tomasello et al. describe?
We think part of the answer to the developmental question
may lie in a sort of reversal of Tomasello et al. s argument. They
see the social-cognitive abilities as the underpinning for cultural
learning, particularly imitative abilities. We suggest that this
relation may be reversed, that is, imitation itself may serve as a
mechanism driving our ability to understand the mental states of
others. In combination with strong theory-formation abilities,
imitation may serve as a motor for social-cognitive development.
The unique feature of imitation, as Tomasello et al. note, is
that it both requires and instantiates a mapping from the actions
of one person to those of another. More significantly, even the
earliest forms of imitations, the imitation of facial gestures like
tongue protrusion and mouth opening, also involve a mapping
from the visually perceived behavior of the other to internal
sensations and to a plan of action that is formulated in the mind
of the self. For example, imitating tongue protrusion requires
that the infant map the visually perceived movement of another
person onto his own movements, known only through internal
kinesthetic sensations, and formulate a plan to execute those
movements. Infants demonstrate these imitative abilities even
when they are only a few hours old (Meltzoff & Moore 1977;
1983). Moreover, recent studies show that this behavior is not a
simple reflex (Meltzoff & Moore 1992).
The fact that infants imitate the facial gestures of others at
birth is relevant to a basic psychological and philosophical
puzzle. How do we ever come to map our experience of our-
selves onto our experience of others at all? The sensory informa-
tion we have about ourselves seems to consist of a stream of
internal sensations, thoughts, feelings, and intentions, the occa-
sional waving hand or foot, and a blurry edge of nose, whereas
our sensory information about others is of a bag of skin moving
over the ground. And yet the identification of ourselves and
others as similar beings seems effortless. This identification is a
prerequisite for any of the conceptions of the person Tomasello
et al. discuss, as well as for other accounts of the child's theory of
mind.
A number of authors have suggested that infants have some
innate "intersubjectivity" (cf. Stern 1985; Trevarthen 1980), but
the evidence for these claims has been unclear. Trevarthen and
Stern point to the infant's "conversational dances": the elaborate
play of eye contact, vocalization, an d gesture between infant and
mother. But why should these temporal coordinations require
the sense that the other person is "like me" in fundamental
ways? The fact of newborn imitation suggests a deeper identi-
fication between the self and the other. To imitate, infants must
somehow assign the same representation to perceived move-
ments of others and their own internal kinesthetic sensations.
This is apparently an innate ability.
This innate bridge between the self and the other accounts for
the basic fact that the behaviors of others are automatically
construed as relevant to my own behaviors, intentions, and
plans. More significantly, however, imitation can also serve as a
source for more elaborated understandings of the person. By 9
months infants imitate not only gestures but also actions on
objects, in the way Tomasello et al. describes; they also recog-
nize when their own actions on objects are being imitated by
others (Meltzoff 1990). We suggest, however, that this ability is
an elaboration of the earlier more foundational ability to identify
the self and others in the first place. We have suggested, for
example, that the mutual imitation games between infant and
mother that are commonly found in infancy may serve as a sort of
theory-of-mind tutorial, specifying for the infant what his own
relations and attitudes to objects and persons ought to be
(Meltzoff & Gopnik 1993).
This example raises an important point about the develop-
mental continuities between various early conceptions of the
person. Imitation, by itself, has seemed to many, including
Tomasello et al., to be limited to rather superficial behavioral
mimicry. Now combine the impulse to imitate, and the identi-
fication of self and other that underlies it, with highly powerful
theory-formation abilities. Suppose the child is simultaneously
trying to understand people and to be like them. For example,
as the child begins to understand relations between people and
objects at 9 months, the relevant units, as it were, for imitation
turn into actions on objects rather than actions per se. The basic
mechanism, namely, the identification of the behavior of others
with our own intentions and internal states, is the same but the
construal of what the behavior of others is, and therefore what
our own internal states are, has become far more sophisticated.
The child's behavior starts to look less like imitation and more
like attribution.
Now suppose that the child makes some even more sophisti-
cated theory-like generalizations about behavior, say, those
generalizations that are involved in a new understanding of
beliefs at about age 4. Several investigators have argued that
such generalizations are responsible for the changes in false-
belief performance at around this age (Gopnik & Wellman 1992).
It is crucial for Tomasello et al.'s arguments about cultural
learning that children not only make this generalization but
apply it equally to themselves and others; and indeed the
empirical evidence suggests this is the case (Gopnik 1993). But
why would children apply these generalizations to themselves?
It sounds odd to say that children "imitate" beliefs or desires in
the way that they imitate actions, but we think the basic
mechanism may be the same. Children develop a more sophisti-
cated and abstract conception of human behavior, which in-
cludes "theoretical entities" like belief and desire. Given the
fundamental and innate identification between the behavior of
others and the internal states of the self, the child attributes
these states to both the self and other. As a consequence, when
children have an inaccurate view of others, their view of them-
selves is similarly inaccurate. For example, children who fail to
understand the false beliefs of others also fail to understand their
own false beliefs (Gopnik 1993).
This combination of theory formation and imitation may itself
lead to some of the unique and puzzling features of human
culture. When we develop knowledge about objects, we feel no
impulse to extend that knowledge to ourselves or to regulate our
actions in accord with it. When we develop similar knowledge
about persons, on the other hand, especially the persons closest
to us, we do indeed attribute similar states of mind to ourselves,
and act in accord with them. This fairly simple story might
provide a basis for the mysterious "internalization" that
Vygotsky (1962), representatives of the psychoanalytic tradition,
and others have postulated. It would also help to explain the
cultural "racheting" that Tomasello et al. describe so well.
We suggest, then, that imitation and the identification of self
and other that underlies it is more than just one more form of
cultural learning. It may lie very near to the heart of the
astonishing ability of human beings to understand the minds of
their conspecifics and to attribute similar mental states to
themselves and others. As humans, we use our extraordinary
theory-creating abilities to construct ever more elaborate and
abstract accounts of the behavior of others. It is, however, our
basic identification with others, manifested first in imitation,
that leads us to treat these theoretical constructions not only as
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cold generalizations about the behavior of others, but as descrip-
tions of the deepest and most fundamental aspects of our own
being.
Child development and theories of culture:
A historical perspective
Robin L. Harwood
Department of Psychology, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA
70148
Electronic mail: rlhps@uno.edu
One of the most intriguing aspects of Tomasello et al.'s formula-
tion is their synthesis of two historically disparate lines of
inquiry in cross-cultural child development: (a) grounding in an
evolutionary model, and (b) explicit identification with more
interpretive approaches to culture.
Evolutionary I adaptationlst approaches. Historically, both an-
thropology and developmental psychology emerged from the
progressive developmental paradigm that we today associate
with such nineteenth-century evolutionist thinkers as Spencer,
Haeckel, Romanes, Morgan, and Tylor (Morss 1990; Stocking
1984). Based on non-Darwinian evolutionary speculation, as
well as on a misreading of Darwin himself, this paradigm
maintained that development consists of an orderly sequence of
changes that are parallel across the individual, the history of
civilization, and the course of evolution itself.
This paradigm ceased to be dominant in cultural anthropology
early in the twentieth century, due in part to post-World War I
disillusionment with the presumed superiority of Western civili-
zation, and in part to the rise of the structural/functionalist
approaches of Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski. Child psychol-
ogy, on the other hand, took a different course in that the search
for universal, sequential stages of development remained a
more paradigmatically dominant concern (e.g., Baldwin,
Freud, Piaget).
The cultural study of the child, however, did not emerge from
within developmental psychology, but instead from Mal-
inowskian functionalism in anthropology. Ruth Benedict and
Margaret Mead, students of Malinowski, are generally credited
with founding the culture and personality movement - a move-
ment whose dominance in cross-cultural child psychology is still
felt (e.g., Segall et al. 1990). In the late 1950s, culture and
personality incorporated the ecosystem concept in anthropol-
ogy (Steward 1955) to form what Keesing (1981) terms "cultural
adaptationism." According to this view, the socializing context of
the child is an ecosystem in which the physical environment,
modes of production, social organization, and belief systems are
all viewed as functionally interdependent and coexisting in an
adaptive equilibrium. Culture itself is ultimately defined as
socially transmitted behaviors that are adaptive to an environ-
ment common to a group of people. Adult personality plays a
functional role in relation to a society's economy and the goal of
child training is to produce personality traits that are adaptive to
a society's economic needs (Whiting & Whiting 1975).
To this day, when developmental psychologists choose a
theory, it is usually an heir to the progressive developmental
paradigm, with its search for an orderly and universal sequence
of change across the lifespan. Concomitantly, when child psy-
chologists reach for a theory of culture, it is generally some
variant of cultural adaptationism. However, cultural adaptation-
ism has fallen into disfavor among both cultural anthropologists
and cultural psychologists. First, its inherent functionalism has
been heavily criticized for confusing the genesis of practices
with their current use (Little 1991). Second, scholars have
questioned the assumption that ecosystems exist as isolable
units (Drummond 1980). Third, the failure to find lawful rela-
tions between environmental variables and particular attitudes
and behaviors has called into question the notion that all aspects
of an ecosystem exist in a necessary interrelationship (Super &
Harkness 1986). Fourth, increased disillusionment with the idea
that researchers can identify stable characteristics of individuals
apart from situational determinants (Mischel 1968) has chal-
lenged the notion of personality itself. Finally, the cognitive
revolution in psychology has brought with it greater interest in
the cognitive processing of social demands, a perspective that
necessitates a more fluid, contextualized approach than that
suggested by a notion of generalized adaptive tendencies (Labo-
ratory of Comparative Human Cognition 1983). Interest in
cognition has in turn paved the way for more interpretive
approaches to the study of culture.
Interpretive approaches. Although diverse in their particu-
lars, interpretive approaches generally share two central con-
cepts: (a) Human beings construct meaning through their cul-
tural symbol systems, with language being one of culture's most
powerful symbol systems; and (b) this construction occurs within
a matrix of social interaction. Interpretive approaches within the
social sciences have included: symbolic interactionism (Mead
1934); sociolinguistics (Gumperz & Hymes 1986); postmodern
cultural anthropology (Clifford 1986); social constructionism
(Shweder 1990); sociohistorical approaches (Vygotsky 1978); and
Ochs and Schieffelin's (1986) interactional view of socialization.
According to interpretive approaches, through the process of
socialization individuals acquire "stock knowledge" for use in
constructing and interpreting contexts; through participation in
social activities with culturally competent interactants, individ-
uals internalize interactional norms and gain performative com-
petencies. The child is thus viewed as an active organizer of the
rule-governed understandings to be abstracted from the speech
acts of everyday social interactions. Although this has led to
increasingly popular narrative/linguistic studies of socialization
(see Garvey 1992), interpretive approaches have generally been
considered too "soft" and "murky" for child psychologists seek-
ing universal laws of human nature; the latter have tended to
look instead to evolutionary/adaptationist models (e.g., Segall et
al. 1990) for explanatory mechanisms.
Cultural learning. The theory of cultural learning offered by
Tomasello et al. clearly shares some aspects of the evolution-
ary/adaptationist approach outlined above. First, it contains
elements of a comparative model with its appeal to research on
chimpanzees and autistic children. Second, it outlines an or-
derly, presumably universal sequence of developmental stages.
Finally, it is clearly influenced by Boyd and Richerson's (1985)
dual-inheritance theory, a processual approach within contem-
porary anthropology which seeks to explain how biological
evolution led to the capacity for culture and its diversity.
Tomasello et al., however, upset the status quo of cultural
approaches to the study of child development by combining
their theory's evolutionary grounding with key aspects of the
interpretive approach: the central role of human cognition, the
significance of language as a symbolic system, the importance of
the social context in the internalization of the "voice' of the
other, and a stated commitment to "the emerging paradigm of
Cultural Psychology" as articulated by Shweder (1990). Many
researchers may find that this model lacks some of the defining
characteristics of a fully interpretive approach (e.g., emphases
on the coconstruction of a worldview, the arbitrariness of most
aspects of culture, the importance and variability of cultural
meaning systems, and the extent to which individuals' percep-
tions are shaped by those meaning systems). Nonetheless,
Tomasello et al.'s cultural learning model represents an attempt
at and an opportunity for rapprochement between two histori-
cally disparate and deeply entrenched schools of thought. Such
a rapprochement may be essential to further progress in the
field of cross-cultural child psychology.
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Cultural learning: Are there functional
consequences?
Marc D. Hauser
Department of Biological Anthropology and Psychology, Harvard
University, Cambridge, MA 02138
Electronic mail: hauser@harvarda.bitnet
Two problems commonly surface when scientists attempt to
provide evolutionary accounts of human cognition. First, proxi-
mate causation (i.e., mechanism) is often viewed as an alterna-
tive to ultimate causation (i.e., adaptive function). It is not.
Second, performance on a task is equated with cognitive ability.
This is only sometimes true.
In this commentary I raise two objections. I claim that a more
complete evolutionary account of human culture will require
the integration of a more explicit functional stance, exploring
the fitness consequences of the different mechanisms of infor-
mation transmission in the social arena. This claim is important
for the second point, which is that current assessments of the
"special" nature of human cognition depend on the reliability,
robustness, and interpretation of current work on nonhuman
animal cognition. I believe this is a weak foundation for building
evolutionary theories of cognition.
Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner believe that cultural learning
and the products it generates are the result of cognitive pro-
cesses whose origins are within the hominid line rather than
within the more ancient hominoid or even primate line. This
claim is difficult to defend because it relies completely on the
strength of experiments with extant nonhuman primates. As the
history of research on animal intelligence warns us, we must be
careful to distinguish between ability and performance. Because
so few controlled experiments have been conducted to assess
the cognitive abilities of our closest relatives (and I would
include all of the nonhuman primates, not just chimpanzees), I
don't believe that current performance is actually indicative of
ability. I suppose that in this sense, I am a closet MacPhailian
who believes that it takes considerable work to demonstrate the
lack of an ability. We are a long way off from claims regarding the
representations, beliefs, and intentions of monkeys and apes.
Tomasello et al. want to rule out some of the observations of
chimpanzee culture and imitation as bona fide examples be-
cause they do not meet some of the stringent criteria that have
been set up. I found, however, that their discussion underesti-
mated the potential importance of nonhuman animal work and
in particular underemphasized the necessity of considering the
function of different mechanisms of transmission and the evolu-
tionary consequences they bring. Consider for the moment the
data on putative teaching in wild chimpanzees (Boesch 1991).
Tomasello et al. state that, in two cases, mothers appeared to
"slow down their tool use when infants were watching." This is
completely inaccurate. In one case the mother reoriented the
way in which her infant was holding the tool (i.e., a hammer
used to open nuts), and in the second case a mother reoriented
the position of the nut on the anvil to increase the probability of a
successful hit. This direct intervention on the part of the mother
suggests both that she recognized how things should be done
and that she recognized a deficiency in her infant with regard to
the requisite motor task. More important, as Caro and Hauser
(1992) have argued in a review paper on teaching in nonhuman
animals, instructive interactions do not require the ability to
attribute mental states to others. This is because from a func-
tional perspective what counts is whether the interaction leads
to significant fitness consequences. And in many recent cases of
socially mediated learning, there are clear fitness consequences
such as increased survivorship (e.g., Aisner & Terkell 1992;
Hauser, in press). Although Tomasello et al. cite our paper as
providing a "more generous interpretation of animal teaching,"
it has nothing to do with generosity. Rather, our view reflects an
emphasis on the adaptive function of teaching as opposed to the
mechanisms of teaching. Thus, to summarize my first point, if an
evolutionary account of human cognition is desirable, as
Tomasello et al. clearly seem to suggest, then it is absolutely
essential for the theory to consider the function of different
mechanisms of transmission and thus why the hominid line
developed its own special breed of cognitive abilities - if it did.
My second point concerns the claim that nonhuman primates
lack the appropriate cognitive capacities to engage in cultural
learning. We now know from the work of several neuropsycholo-
gists that nonhuman primates have the ability to represent, over
fairly long periods of time, complex visual and auditory informa-
tion. Among the key neural players are the prefrontal cortex,
amygdala, and hippocampus. The strong claim of the target
article by Tomasello et al. is that nonhuman primates, in particu-
lar chimpanzees, lack the ability to take the perspective of
others and thus lack the ability to make use of intentional
instruction or to engage in intentional collaborations. I would
like to suggest that our nonhuman primate relatives have the
neural machinery to engage in the sorts of cultural learning
discussed by Tomasello et al. and that there are in fact cases that
are at least as suggestive as those described for preverbal human
infants. For example, Stammbach (1988) has shown that when a
subordinate individual is trained to perform a task that yields
extremely valuable goods (i.e., food) and no other group mem-
ber is capable of performing the task, the subordinate's status in
the group changes. Specifically, although dominant individuals
would normally supplant a subordinate from food, the subordi-
nate individual is now allowed to keep some of the goods as long
as he continues to perform the task. In this example, there is
clearly collaboration and, although the individuals involved may
be basing their actions on the behavior of others rather than on
their mental states, it implies a level of sophistication that I
believe Tomasello et al. fail to consider. And, in the case
involved, there are clearly functional consequences to the col-
laborative effort.
In conclusion, although I would very much like to see
Tomasello et al. place their framework in a more functionally
based perspective, I applaud them on their effective integration
of issues in the cognitive sciences, developmental psychology,
and behavioral biology. They have certainly provided those of us
working on nonhuman animals with some theoretical targets to
shoot at and for.
Imitation without perspective-taking
C. M. Heyes
Department of Psychology, University College London, London WC1E 6BT,
England
Electronic mail: ucjtsch@ucl.ac.uk
Tomasello et al. offer a hypothesis to explain the unique char-
acteristics of human traditions. They have identified features
that distinguish human and nonhuman traditions with unusual
clarity and their hypothesis is intriguing, but the target article
leaves me unconvinced that social-cognitive abilities such as
perspective-taking play "a vital role" in cultural learning.
My doubts about the relationship between social-cognitive
abilities and cultural learning were aroused principally by
Tomasello et al.'s discussion of imitation. They suggested both
that perspective-taking is logically necessary for imitation and
that there is convincing empirical evidence of a link between the
two. Both these propositions are, I shall argue, false and their
cooccurrence is a sign of confusion. If imitation implied
perspective-taking then it would be unnecessary to seek empiri-
cal evidence that the capacities for imitation and perspective-
taking coincide. Instead of opting to rest their case on one claim
or the other, Tomasello et al. have, I suspect, allowed false
preconceptions about the psychological processes underlying
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imitation to guide their interpretation of the empirical
evidence.
Tomasello et al. suggest that perspective-taking is logically
necessary for imitation in section 2.2: "Reproducing an adult's
novel behavior in both its form and appropriate function (i.e.,
imitative learning) clearly requires some understanding of what
the adult is perceiving and intending because without such un-
derstanding the child cannot know which aspects of the adult's
behavior are relevant or irrelevant." There are in fact at least two
ways in which an individual could achieve form and function or
action and outcome reproduction without perspective-taking
(Heyes 1992). First, if individuals observe a model executing
several different action-outcome sequences (e.g., see a ball
being thrown underarm and overarm and landing in different
places), then they might learn that certain, observable features
of the action are predictive of certain, observable outcomes, and
selectively reproduce those features that are predictive of the
outcome that is desired. This process may be described as
action-outcome contingency learning by observation. Second,
an individual could "mimic' a model's behaviour, that is, repro-
duce the action without expectations about its outcome, let alone
any apprehension of the model's goal (if any) in performing the
action. Tomasello et al. acknowledge the possibility of mimicry
without saying how, in general, it may be distinguished empiri-
cally from imitation; and they overlook the possibility of action-
outcome contingency learning altogether.
Tomasello et al.'s case for empirical rather than a logical link
between imitation and perspective-taking is also unconvincing,
for at least two reasons. First, it dismisses without proper
justification evidence of imitation in creatures that are thought
to be incapable of perspective-taking. For example, the capacity
of newborns to imitate facial movements and head turnings
(Mcltzoff & Moore 1989) is discounted on the grounds that it
does not involve "the acquisition of novel behaviors," but it is not
clear why this fact might protect Tomasello et al.'s hypothesis
from discontinuation by Meltzoff & Moore's (1989) data. The
requirement that a behaviour be novel in order to qualify as
evidence of imitation was imposed when researchers could not
think of another reliable means of distinguishing imitation from
the chance occurrence of matching behaviour (e.g., Thorpe
1956). Now that the possibility of chance or coincidental match-
ing can be eliminated using, for example, Meltzoff and Moore's
(1989) "cross-target" procedure, continued adherence to the
novelty rule requires explanation. Tomasello et al. might explain
their adherence by pointing out that the reproduction of behav-
iours already in an individual's repertoire is unlikely to effect
behaviour transmission. This argument, however, would make
Tomasello et al.'s claim that imitation is a form of cultural
learning rather vacuous. If imitation were defined, in part, as a
learning process that effects behaviour transmission, and if the
potential to effect behaviour transmission were judged to be
sufficient to make a learning process "cultural," then imitation
would inevitably count as a form of "cultural learning." (Because
"cultural accumulation" is likely to depend at least as much on
processes of information retention as on mechanisms of informa-
tion acquisition, 1 would also contest the second premise above,
but that's another story - Heyes 1992).
Second, Tomasello et al.'s review of the literature is too
narrow to take account of the fact that when imitation is defined
as the reproduction of the form and function of a model's novel
behaviour there is evidence that both budgerigars and rats can
imitate. Budgerigars that have observed a conspecific using
either its beak or its feet to lift a flat cover from the top of a food
cup tend to use the same appendage as their model to lift the
cover (Calef et al. 1986). Rats that have observed a conspecific
pushing a joystick in one of two directions for food reward tend
subsequently to push the joystick in the same direction (relative
to the actor's body) as their model (Heyes & Dawson 1990;
Heyes et al. 1992). As far as I know, no one has tried to find out
whether budgerigars and rats can attribute intentions; hence
these experiments cannot be said to indicate with certainty that
perspective-taking is not necessary for imitation. However,
since our reasoning about vermin and budgies may be freer of
anthropomorphic bias than our reasoning about children and
chimpanzees, they are a reminder that the link between imita-
tion and perspective-taking is a bold, largely unsupported hy-
pothesis rather than a necessary truth.
Turning finally from imitation to "cultural learning" more
generally, I found Tomasello et al.'s remarks about "encultu-
rated" and "nonenculturated" chimpanzees inconsistent with
their claim that social-cognitive abilities such as perspective-
taking are required for imitative, instructive, and collaborative
learning. If their suggestion were valid then how could a "non-
enculturated" chimpanzee deficient in the relevant social-
cognitive abilities become an "enculturated" chimpanzee that
had sufficient social-cognitive ability to be capable of cultural
learning? Tomasello et al.'s concession that such a transforma-
tion may occur implies either that social-cognitive abilities
result from, rather than give rise to, imitative, instructive, and
collaborative learning, or that there is some other variety of
cultural learning that does not require social-cognitive ability.
Thus, far from providing convergent evidence that certain
social-cognitive abilities are necessary for cultural learning,
Tomasello et al.'s interpretation of the chimpanzee data appar-
ently contradicts that conclusion.
On acquiring the concept of "persons"
R. Peter Hobson
Developmental Psychopathology Research Unit, Tavistock Clinic, London
NW3 5BA, England
In their description of cultural learning, Tomasello, Kruger &
Ratner offer a timely and persuasive account of the emergence of
certain forms of perspective-taking that are unique to human
beings. The developmental story is couched in terms of the
child's growth in understanding about the nature of "persons." I
believe there is much to be said for adopting such an approach.
Tomasello et al. suggest that in successive stages of develop-
ment, a young child operates with different "concepts" or
"constructs" of the person: the intentional agent, the mental
agent, and the reflective agent. I shall concentrate on the first of
these categories.
The initial stage of cultural learning corresponds with the
infant's ability to learn through imitation of another person.
Such behavior appears towards the end of the first year of life and
requires that "the child must understand the demonstrator in
terms of his intentions toward things (i.e., as an intentional
agent) in order to distinguish the relevant and irrelevant aspects
of the demonstrator's behavior" (sect. 2.4, para. 5). In this
regard, Tomasello et al. emphasize the child's understanding of
what the adult is perceiving and intending. At several points
they also state that cultural learning occurs when the child
attempts to understand or perceive a situation in the way that
another person understands or perceives it.
Two questions arise. First, what is the kind of "understand-
ing" these infants have attained? Second, how is such under-
standing acquired?
I am doubtful whether it is appropriate to talk about the
infant's "concept" of persons at this early period. I say this, even
though I strongly agree that this is an important stage in the
acquisition of such a concept. Tomasello et al. seem to suggest
that in early imitation, infants themselves have the goal of
approximating their own actions and intentions to those of
another person, conceptualized as such. They are supposed to
have a concept of persons and a sophisticated degree of self-
reflective awareness, so that they can knowingly adopt or try to
adopt the psychological stance of someone else. I doubt whether
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this is a correct description of the 12-month-old. I agree that
infants are trying to act in correspondence with perceived
actions. For this to occur, "actions" have to be perceived as
actions and thus infants must have some awareness of the nature
of other persons. This having been said, infants may not have the
goal of adopting the other person's psychological perspective,
even if this is an outcome of what they arc attempting to achieve.
I would suggest that, on the contrary, it is partly through
imitating others' actions that infants come to experience and in
due course understand what it means to assume another per-
son's viewpoint. Only with such insight will they have acquired
the concept of a person as "someone in whose place I can put
myself" (Bosch 1970, p. 89), and only then will they be in a
position to "attempt" to adopt alternative perspectives as alter-
native perspectives. This seems to occur around the middle of
the second year of life.
Just now I suggested that it is "partly" through imitating
actions that a child comes to understand what it means to adopt
someone else's psychological orientation. What else might be
involved? I believe that Tomasello et al. are overly restrictive
and perhaps somewhat misleading in the way they characterize
the content of the child's interpersonal understanding at the end
of the first year of life. Here I shall need to supplement as well as
comment upon their ideas. The important thing to add is that
the infant apprehends other persons as having subjective orien-
tations and attitudes as well as intentions-in-acting. Such out-
wardly directed mental states are "intentional" in Brentano's
(1874/1973) sense of this word, but only a subgroup are inten-
tional in the sense of "intending-to-X" (and note that I am not
claiming the infant conceptualizes any of this). So, for example,
Tomasello et al. suggest that an understanding of another "in
terms of his intentions toward things (i.e., as an intentional
agent) . . . would also seem to underlie the child's early attempt
to make social reference, to engage in joint attention, and to
communicate intentionally with others" (sect. 2.4, para. 5). If
the authors meant that the "intentional agent" was construed as a
person who has psychological attitudes towards the world, then
the terms would be defensible, at least in a qualified way;
however, it is not clear that this is what they mean. They do not
consider the processes by which an infant comes to perceive,
react to, and sometimes assume the psychological orientations
(as opposed to the actions) of others, nor do they analyze how the
child becomes aware of the "intentionality of mind" behind
"intending."
I think Tomasello et al. overlook certain important "nonin-
ferential" mechanisms that come into play here - mechanisms
that may be specifically abnormal in autism. These mechanisms
have much to do with the "direct" perception of and responsive-
ness to what we might broadly call the affective expressions and
conduct of others. They are mechanisms that draw the child into
states of mind that are coordinated with the mental states of
others - and are so registered. They establish the earliest forms
of shared experience and thus of communication between the
infant and others, and they account for much though not all of
joint attention and social referencing. According to this account,
normal 12-month-olds perceive rather than conceive person-
related "meanings," which induce corresponding feelings and
motivational propensities in themselves, including dispositions
to imitate. Concepts will come later, built on these very noncon-
ceptual foundations.
I would also make one comment on the next phase in the
scheme of Tomasello et al. This is when the child acquires the
concept of a mental agent, around the age of 4. It is questionable
whether the expression "mental agent" should be reserved to
characterize this relatively late stage of interpersonal under-
standing. As the authors appreciate, it is not a matter of children
understanding how there can be different subjective orienta-
tions on the same situation, something they achieve during the
second year of life, but rather that around age 4 children acquire
an understanding of the way that different people may hold
different views (and convictions) concerning what is truly the
case. It will need some further fleshing out to explain why this is
critical for instructed learning.
There is a great deal of value in the concept of cultural
learning. I agree with Tomasello et al. that this perspective is of
fundamental importance in understanding the cognitive deficits
that characterize autism. The authors have highlighted and
begun to characterize a central feature of human cognitive
development.
A social anthropological view
Tim Ingold
Department of Social Anthropology, University of Manchester, Manchester
M13 9PL, England
Writing as a social anthropologist rather than a psychologist, I
can only welcome this target article's call for an approach to
processes of cultural transmission that is sensitive to their
embeddedness in contexts of social relations. It would be in-
vidious to suggest that psychologists are at last discovering what
anthropologists knew all along, for psychology's erstwhile ne-
glect of the social and cultural dimensions of human experience
has been matched by an equally shameful neglect, on the part of
anthropology, of children and their development. A decade ago,
Theodore Schwartz told us of his "sudden and belated realiza-
tion . . . that anthropology had ignored children in culture
while developmental psychologists had ignored culture in chil-
dren." The result, he observed, "is ignorance of the process and
content of the child's emerging competence as a member of a
culture" (Schwartz 1981, p. 4).
Not much has changed in the intervening years, though there
are signs that anthropologists are at last waking up to the fact that
a large proportion of the people in the societies they study are
children (just as a while ago they woke up to the fact that half of
them are women). And on the part of psychology, we have the
evidence of Tomasello et al.'s paper, and other work cited
therein, for a redirection of attention towards culture and social
context. There are grounds for optimism that practitioners of the
two fields will eventually realize that mind and culture are not
separate entities, lying on either side of a dichotomy between
individual and society, but are rather mutually implicated in the
processes by which human beings make their way in the world.
In their attempts to understand these processes, anthropolo-
gists and psychologists have (or should have) the same
objectives.
Many hurdles to disciplinary integration remain, however.
One of these is that we are heirs to a conceptual vocabulary that
is ill-suited to current concerns. This vocabulary includes such
key terms as mind, culture, individual, and society. Let me
begin with a word about culture. It seems that the concept of
culture is currently making its entry into psychological theo-
rising in a sense that more and more anthropologists would now
regard as virtually obsolete. Few would any longer subscribe to
the idea, apparently endorsed by Tomasello et al., that cultures
exist "out there" as things that human beings might be said to
live in: each one a neatly bounded, perfectly shared, and
historically cumulative body of acquired tradition. It would be
more in accord with present anthropological thinking to say that
people live culturally rather than living in cultures, and that
cultural life consists in a medley of multiple voices, as often
discordant as in unison, characterised by an imperfect sharing of
knowledge, founded as much on misunderstanding as on com-
mon understanding, and perpetuated through an improvisatory,
often playful and always creative, dissembling of convention.
People, in their everyday lives, encounter and engage both with
other people and with a range of nonhuman agencies and
entities in their environments, in diverse situations and con-
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texts. But no one has ever encountered a culture. There must be
some question, therefore, about whether it is possible to distin-
guish cultural learning from the total process of cultural life in
which all of us participate all the time - a process otherwise
known as history.
Quite apart from what we might mean by culture, the terms of
the distinction Tomasello et al. draw between social and cultural
learning are bound to cause confusion. This is apparent from the
observation that for the authors, social learning is essentially
individual whereas cultural learning is essentially social. Part of
the problem goes back to the thoroughly unsatisfactory nature of
the classical distinction between individual and social learning,
a distinction that effectively divorces the learners' interactions
with conspecifics from the contexts of their practical involve-
ment with other components of the environment. Anthropologi-
cal thinking, too, has been plagued by a pervasive dichotomy
between the individual and the social; its consequence has been
to split off the development of human beings as organisms,
endowed with capacities common to the species, from their
development as persons, equipped with the particular attri-
butes required to function as members of this or that social
group. This, in turn, lies behind classical anthropological theo-
ries of socialization and enculturation, according to which the
human organism is the passive recipient of social and cultural
forms that are imposed upon it from outside, and that mould its
ways of acting, thinking, and feeling into conformity with pre-
vailing normative standards.
I believe that this individual/social dichotomy is also respon-
sible for the unfortunate separation, noted earlier, between the
psychological study of child development and the anthropologi-
cal study of culture and social life. For the implication is that
only as fully socialised or enculturated beings do humans prop-
erly participate (as persons) in the life of society: the processes of
socialisation and enculturation that prepare the child for person-
hood thus form no part of that life, and to study them is to study
not the dynamics of social life but the psychodynamics of
acquisition, by immature individuals, of the sociocultural sche-
mata that enable them to enter into it. However, recent studies
in both anthropology and psychology, including the present
target article, demonstrate convincingly that this position is
untenable (see Ingold 1991; Lave 1990; Toren 1990 for some
relevant anthropological discussions). They show that from the
start the infant is caught up within a nexus of social relations and
that its own individuality, far from being given in advance as a
biological datum, emerges as these relations unfold in the
course of development.
Certain implications follow, however, which are not so easily
reconciled with Tomasello et al.'s position. The first is that it is
precisely in those so-called learning processes wherein children
actively and creatively engage with others in their surroundings,
recognizing them as persons who attend to them, that history is
being made. The authors claim that it is thanks to cultural
learning that humans have history, yet with the possible excep-
tion of collaborative learning, they separate the learning from
the history, the former providing a route of induction into the
latter. As intimated above, I would question that separation.
Situations of learning do not provide a prelude, in the life cycles
of individuals, for their entry onto the historical stage; rather,
they are the sites from which history unfolds. And by the same
token, I would be inclined to seek the conditions of learning in
historically formed asymmetries in the social distribution of
knowledge (and concomitantly in the structuring of social
power), rather than in universal stages of individual ontogeny. To
put it crudely, trajectories of learning will depend upon the
power relations obtaining between adults and children, and
these relations are historically variable.
Second, I would query the authors' consistent emphasis on
the acquisition of cognitive representations, and along with this,
their frequent resort to the notion of learning as a process of
internalisation. This amounts to positing the individual, right
from the start, as a bounded, self-contained entity vis-a-vis an
"outside world" that must be internally represented in con-
sciousness prior to any attempt at engagement. As regards the
representation of other persons, it is precisely this cognitivist
premise that has underwritten the dichotomy between individ-
ual and society, whose damaging consequences I have already
outlined. I would be more inclined to treat learning as an
attunement of the perceptual system constituted by virtue of
novices' active, bodily immersion in their surroundings. What
learners acquire, then, are skills of attending to the world
(including skills of reflexively attending to their own and others'
attentiveness), rather than schemata for representing it within
their several minds. With Gibson (1979, p. 254), I would thus
regard learning as an "education of attention,' a matter of
enskillment rather than enculturation (Ingold 1991, p. 371).
This brings me to the third of my reservations about the
position taken in this target article, which concerns the concept
of the person. The authors claim that children operate, in
successive stages of development, with a concept of the person
as intentional agent, as mental agent, and as reflective agent.
These concepts, it is supposed, enable the child to understand
the behaviour of other persons by referring it back to preexisting
"intentional," "mental states" or "beliefs" located in the minds of
agents. This claim, it seems to me, is problematic on two levels:
ethnographic and ontological. First, it attributes to children
everywhere a model of agency that is in fact of peculiarly
Western provenance (and for that reason, of course, deeply
embedded in mainstream psychological thought). By and large,
people in non-Western societies do not subscribe to this model,
and look to the sphere of a person's involvement in wider fields
of relationship, rather than invoking interior mental states, to
discover the generative source of social action. Second, it as-
sumes that the child's apprehension of actual persons in its
environment is always, and necessarily, mediated by concepts.
In other words there can be no direct, mutual involvement of
self and other: Intersubjectivity is possible only on the level of
shared representations. This is to accord ontological primacy to
the Western model of agency, and once again to perpetuate the
dichotomy between individual and society.
In their target article, Tomasello et al. take a major step
towards "socializing" the theory of learning, but they make it
only halfway. To complete the passage, it will be necessary to
jettison the conceptual baggage of cognitivism, whose effect is to
remove persons and relationships from the lived-in world, only
to reinscribe them on the plane of its mental representation.
What remain are isolated, asocial individuals, opaque to one
another. Human beings are indeed perspective-takers, but their
perspectives are taken from positions within the world, and the
very taking of a perspective is itself an aspect of social action.
The primate behavioral continuum: What are
its limits?
Barbara J. King
Department of Anthropology, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg,
VA 23185-8795
Electronic mail: bjking@wmvml.bitnet
Even those of us who embrace the notion of a continuum as the
best way to describe primate behavior - and who thus reject
strict behavioral dichotomies in cognition and communication
between humans and other primates - recognize that the
continuum has its limits. Nonhuman primates do not, for exam-
ple, show evidence of religious ideology, complex trade net-
works, or the ability to express their thoughts in writing.
Species-specific adaptations and evidence for human unique-
ness, then, sometimes overlap in a meaningful way, that is, it
surely must matter that humans behave in ways qualitatively
different from their closest relatives.
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One might ask, though, whether all species-specific differ-
ences are meaningful. In some cases, might there be a differ-
ence between noting that "behavior X is species-specific to
humans" and claiming that "behavior X is qualitatively different
from behaviors shown by other primates and thus makes hu-
mans unique in a meaningful way"? My remarks are intended to
address this question plus the related issue of whether
Tomasello et al.'s conclusions about human uniqueness are
shaped primarily by data, primarily by assumptions, or by a mix
of each.
That my commentary is topically restricted to suggesting an
alternative perspective on some of the assumptions and conclu-
sions is a credit to the authors. The target article is well argued
and stimulating, as is the research of Tomasello and his col-
leagues reported in it; comparison of data from apes and chil-
dren is particularly welcome. Indeed, on quite a few points,
Tomasello et al. are convincing. From their account, collabora-
tive learning and the complex perspective-taking on which it
depends do seem to be unique to humans, with important
consequences for the mode of cultural transmission (and the
ratchet effect) found in human societies. When it comes to
imitative learning and particularly to instructed learning,
though, the case seems less clear, for two reasons - the anthro-
pocentric assumptions of the authors and the lack of sufficient
data from nonhuman primates on the issues raised.
In note 10, section 4, Tomasello et al. recognize their anthro-
pocentric bias and justify it by noting their primary interest in
humans. It seems to me that their primary interest is in differen-
tiating humans from other primates. Adopting definitions with
an admittedly anthropocentric bias is not the best way to achieve
this goal - or even to understand humans alone - because it does
not allow for the possibility that a different type of species-
typical adaptation might accomplish the same end as human-
specific behavior (see Cartmill 1990). Tomasello et al. do not ask
what monkeys and apes do so much as ask whether monkeys and
apes do what humans do. These questions are quite different
and might well produce divergent answers. In section 5 they say
that nonhuman primate traditions such as termite fishing by
chimpanzees are not cultural, "at least not in the human sense of
that term." True enough, but why would we expect chimpanzees
to show culture in the human sense?
Elsewhere (King 1991a), I have suggested that theories by
anthropologists and other scholars about the origins of speech or
language tend to fall into three categories. In the first (e.g.,
Burling 1993), communication skills of humans and other pri-
mates are strictly dichotomized, with human skills seen as vastly
superior. In the second (e.g., Lieberman 1991), no strict dichot-
omization is attempted, but modern human speech and lan-
guage are used as standards against which all other abilities are
judged, with the clear assumption that these abilities are the
most complex and efficient. In the third (e.g., Gibson 1990),
behavioral change over time is modelled to suggest how and why
change occurs gradually along the continuum of communication
abilities in primates. It is possible, naturally, to show bias toward
any of these categories (I am probably biased toward the third). I
only want to suggest that Tomasello et al. fall into an analog of the
second category, and that their conclusions are influenced by
that fact.
The authors state in section 4, for example, that chimpanzees
in the wild do not actively instruct their young, but only prevent
certain behaviors and facilitate others. From another perspec-
tive, King (1991b) suggests that although instruction is indeed
rare in nonhuman primates, evidence exists for (1) behavior that
meets logical, nonanthropocentric criteria for active instruction,
and (2) a continuum exists in active information transfer across
primates. I agree with Tomasello et al. that there is no evidence
that young chimpanzees internalize anything social or intersub-
jective from their interactions with adults, but that lack of
evidence does not seem to justify claims for no active instruction
- which brings us back to questions of definition.
Some questions to consider are: Should the Boesch (1991)
report of teaching in wild chimpanzees be dismissed as
Tomasello et al. suggest, because the adults do not "persist in
their behaviors until the youngster has reached a criterial level
of performance"? According to Boesch, mothers adjust their
behavior to the skill level of infants; if these data are confirmed, I
see no point in excluding this behavior by definition from active
instruction (these data may also have significant consequences
for understanding perspective-taking in adult chimpanzees). If,
as Tomasello et al. admit in section 2.2, there may be no clear
testable differences between instructed learning, as they define
it, and scaffolding, it is also not clear that the definition of
instructed learning should always include the child learning
about the adult as well as about the task. Perhaps the instructed
learning described by Tomasello et al. is just the human species-
typical version rather than the only possible kind of instructed
learning. What evidence would be needed, in any case, to claim
that young chimps learn about adults as well as the task? What is
meant specifically by "cognitive self-monitoring" in this context?
In section 4, the authors comment that it is unclear how an
unenculturated chimp would demonstrate understanding of
others as reflective agents, and the point applies throughout. In
the absence of clear testable predictions for distinguishing
among behaviors, the requisite evidence cannot be sought, and
claims for human uniqueness are premature.
Consider next the description from section 5 used to discuss
three posited differences between traditional behavior of non-
human primates and cultural behavior of humans. The authors
state that human children learn "concrete tasks," such as hoeing,
"in the way they have been shown . . . with perhaps some
individual idiosyncrasies." With human social-conventional be-
haviors such as linguistic symbols or religious rituals, idio-
syncratic use is not viable. By contrast, "many keen observers
have noted that individual chimpanzees often use their own
idiosyncratic techniques in all kinds of 'cultural' behaviors."
Assuming that the appropriate comparison to chimpanzee ter-
mite fishing is with concrete tasks such as hoeing (and not with
linguistic symbols or religious rituals), isn't the reported differ-
ence one of degree only?
In sum, Tomasello et al. are on the right track in arguing that
differences in perspective-taking abilities between humans and
other primates have meaningful consequences for cultural trans-
mission across species. Others of their conclusions, however,
are rooted as much in assumptions as in data.
Moving forward on cultural learning
Angeline S. Lillard
Department of Psychology, University of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA
94117-1080
Electronic mail: lillard@alm.admin.usfca.edu
Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner make the very interesting and valid
point that the transmission of culture must depend on under-
standing others' minds. Culture is shared among a people and is
passed on to progeny. The sharing of culture implies that the
purpose of (and therefore the meaning behind) any given cul-
tural element (behavioral tradition, word, or artifact) is under-
stood. Because meaning or purpose emanates from minds,
something about others' minds must be understood in order to
truly learn some element of a culture. It thus makes sense that
cultural learning should depend on social-cognitive skills. But
what exactly is cultural learning?
There are two rival interpretations of the term cultural learn-
ing. In the first, one would define a given type of cultural
learning by the type of social-cognitive skill it entails. For
example, imitative learning would be defined as any learning of
a cultural element in which another's goals or intentions are
taken into account. This definition of cultural learning, however,
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would force Tomasello et al.'s argument into a circle: Imitative
learning relies on this social-cognitive skill because imitative
learning is defined as learning that relies on this social-cognitive
skill. Such a circular definition does not do their argument
justice.
The alternative interpretation requires that any given type of
cultural learning be defined separately from the skills used to
engage in it. This calls for a focus on the cultural elements
themselves. Exactly what elements of a culture are learned via a
given type of cultural learning?
The clearest example is language, learned in Tomasello et al.'s
scheme via imitation. Imitative learning involves taking the
other's perspective where the other is conceptualized as an
intentional agent. Language acquisition entails imitative learn-
ing because in order to understand that words refer, children
must understand adults as intending to refer when they use
words. In this case, then, Tomasello et al. specify an element of
culture (language) and discuss how certain social-cognitive skills
allow its transmission. The main problem with their line of
argument in this domain is the age at which they claim it occurs:
9 months. Joint attention and social referencing behaviors are
given as evidence that 9-month-olds understand that adults
attend and refer to objects. The evidence that 9-month-olds
actually have this understanding is controversial. Reductive
explanations can be made for early instances of joint attention.
For example, children might have learned that when they look
where an adult looks they see an interesting sight, or perhaps it
just feels good to look where others look. And although some
recent work suggests that social referencing is engaged in by
older infants (Baldwin, personal communication), effects that
have been attributed to younger infants might be explained as
the child's associating a feeling elicited by the mother's voice
with a given toy (Muinme, personal communication). Hence the
skills necessary for understanding reference might not be there
at 9 months. The best evidence of infants' seeming to under-
stand something about others' intent to refer is probably Baldwin
(1991), in which infants 16-19 months old did not apply new
word labels to a novel toy that an adult was not attending to even
when the children themselves were attending to the toy. Yet it is
unclear exactly how to characterize even these older infants'
knowledge of the mind. Early word use, on the other hand,
could be explained by association or other low-level principles
rather than by understanding attention. In short, the jury is still
out on what infants understand about others' minds, and
Tomasello et al.'s claim of an ability to understand others'
intentions at 9 months is too generous based on current evi-
dence. Language is a good example of cultural learning, how-
ever, and imitative learning, with its underlying social-cognitive
skill of understanding others' goals and intentions, does seem
necessary to learn a language.
Tomasello et al. are less clear about what aspects of culture are
learned through instructional learning. Self-regulating speech is
their main line of evidence that it has occurred, and presumably
any cultural domain in which direct instruction is given can
qualify. The problem with this as evidence for social-cognitive
knowledge is provided by Tomasello et al. in their note 3: A child
repeating an adult's instructions at a later time could simply be
deferred imitation. There is no evidence that children are
comparing their own perspective with that of the instructor as
they do this. (Indeed, there is also no evidence that they are not
doing so in Tomasello et al.'s counterexamples. When the
children say "No!" when they are about to touch the electrical
outlet, they could be enacting the adult's perspective and
comparing it to their own.) Furthermore, the fact that high-
functioning autistic children can learn to use tools quite well
suggests that it does not require any insight into the mind of the
teacher. If one were to respond to this by claiming that cultural
learning occurs only when the learning is accompanied by
insight into the mind of the teacher then we have run into the
circular argument outlined and dismissed above. How do we
know when a child has internalized the perspective of an adult
as opposed to simply imitating the adult's directions? When has
a child learned the meaning behind a religious custom as
opposed to only the behaviors? It seems likely that children
understand the perspectives of others at different times in
different domains. Future work needs to determine more pre-
cisely and in different domains when true cultural learning
rather than its poorer cousin (a reductive/behavioral counter-
part) has occurred.
The same problems arise with regard to collaborative learn-
ing. One example of collaborative learning is that of the hammer
evolving over the years. To make modifications to the hammer,
however, it is not necessary to understand the intentions of the
previous hammer-alterer. One need only know one's own re-
quirements for the hammer and improve it accordingly. Regard-
ing scientific collaboration, the partner need only respond to the
words of the other, one need not conceptualize the other as
having beliefs about one's own beliefs. The examples given of
children solving conservation problems together are open to the
same interpretation. Hence, with the examples of collaborative
learning given by Tomasello et al., recursive understanding is
unnecessary. Again, one might wish to define collaborative
learning as only those cases in which one does simulate another's
perspective on one's own mental state, but if this is the case then
we are faced with the circular argument.
In sum, there is no strong evidence supporting Tomasello et
al.'s position that the given social-cognitive skills are needed for
the instances of instructional and collaborative learning that
they use as examples. The most promising case is for imitative
learning in acquiring word labels: It seems that to truly acquire
language (as opposed to simply imitating sounds in response to
certain stimuli), children must understand something about
speaker intent. However, the evidence that children can engage
in such learning is weak at 9 months; stronger evidence exists for
14- to 18-month-olds. Despite the lack of evidence, there is a
strong logical appeal to their thesis: Human culture is endowed
with meaning, and meaning entails minds, so the ability to
understand minds should be integral to the true transmission of
culture. Future work needs to examine specific cultural learning
events and analyze how understanding the mind is entailed. An
interesting test case might be the kinds of cultural transmission
that occur to and among autistic individuals, who lack an under-
standing of beliefs, and therefore also of reflective thought. Such
cases must not be explainable by the autistic person's lack of
desire to be in a social group, as are the autism examples
currently given by Tomasello et al.
Cultural transmission is more than cultural
learning
Peter Midford
Department of Zoology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wl
53706
Electronic mail: pmidford@macc.wisc.edu
Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner have proposed a model of human
cultural learning and innovation based on a transfer mechanism
they claim is unique to humans. Cultural (as contrasted with
social) transfer is based on taking or modeling the perspective of
another, a uniquely human interaction that accounts for the
stability and directional development ("ratchet effect') of human
culture. Based on this interaction, the authors conclude that
human culture is qualitatively different from the socially trans-
mitted knowledge bases of birds and nonhuman mammals.
The evidence that Tomasello et al. provide suggests that
transmission based on shared perceptions and intentional
models of social partners are a unique feature of human culture.
The developmental evidence, however, could be parsi-
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moniously interpreted as resulting from processes that lead to
shared perspective and the modeling of others as intentional
agents rather than the final outcome of these processes. The
authors are properly skeptical of claims of mental modeling in
animals, but pushing such modeling earlier into human devel-
opment is equally subject to skepticism. To take the best-
developed example, tracking the gaze of adults and later signs of
joint attention are interpreted as indicating that the child is
responding to the parent as an intentional agent. Might the data
just as well indicate the operation of a preintentional mechanism
that causes the tracking of direction of gaze and other behaviors
when interacting with conspecific adults? Such a mechanism
might be a prerequisite to the child's developing an intentional
model of others.
If Tomasello et al. are right in their conclusion that modeling
others as intentional agents is absent in other primates then
identifying the developmental precursors to perspective-
sharing would be an important step in uncovering the underly-
ing causes of human uniqueness. If linguistically trained apes,
given the best training that 5 million years of selection for
interactive instruction can provide, fail to model others, well
enough to pass culture through one generation, then the bot-
tleneck must be in the appearance of modeling in infants.
Perhaps the behaviors the authors take as evidence of shared
perspective (e.g., the infant alternating gaze between mother
and the focus of her gaze) started as a novel mechanism for
offspring to retain or reestablish contact with the mother. This
noncognitive mechanism would begin operating during the
period when infants were just starting to move independently
and risk separation.
Although sharing perspectives in social interactions may char-
acterize human culture, it is unreasonable to assume that the
social learning processes found in other animals do not continue
to operate and play a part in transmission in humans. Although
human culture may not be homologous in the sense intended by
Galef (1992), processes homologous to animal transmission do
operate. Besides the types of teaching, reported in animals, that
Tomasello et al. categorize as "scaffolding,' processes of facilita-
tion and enhancement continue to operate in humans, as even
the authors admit in their discussion of early development. In
cases where intersubjective instruction may be impossible (be1
cause the model on which the behavior is based is beyond the
capacity of the child) or too expensive in time or attention
resources at the moment, other instructional tactics such as
scaffolding or conditioning can be used (e.g., talking during a
religious service). Although primates, as a group, are adept at
social interactions, other groups (e.g., birds such as columbids,
Lefebvre & Palameta 1990) have demonstrated a stronger incli-
nation to social learning. Even among relatively primitively
social birds such as Florida scrub jays (Woolfenden & Fitzpatrick
1984) enhancement plays a significant role in the learning of
foraging by juveniles (personal observation).
In light of the foregoing, it is reasonable to consider the
possibility of differences in transmission between cultures.
Most of the studies cited deal with interactions of Western adults
with children. Cultures certainly vary in the uses to which
perspective-sharing is put. They might well vary in the emphasis
placed on different types of transmission, ranging from a rigid
conditioning to highly interactive teaching to "looser" cultures
where trial-and-error learning directed by enhancement might
prevail.
Finally, whether or not a uniquely human form of cultural
transmission exists, pursuit of the role of culture (or social
information exchange) in shaping cognition should not be lim-
ited to human cultural psychology. It would be shortsighted to
assume that social transmission in animals does not affect their
cognition in a manner at least analogous to the effect in humans.
Kinesthetic-visual matching, perspective-
taking and reflective self-awareness in
cultural learning
Robert W. Mitchell
Department of Psychology, Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond, KY
40475
Electronic mail: psymitch@eku.bitnet
Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner deserve congratulations for their
well-reasoned ideas on the development of cultural learning.
Their arguments are generally convincing, perhaps because
their distinctions and developmental relations among types of
cultural learning and agency mirror concepts of my own.
In trying to explain mirror-self-recognition I developed the
idea, following Guillaume (1926/1971), that an organism could
recognize itself in the mirror if it had an ability for matching its
kinesthetic feelings with a visual representation of those feel-
ings. An organism with such kinesthetic-visual matching could
(quasivisually) imagine itself acting within situations that it
could then reproduce because it could translate from its imagin-
ings (mental plans) to its body movements in real space and vice
versa and also know what its actions look like. According to this
theory, kinesthetic-visual matching is present not only in
mirror-recognition but in the imitation of others, in recognition
of others' imitations of oneself, in pretense of others, and in
planning (Mitchell 1990; 1992; 1993a; 1993b; 1993c). Thus, an
organism with kinesthetic-visual matching would have self-
awareness, in the sense of imagining itself and knowing what it
looks like (cf. Gallup 1985).
This form of self-awareness seemed different from that of
mature humans, as exemplified in responses to mirrors. Mature
humans use mirrors to create an image of themselves which is
satisfying to themselves or others, and very young humans and
apes do not. I suggested that, unlike young humans and apes,
mature humans incorporate their perspective of the other into
their own self-image; we create a self which satisfies (or reacts
against) the perspectives of others that we have internalized.
Although apes exhibit an awareness of the other's perspective in
some of their deceptions, pretenses, and imitations, they fail to
exhibit reflective self-awareness (Mitchell 1986; 1987; 1990;
1992; 1993a; 1993b; 1993c).
Thus, my approach distinguished three types of awareness
relevant to the concerns of Tomasello et al.: the self-awareness
present in kinesthetic-visual matching (their "intentional
agency"); the awareness of others' perspectives present in some
acts of deception and communication ("mental agency"); and the
reflective self-awareness present in thinking about ourselves
and others in terms of others' and our own perspectives ("reflec-
tive agency"). Reflective self-awareness allows humans to think
about their mental states in terms of multiple perspectives, to
experience tremendous conflict when going against their inter-
nalized perspectives of others, and to experience emotions
about themselves which result from their interpretation of
others' perspectives on themselves (Lewis et al. 1989).
These ideas suggest that perspective-taking develops from
the imitative learning of organisms rather than the opposite as
Tomasello et al. suggest in relation to autistic people and
chimpanzees. These ideas also suggest that, although children
may not fully understand their own mental states until they
understand those of others, they clearly experience mental
states before they understand that others have mental states that
are different from their own. Thus, although I agree with
Tomasello et al. that understanding of others and of (some
aspects of) self requires social interaction, I think some self-
understanding exists prior to awareness of the perspective of
others.
Tomasello et al. s skepticism toward imitative learning and
deception in chimpanzees is understandable but it forces us to
avoid developing coherent theories of chimpanzee behavior;
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each instance of imitation and deception must accordingly be
approached ad hoc (see de Waal 1986). To create an experimental
situation for nonenculturated chimpanzees similar to that used
to exhibit human-reared chimpanzees' imitational skills is diffi-
cult in that it calls for chimpanzee modelers (or perhaps humans
dressed as chimpanzees and trained to act as chimpanzees)
because nonenculturated chimpanzees are selectively respon-
sive to chimpanzees, not humans. Thus, the apparent distinc-
tion in imitative learning between nonenculturated and en-
culturated chimps is inadequately supported. Although
Tomasello et al. deny that techniques used by chimpanzees are
cultural because these can be idiosyncratic, they fail to note that
human beings use a variety of idiosyncratic techniques in food
shopping and preparation, hair combing and decoration, tooth-
brushing and early morning bathroom rituals, yet we do not
deny that these are cultural techniques. The implied difference
seems to reside in some measure of how similar the activities are
within the groups to be compared, yet no such absolute measure
of similarity is available. Tomasello et al.'s claim that adult
chimpanzees fail to exhibit instructed learning because they do
not continue to teach until their youngster reaches an adequate
performance suggests, given the state of understanding in un-
dergraduates, that many human teachers fail to exhibit in-
structed learning.
Although Tomasello et al. apply their ideas specifically to task
learning, their range can be extended. Collaborative learning
seems implicit in mature sexual encounters between people,
who create their sexual excitement in terms of the other's sexual
excitement about their own sexual excitement (Nagel 1969/
1979). The instructed learning parents teach their children
about interpersonal relations need not be explicit and can be
used in other interactions, as shown by transference in psycho-
therapy. And people's imitating the behaviors, peccadillos, or
mannerisms of those they esteem (Mussen 1967; Valentine 1930)
suggests that imitative learning is present in more than just
functional tasks, as well as that, contrary to Tomasello et al.'s
assessment, perspective-taking and reproduction of both form
and function need not be present in all forms of imitative
learning.
For Tomasello et al., instructed learning requires understand-
ing another's point of view and explicitly relating it to one's own,
but much instructed learning involves merely internalizing
another's instructions apparently without such perspective-
taking and relating. For example, in teaching me how to drive, a
friend informed me that when I go around curves I should turn
into the curve in order to have better control. For many months
following her teaching, as I drove around curves, in my head I
heard my friend's voice saying "When you go around a curve,
turn into the curve. ' Although there was an awareness that these
were her instructions / was following, there was no awareness of
a point of view different from my own or of an explicit relating of
it to mine - I simply "heard" and followed her instructions. Now
I think Tomasello et al. might believe that in following the
instructions (or in first learning the instructions) I teas under-
standing her perspective and relating it to my own. Although
this belief seems unnecessarily cumbersome to some (see Milli-
kan 1984), if correct it suggests that human perspective-taking is
not always conscious or explicit. In any learned task that has
been enacted repeatedly, consciousness of the component activ-
ities is diminished with repetition; in learning to type we
become less and less conscious of our finger movements; and in
learning about perspectives perhaps we develop to the point
where perspective-taking is unconscious.
Although the idea that humans show an extrapolation of
apparently social-cognitive adaptations to nonsocial domains is
intriguing and reasonable, I wonder if in reality the opposite is
true (see, e.g., Parker 1992). Sometimes the understanding of
other minds seems to me just another problem-solving skill
developed from kinesthetic-visual matching. But I'm not com-
pletely sure where to go from there.
Cultural learning and educational process
David R. Olson8 and Janet Wilde Astington"
'Centre for Applied Cognitive Science, Ontario Institute for Studies in
Education, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 1V6 and WnsWute of Child
Study, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 1A1
Electronic mail: d-olson@utoroise.bitnet; jwastin@ics.utoronto.ca
Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner relate the evolution of social cogni-
tion - the understanding of others' minds - to the evolution of
culture. Tomasello et al. conceive of the accumulation of culture
as the product of cultural learning, a kind of learning dependent
upon recognizing others' intentionality. They distinguish three
levels of this recognition: of intention (what is x trying to do), of
beliefs (what does x think about p), and of beliefs about beliefs
(what does * think y thinks about p). They then tie these levels to
three discrete forms of cultural learning - imitative, instructed,
and collaborative - which children become capable of when
they are 9 months, 4 years, and 6 years old respectively, at least
in Western culture where relevant data are available.
We express two concerns about these proposals. First,
Tomasello et al. attribute to the human species as a whole
aspects of subjectivity that may be elaborated and exploited in
particular cultures and embodied in the educational practices of
those cultures. Second, they fail to distinguish the different
understanding of minds required by the teacher as opposed to
the learner in cultural learning. Teachers' assumptions about the
child's understanding may be of more importance to the evolu-
tion of culture than the child's understanding itself. We show
how these two issues are related.
Our first concern, then, is the relation between the capacity
to recognize another's intentionality, which Tomasello et al. take
as criterial for the human species, and the level of this capacity
exploited in various ways by diverse human cultures and diverse
pedagogies. Although all humans are presumably capable of
understanding the actions, knowledge states, and beliefs of
others - a form of competence required for any complex dis-
course or social interaction - the extent to which these under-
standings are embedded in explicit concepts and applied sys-
tematically in educational contexts varies greatly from culture to
culture. Stages in the evolution of schooling are analogous to the
stages of development described by Tomasello et al. Traditional
societies, cultures without schools, pass on their cultural tradi-
tions via "apprenticeship," processes that rely heavily upon
imitation, the first of Tomasello et al.'s levels. To cite one
example, Bruner (1972) noted that among the !Kung Bushmen
of the Kalahari there is a complete absence of "teaching" in the
modern sense of that term. "Most of what we would call
instruction is through showing. . . . Among the !Kung children
there is very little 'telling'" (p. 11). More recent studies (Rogoff
1990) tend to confirm this view.
The more systematic educational attempts characteristic of
"modern" societies place a great deal of emphasis on formal
teaching. Formal schooling, at least until recent times, was
based primarily upon instruction - the attempt to convey bodies
of truth to ignorant learners with little regard for the beliefs and
opinions of the learners themselves, Tomasello et al.'s second
level. Modern schooling ( we like to think) is based upon the
assumption that children are not merely ignorant, but that they,
too, have thoughts, which can be revised or extended through
argument and evidence, a form of collaborative learning,
Tomasello et al.'s third level. After all, it was only under the
guidance of Dewey and Piaget in this century that educators
began to take seriously the notion that children had conceptions
and misconceptions; they were not merely ignorant. Although
thinking recursively about others' beliefs and intentions may be
far from modern in social life, using this way of thinking to
educate children in school may be an essentially modern
method of education.
Although Tomasello et al. may be right about the role that the
recognition of intentionality played in the evolution of culture,
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they may underestimate the role that culture has in understand-
ing of mind. Children may come to see themselves as having
minds because their culture sees them that way. It may be
argued, as indeed it has been (Bruner 1983), that children come
to see themselves as intentional creatures in part because
parents and teacher ascribe intentionality to them. Further-
more, Tomasello et al. present some evidence along these lines.
Enculturated chimpanzees, that is, chimps who have been
reared by human beings, are much more able to engage in joint
attention and to ascribe intentional states to others ("simulating
the intentional states of others"). But if this is the case, it
requires that we distinguish the understanding of mind held by
the acculturated person, the teacher, and that held by the
learner.
Let us spell out this as asymmetry between teacher and
learner more fully. To learn through imitation, the learner must
recognize the intentionality of the actor as Tomasello et al.
suggest. But to deliberately provide a model for imitation, the
teacher must have, in addition, a model of the learner's ability or
inability, an understanding that the learner does not know how
to do X, which the demonstration attempts to rectify. To instruct
a learner, that is, to provide information, the teacher must
recognize ignorance or false belief in a learner, that is, the
learner does not know that p, an understanding not necessarily
available to the learner. And finally, a recognition of what
the learner thinks the teacher thinks is implicated only when the
teacher recognizes the possibility of misinterpretation on the
learner's part. Thus, the purveyors of culture must have a higher
level of representation of mind than the learners they teach.
And the learners in turn come to think about their intentional
states in terms of the ascriptive and pedagogical practices of
adults.
Put simply, the ability to teach is what is critical to cultural
development, not the ability to learn. And that ability to teach -
to understand inability and provide demonstrations, to under-
stand ignorance and provide instruction, and to understand
thinking and provide theoretical discourse - although premised
on certain evolutionary properties of the mind, is the product
itself of cultural evolution. Second, it is not the ability to imitate
that provides the basis for the accumulation of human cultures
but the ability to teach.
Cultural learning and teaching: Toward a
nonreductionist theory of development
Peter Renshaw
Faculty of Education, The University of Queensland, Australia 4072
Electronic mail: p.tupe@mailbox.uq.oz.au
The theory of cultural learning proposed by Tomasello, Kruger
& Ratner exemplifies Vygotsky's methodological tenet that a
complete understanding of human activity requires the investi-
gation of phylogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis (small scale
changes occurring during episodes of teaching and social inter-
action), and sociohistorical evolution. With regard to ontogene-
sis, Vygotsky distinguished conceptually between natural influ-
ences and cultural influences but he concluded that the two
threads were indistinguishable, that is, they become woven into
a single thread of sociobiological development for each individ-
ual because the cultural line of development interpenetrates
and transforms the natural line (Kozulin 1990; Wertsch 1985b).
Tomasello et al.'s theory of cultural learning is a sophisticated
attempt to unpick this single ontogenetic thread.
Their endeavor reveals the inevitable tensions between var-
ious dualisms - learning and teaching, the individual and
society, the psychological and the cultural, and the biological
and the social. Psychology has been characterised by the reduc-
tionist tendency to explain human activity by reference to
processes within the individual which have in turn been traced
back to biological roots. The theory of cultural learning pro-
posed by Tomasello et al. exemplifies this reductionist tendency.
They suggest that cultural learning - the uniquely human form
of learning - is based on the social-cognitive capacity to take the
perspective of other persons. This cognitive capacity is in turn
described as unfolding according to an age-determined matura-
tional schedule that the authors imply is driven biologically. The
implication regarding the biological cause was inferred from the
following statement in their target article:
And all of these [uniquely human cognitive capacities] rely, ex
hypothesis, on the fundamentally social-cognitive process of taking
the perspective of other persons and learning from that perspective-
taking. This conjecture may thus be viewed as a kind of biological
extension of Vygotsky's original hypothesis of the social origin of all of
the "higher" human psychological functions. " (sect. 6, para. 5)
There is no attempt in the paper to explain why social-cognitive
capacities should develop on a biologically based maturational
age schedule, in contrast to other aspects of higher mental
functioning that they propose are derived from increasingly
complex forms of cultural learning. The recent "theory-of-mind
research that is used to formulate aspects of the theory of
cultural learning is an elaboration and extension of Piaget's
genetic epistemology. There is no support from Piaget, how-
ever, for a maturational explanation of social-cognitive develop-
ment. All aspects of cognitive development were explained by
Piaget through the interaction of four factors: biological matura-
tion, experience, social interaction, and the internal regulatory
process of equilibrium. In examining the synchrony in develop-
ment between levels of logical thought and levels of reciprocity
in social interaction, Piaget (1926, p. 72) suggested that there
was "perpetual interaction between these two factors of evolu-
tion. " Social interaction could not in itself cause cognitive
change but particular types of interaction could either retard
(relations of heteronomy) or foster (relations of equality) the
conditions conducive to restructuring the cognitive system.
This reciprocal and dynamic model of the relation between
forms of social interaction and levels of cognitive development
avoids the problem of locating one aspect of cognition (social-
cognitive capacity) outside the explanatory framework that ap-
plies to all other aspects of cognition.
The reductionist tendency in the theory of cultural learning is
also present in the preference for the individually focussed
terms of learning and perspective-taking over the socially fo-
cussed terms of teaching and intersuhjectivity. The result is that
the actions of the social agents (parent, peer, carer) in cocon-
structing the contexts of learning with the child arc largely
ignored. For example, Tomasello et al. note that language is
acquired in "highly contextualized, often routinized, mutually
understood (i.e., intersubjective), nonlinguistic formats such as
the feeding situation, diaper changing, book reading, taking a
walk, or playing a game of peek-a-boo." This contextualist
theory of language acquisition and usage, however, undermines
Tomasello et al.'s current formulation of the theory. Clearly the
contexts of language acquisition are not given in nature. The
social agent and the child create the contexts by their interac-
tions. In particular, the actions of the adult in interpreting the
child's incomplete, rudimentary, and perhaps unintended ges-
tures and vocalisations as if they were infused with specific
meaning and significance is crucial in enabling the child to
become a progressively more competent partner in the interac-
tion (Bruner 1983). As the contexts acquire shared meaning for
the adult and child the child has in a real sense come to see the
situation through the eyes of the adult. For example, in support-
ing very young children's participation in the shared book
format, the adult infuses the book-reading activity with specific
cultural meanings that might be represented as "one looks at and
points to the pictures and 'labels' the pictures and turns the page
and repeats the actions until all the pages have been turned."
Obviously adults have multiplied and sophisticated representa-
532 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1993) 16:3
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00031277
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:48:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Commentary/TomaseUo et al.: Cultural learning
tions of books and reading that are not instantiated in their
interactions with children, but in order to move the children
away from their perhaps preferred sensorimotor representation
of books ("books are to be sucked, pulled apart, stacked, and
thrown") toward the shared reading format, the adults adjust
their actions in order to create the possibility of a shared
understanding of the situation. I would interpret the shared
book interaction as an unambiguous instance of "instructed
learning" in the terms ofTomasello et al.'s theory. They appear to
interpret these events as instances of "adult task simplifica-
tion," which they call "scaffolding." To quote:
Instructed learning as we define it involves more than the child's
learning by means of adult task simplification. Whereas in scaffolded
learning children learn about the task [emphasis added], with the
adult in the background providing help, in instructed learning chil-
dren learn about the adult specifically, about the adult's understand-
ing of the task and how that compares with their own understanding,
(sect. 2.2, para. 2)
What is problematic in this quote is the absence of a coherent
theory of meaning. The notion that the child can learn about the
task directly suggests an empiricist epistemology in which
meanings exist in the outside world waiting to be discovered.
The contextualist approach that Tomasello et al. invoke sug-
gests, in contrast, that meanings are constructed in communica-
tive exchanges that necessarily involve intersubjectivity. This
incoherence in the underlying theory of meaning needs to be
addressed in future formulations of the theory.
Tomasello et al.'s attempt to unpick the development thread
has many more features to it (e.g., phylogenetic analysis) than I
have been able to address here. With regard to human on-
togenesis, a focus on the concepts of intersubjectivity and
teaching within a theory of language discourse (e.g., Bruner
1990; Wertsch 1991) may provide the basis for formulating a
theory of cultural learning without reductionist tendencies.
Questioning assumptions about culture
and individuals
Barbara Rogoff, Pablo Chavajay and Eugene Matusov
Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA 95064
This is a daring and provocative article that takes on the classic
question of what makes humans human. It argues that cultural
learning is the distinguishing feature, and proposes a distinction
between three types of capacity for learning from others. How-
ever, this account of cultural learning seems to be based on
unexamined and problematic assumptions about the nature of
the relation between individual and cultural processes.
The approach taken by Tomasello et al. separates the roles of
individual and culture, leading to questions about the "impact"
of culture on individuals and how individuals "acquire' culture.
It is not necessary, however, to assume a boundary between
individual and cultural processes, and to do so, we argue, limits
the ways scholars can understand how individual and cultural
processes function. It is revealing that Tomasello et al. equate
the concepts of internalization and their reading of the concept
of appropriation as used by Rogoff(1990), where the concept of
appropriation was introduced specifically to argue against the
assumption system of internalization, which separates individ-
ual and culture.
Briefly, the internalization model assumes that individuals are
separate elements that may be influenced by other people (also
elements) and by cultures (also elements). Individual and cul-
ture are conceived as separate and inherently static collections
of objects, so the approach requires positing ways that culture or
social things "transmit" skills and knowledge to the individual
(producing change from outside), or that the individual "ac-
quires" social or cultural things (producing change from inside).
Tomasello et al. take the latter approach, proposing that the
mechanism is what they call "cultural learning" - a capacity (that
some have and others do not) to take the perspective of social
partners.
In contrast, the appropriation model does not separate indi-
vidual from cultural processes as elements requiring links to
relate them. Instead, the appropriation approach uses activity
(rather than individual characteristics or moves) as the unit of
analysis, arguing that individual, interpersonal, and socio-
cultural processes constitute each other and cannot be separated
(see Rogoff, in press). As people participate in activities involv-
ing other people and cultural practices, they develop and their
participation changes. In the appropriation model there is no
boundary between the individual and the rest of the world, and
there is no need to posit a link between elements; rather, the
focus is on understanding processes of participation in shared
activity.
The internalization model in which culture and individual are
separated leads to problems at the level of cultural processes,
interpersonal processes, and individual processes in Tomasello
et al.'s account. The view of culture that is presented is a
reduction of culture to societal tools and social partners, with no
consideration of culture as human activity involving organized
processes. There is little mention of communities or of institu-
tions except in a footnote indicating that considering the institu-
tionalization of human practices would take the authors far
beyond their current aims.
The target article presents an ordered series of the kinds of
social interaction the authors consider to be cultural.' However,
all three kinds of "cultural" learning focus on separate individ-
uals involved with another person. The progression begins with
interaction in which the learner is active and the social world
passive (imitative learning), to interaction in which a partner is
active and the learner is passive (instructed learning), to interac-
tion in which both are active but their roles are still separate
efforts to take the perspective of the other (which the authors call
collaborative learning). In none of the types do the authors
consider social relations in which people contribute inseparable
efforts to shared endeavors.
The ordering of certain forms of social interaction as more
"cultural" than others reveals culturally bound assumptions
about social interaction, evident in the primacy given to dyadic,
intentionally instructional interaction and the exclusion of ar-
rangements between people. Tomasello et al. explicitly exclude
arrangements of the social environment as being cultural be-
cause they attribute responsibility for making sense of the
environment to the individual when no explicit instruction
occurs. Although individuals carry great responsibility for learn-
ing from social arrangements, it seems odd to exclude such
arrangements from being cultural. We agree with Whiting's
(1980) view that a primary cultural role of caregivers is deciding
about the activities in which children participate and with
whom. Tomasello et al.'s focus on instructional intent makes
their system inapplicable to other cultural systems.
Their claims that instructional and focused interaction is the
norm for children's learning overlook well-known observations
to the contrary in many cultural communities. In many commu-
nities, individuals are embedded in cultural systems of activity;
children's learning of cultural ways can occur (and often does) by
means of observation and eavesdropping if cultural arrange-
ments for children allow them to participate in the mature
activities of their community (Heath 1983; Ochs 1988; Rogoff
1990; Rogoff et al., in press; Schieffelin 1991; Ward 1971).
We find Tomasello et al.'s characterization of learning through
imitation to be particularly troubling, although they do make
interesting distinctions between imitation, mimicking, and em-
ulating. Their characterization of learning through imitation
seems to portray learning through observation as a relatively
unskilled interpersonal approach to learning. However,
learning through observation seems to involve very skilled
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management of attention by children as well as sophisticated
and responsive support for children's efforts by adults and others
in the group present (Rogoff 1990; Rogoffet al., in press).
To resolve the dilemma of how individuals internalize culture,
the authors rely on children's "theory of mind" and "capacity" for
perspective-taking to make the connection. They claim that
cultural learning in its highest forms involves individuals "get-
ting inside" the heads of others, so to speak, or at least making
use of the words of others to regulate their own behavior and
understanding.2 Tomasello et al. regard use-of-other-people's-
words-to-regulate-oneself as evidence of attention and under-
standing, but they do not seem to notice that it is only when
people are having difficulty with a task that such talking to
oneself is likely to occur. People who really understand a shared
activity may simply begin to take on greater responsibility for
managing the activity; if they resort to repeating others' instruc-
tions to them it may indicate that they attended but did not
really understand the process.
We prefer an approach that examines how children's involve-
ment in cultural activities changes with the developmental
processes of the children, their partners, and their communities
in shared activities, rather than an approach based on internaliz-
ation of social or cultural objects. Nonetheless, we applaud
Tomasello et al. for offering a provocative and far-ranging
account.
N O T E S
1. If there were space we would argue with the effort to put the
different kinds of social interaction on any single, directional scale.
2. The authors attempt to include nonverbal symbols as regulators,
but their effort draws attention to their reliance on symbols as somehow
external to the shared activity, to be lifted and imported for the use of the
individual.
Cultural learning is cultural
Bernard Schneuwly
Faculty de Psychologie et des Sciences de /'Education, University de
Geneve, CH-1227 Carouge, Switzerland
Electronic mail: schneuwl@lapse.unige.ch
Cultural learning in itself is not cultural; its forms and contents
are universal: This is the implicit consequence of Tomasello et
al.'s model. It thus seems coherent that they refer to Piaget
(1985) and to Karmiloff-Smith (1986) - possibly his most inter-
esting successor - to understand the way complex systems of
"human cognition" like "the various systems of mathematics and
the various grammars of human languages that have been
created by human cultures" are constructed. Tomasello et al. in
fact do no more than add a social component to the cognitive
development saying: Pay attention to the fact that children need
another person to construct their own cognitive mechanisms.
This facilitates construction (this is the weak Piagetian formula-
tion one can already find in the final remarks of Piaget and
Inhelder's 1966, p. 123); or this is necessary for it (which is the
social psychological version represented by authors like Doise
and Mugny (1979) or Perret-Clermont and Brossard (1985)
referenced by Tomasello et al.). From this point of view, the
forms of interaction are universal and so are the contents of
learning (look at the examples of collaborative learning given by
Tomasello et al.: conservation tasks and abstract moral judge-
ment tasks). Culture is in fact absent from this model of cultural
learning. Note that this kind of cultural learning is easy prey for
"information processing" approaches which can, by enlarging
their scope to include some social aspects, easily integrate the
purely formal interactions described by Tomasello et al.
The model presented, though bringing to the fore important
general aspects of human learning compared to higher forms of
animal learning, is insufficient to characterize real cultural
learning, such as the learning of culture in cultural forms. The
main reason lies in the choice of the unit of analysis which for the
authors is "what the individual organism brings to the process of
enculturation. ' Human beings do indeed have the highest
learning potentials (Schneuwly, in press) for this process, the
most important being precisely that the forms of learning are
open and varied because the means and forms of enculturation
are themselves results of enculturation and are not provided by
organisms. This means that the unit of analysis for modeling
cultural learning can in no case be the individual organism. It
has to be a triangular structure that combines the learner (for
instance the child), the contents to be learned (i.e., culturally
constructed ways of behaving in and knowing reality) and the
technical and psychological tools necessary to appropriate con-
tents, mediated by teachers (parent, older child, sibling, or
whatever else) and their practices.
Already in the stage where, according to Tomasello et al.,
imitation is its only manifestation, learning is cultural in the
sense just described. As shown, for example, in Moro and
Rodriguez's (1991) analysis of the baby-object-child triad in
children aged 7 to 13 months, there is an intricate and changing
relationship - between the contents (in this case the object
signification of certain toys), the means created during interac-
tion mainly by adults {ad hoc semiotic systems) and the actions
and reactions of children - a relationship that can in no way be
grasped in terms of the concept of imitation, all the less so as the
specific form this complex interaction takes is in itself defined by
cultural practices.
The higher forms of learning are even more dependent on
cultural practices. Learning to write in a modern society is very
different, for example, from learning in a more traditional
medieval society (for a general history see Ludwig 1988) and this
has important consequences for mental functioning. The forms
of learning are dependent on the contents (e.g., writing for
religious purposes or for use in some situations in daily life,
Besnier 1991; or as an abstract tool for thinking, Olson et al.
1985), on the forms written texts take in history, which are the
tools for mastering writing (Schneuwly 1992), and on the rela-
tionship students and teachers establish with each other and
with writing in an institution such as public school compared to a
traditional society where writing is completely embedded in the
oral tradition (Clanchy 1979).
Cultural learning is itself a product of culture; its means and
forms are constructed at the same time as culture; it can
therefore only be analyzed by using the triadic structure as unit
of analysis where culture is present in contents; in tools, and in
teaching and learning practices. This does not mean there is a
mechanical conditioning of development by teaching/learning;
on the contrary, as Vygotsky puts it, "There is a process of
teaching/learning; it has its own structure, its linking, its logic of
development; and there is in the mind of each learner taken
individually a sort of internal network of processes which,
although they are provoked and put in motion during teach-
ing/learning, have their own proper logic of development"
(1985, p. 269; our translation). The relationship between these
two logics is at the core of a psychology of cultural learning.
Predispositions to cultural learning
in young infants
Colwyn Trevarthen
Department of Psychology, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8
9JZ, Scotland
Electronic mail: colwyntrevarthen@edinburgh.ac.uk
Tomasello et al.'s theory of cultural learning and its origins has
revolutionary implications for all human sciences. The authors,
experts in ape communication and child language, show how
human learning needs shared attention and "perspective-
taking," a kind of intersubjectivity absent in apes and impaired
in autism (Trevarthen 1989). Unfortunately, the authors do not
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fully appreciate the unique ways in which young infants commu-
nicate their feelings and orientations and react to others' expres-
sions. Any social learning theory has to have an idea, implicit or
explicit, of prelinguistic communication, when knowledge is
interpersonal and emotional and any factual reference must be
to present reality (Trevarthen 1987; 1992; Trevarthen & Log-
otheti 1987).
A new conception of innate predispositions to culture has
been gained in the past 20 years (Trevarthen 1983; 1987; 1992;
Trevarthen & Logotheti 1987). The origin of active human
intelligence is found in the patterns and controls of spontaneous
mother-infant intersubjectivity in the 3 months preceding and
following normal full-term birth (Trevarthen 1993a; 1993b).
Premature infants join in protoconversation, fetuses learn to
identify their own mothers' voice, neonates imitate expressive
elements. In the 3 months after term, innate and growing
sensibilities and expressive abilities, and rapid learning under
intrinsic motivational control, transform the neonate into a
skilled partner in nonverbal or paralinguistic play with a person
(a subject or "object with mind"). At this age the infant is just
beginning effectively to track, identify, grasp, and manipulate
impersonal (physical) objects.
In the earliest human communication the infant is a dis-
criminating perceiver and voluntary agent. In ordinary life,
neonatal imitations are part of reciprocal conversational play
(Kugimutzakis 1993). Parent "models" also imitate neonates.
Kugimutzakis's films show that neonatal vocal imitations are
parts of conversations, as are the hand gestures, "prespeech"
oral movements, and facial expressions of "emotions" (or of
histrionic display) imitated from visual models. (Note: I do not,
as I am said to do by Tomasello et al., identify the primary
intersubjectivity of protoconversation with "any time . . . that
two human beings look at each other"; blind infants can proto-
converse well, and premature infants use audition more than
vision; Trevarthen 1993a).
The timing and melodic features of mothers' speech to infants
transcend languages (Fernald 1989), and even neonates prefer
this "intuitive motherese." Protoconversations contain match-
ing and complementary emotions and reciprocating utterances,
gestures, and expressions of attention and intention (Trevarthen
1993a). Whether positive and supportive or mismatched and
disruptive, the involvement of mother and infant, though asym-
metric, is mutual (Murray 1992). It is not "unidirectional imita-
tion of intentions," a description that might apply in laboratory
tests of the baby's capacity to imitate or discriminate.
After 3 months, infants' communication becomes more obvi-
ously "self-conscious" (monitored through others' reactions,
metacommunicatively - by "emotional referencing" with re-
spect to the self as "referent object"; Reddy 1990). Emotional
negotiations of games, joking, and teasing lead to transfer of
feelings to objects of contemplation or to objects of use, and
objects are animated and validated in games that are rhythmic
and repetitive. Six-month-olds are capable of participating in
and learning a litany in poetic or musical form that lasts many
seconds (Trevarthen 1987). They are equipped to learn in a
dramatic or emotionally transforming narrative or performance.
When they acquire referential content, such narratives become
stories, the primary vehicle of linguistic learning that is so
readily adapted to comment on and explain pragmatic tasks of
culture, such as building a construction, making a meal, deliver-
ing a gift, dressing up, performing an act or a role, and so on.
Before speech, communication becomes integrated in one
shared space for orientations; it becomes cooperative and con-
ventionalized and the infant displays "protosigns" (Trevarthen
1987; 1992; Trevarthen & Logotheti 1987). At the threshold of
language play is richly imaginative, seeking expression in imi-
tated and socially approved roles, attitudes, and humorous
displays that other persons in the familiar community readily
recognize and appreciate (Trevarthen 1992; Trevarthen & Log-
otheti 1987).
Developments over the first year show no discontinuity or
innovation to justify denying the first period of human commu-
nication the dignity of the title "intersubjectivity" - if we mean
the use of imitative and complementary expressions to establish
mutual awareness of basic "mental states" - sharing mutually
adjusted "points of view," interest, pleasure, surprise, confu-
sion, purposefulness, thinking, and so on. The entrenched
philosophical objection that such states are unobservable, or
that they need verbal, problem-solving, empirical, reality-
based rationalisation and practical efficiency, is responsible for a
dark ages in our psychology of the personal, the prejudices of
which have disallowed perception of an initial innate intersub-
jectivity and its adaptation to mental interplay between human
subjects of any age, at least past 30 weeks postconception.
Human social learning occurs in relationships identifying
individual others as distinct sources of psychological or intersub-
jective teaching, and of cooperative initiative. Correspondingly,
a parent is more than a caregiver, protector, or scaffold for
action. The infant seeks, in succession: an identified, emo-
tionally available, and responsive partner in communication of
basic motives and emotions; an opponent in affectionate play; a
companion and guide in emotionally evaluated experience with
objects and events; a helper in task-performance; an audience,
admirer, and critic, whose feelings convey the value of shared
experiences and provide guidance towards greater competence
and facility (Rogoff 1990). The emotional aspect of this early
communication and its growth is scarcely mentioned in the
target article, but it is crucial for any psychobiological theory of
how cultural awareness and its communication develop (Trev-
arthen 1993a).
We lose nothing by a more imaginative and accepting eye on
the young human. We gain a responsibility: to integrate the
theory into a developmental one that explains how linguistic and
metalinguistic cognition are learned. Tomasello et al. review
many critical observations and interpret them with skill and
circumspection, but because they fail to comprehend the initial
protoconversational state, they cannot explain how the steps to
referential and symbolic consciousness and competence in so-
cial conventions, roles, belief systems, moral obligations, and so
on are achieved.
Finally, in considering the link between speaking and
thinking, which Vygotsky brilliantly observed with the insight
that communication in the child's "zone of next learning" pro-
vides the foundations for socio-historic-cultural "evolution,"
Tomasello et al. refer, without acknowledgement, to the "virtual
other." This important concept and term was introduced by the
Norwegian sociologist and cybernetician Stein Braten (1988) to
explain protoconversation and to examine how basic human
communication through "dialogic closure" and "affect attune-
ment" is used in teaching/learning and in therapeutic communi-
cation. The "virtual other" is a key component of the innate
intersubjectivity out of which cultural learning grows. [See
accompanying commentary by Braten.]
Interpersonal interaction as foundation for
cultural learning
Ina 6. Uzgiris
Department of Psychology, Clark University, Worcester, MA 01610
Electronic mail: iuzgiris@vax.clarku.edu
In describing their conception of cultural learning, Tomasello,
Kruger & Ratner differentiate social learning from cultural
learning and assert that cultural learning relies on "uniquely
powerful forms of social cognition," without saying very much
about how these forms of social cognition come about during
ontogenesis. I think it may be useful to examine the nature of
social interaction in which human infants participate from the
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earliest months of life in order to see how the social cognitive
abilities necessary for cultural learning come into being.
As has been argued by the philosopher Macmurray (1961),
human infants enter into social interactions as persons not when
they conceive themselves or their caregivers to be persons, but
when their caregivers engage them as persons, which seems to
be quite soon after birth. Human infants are able to learn that
their expressions and behaviors convey meaning because they
are treated as meaningful during interpersonal interactions,
even if not during all interactions with other people. There are
many descriptions in the current literature of how meaning is
imputed to infant behaviors from the earliest weeks of life in
Western (e.g., Newson 1979; Snow 1977; Trevarthen 1979a) as
well as non-Western societies (Morikawa et al. 1988). During
this time, the infants are not learning culture in the sense of
specific practices; they are learning to become cultural beings.
The occurrence of early imitation, which Tomasello et al.
discount in regard to cultural learning because "nothing new is
being learned,' demonstrates one avenue for constructing an
interpersonal space in which cultural learning can begin. Pre-
cisely because the acts being matched in these early imitative
exchanges are familiar to the infants, their mutual enactment
can result in a shared experience. Observational studies indi-
cate that adults are the ones who initially match infant behaviors
and thus enter a shared world with the infant (Papousek &
Papousek 1977; Uzgiris 1989). Within this world of shared
meanings, infants can begin to differentiate another's distinct
perspective from their own and begin to learn from the other's
perspective. Thus, adult interaction with infants as persons,
which is already culturally nuanced, seems to underlie the
development of abilities that are necessary for the first type of
cultural learning discussed by Tomasello et al.
In the discussion of engagements during which cultural learn-
ing takes place, Tomasello et al. focus more on the product of the
learning than on the process, particularly when describing
imitative learning. But a process of interchange over time is
implied by each of the learning situations. Even imitative
learning is rarely a single exposure encounter. To refer to the
two domains mentioned by Tomasello et al., novel object uses
and novel words, they are seldom learned from a single demon-
stration; in fact, first attempts often result in approximations,
which are perfected through exchanges of demonstration and
imitation (Uzgiris 1991). Although many laboratory studies of
infant imitation attempt to minimize the social relation between
the model and the infant, there is evidence that the interchange
still remains a social interaction for the infant. The interweaving
of social experience with cognitive skills has been recognized
even by theorists like Guillaume (1926/1971), who attempted to
differentiate "pure" imitation from various precursor forms of
matching. A focus on the process in each of the learning
situations might show that the social-cognitive skills deemed
prerequisites for each type of cultural learning are actually
evolved and perfected during social interactions.
My highlighting of the interactive process during learning is
not intended to negate the contribution of the individuals skills
to the process. Tomasello et al.'s focus on "the individual capac-
ity for acquiring culture" serves as an important counterweight
to the recent emphasis on the sociocultural constitution of
human activities. It just seems to me that a full understanding of
the individual's contribution calls for an examination of the use
and modification of individual skills in social interaction. The
individual's cognitive understanding derives from participating
in the total activity that is composed, whether individually or
jointly, and, therefore, cognitive skills need not be viewed as
arising in some other sphere, to be employed subsequently in
social interactions. The issue is not whether individual cognitive
skills are relevant to understanding the types of cultural learning
that are possible, but whether involvement in various learning
encounters still has to be individually assimilated and accommo-
dated (or appropriated, to use Rogoff's [1990] term).
To put it another way, the arrows depicted in Figure 1 seem to
overlook the envelope of bidirectional influences in a social
interaction within which all three types of learning take place.
Even with respect to the main motive force, the depiction seems
to be especially wanting for the imitative learning case; when
the repetitive nature of imitative attempts is taken into account,
it seems clear that the model must consider the imitator's
attempts at least as much as the learner considers the instruc-
tor's moves in the case of instructed learning. In all three cases,
participation in the learning encounter is an opportunity for a
change in cognitive understanding on the part of both partici-
pants, although proportionately the change may be greater for
one than the other.
When considered within the framework of interpersonal
interaction, the three types of cultural learning delineated by
Tomasello et al. capture distinct types of learning situations that
support children's induction into human cultures. Although
their sequencing in ontogeny might be less clearcut than
claimed by Tomasello et al. because the social-cognitive abilities
involved in each type are themselves constructed in the context
of interpersonal interaction, they will nevertheless function as
useful anchors for grouping our knowledge of concrete learning
engagements. It will be also useful to remember that all three
types of learning remain possible for human adults and may be
selectively used in specific contexts by particular societies.
Developing semiotic activity in cultural
contexts
B. van Oers
Faculty of Psychology and Pedagogy, Free University, 1081 BT
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Electronic mail: v75uoog@hasara11.bitnet
A theory of cultural learning. One important question for a
theory of cultural learning concerns how to account causally for
the dynamics of the "ontogeny of learning." Unfortunately, in
the target article no clear answer is given to this question.
Tomasello et al. provide interesting evidence for the correlation
between social cognition and cultural learning, but they do not
propose a specific theory that can plausibly account for the
psychological dynamics of the development in cultural learning.
In this commentary I will argue that the Vygotskian approach
has produced some concepts and empirical evidence for a theory
as desired here. Before describing briefly some core concepts of
this theory, I will put down a few critical remarks.
The context of learning. According to Vygotsky, learning can
promote development when it is embedded in the child's zone
of proximal development (ZPD). It is not the appropriate place
here to discuss all the complexities of the ZPD concept. I will
only draw attention to the fact that the ZPD is essentially related
to "imitation," according to Vygotsky (e.g., 1982, p. 250). In this
activity the child is not merely copying the adult's actions. There
is a meaningful reconstruction of an already existing socio-
cultural activity, in cooperation with an adult or a more capable
peer. The child's activity generally transcends the characteris-
tics of the model that is imitated.
Cultural learning, then, is always embedded in sociocultural
activity settings. The performance and learning of new actions
within this activity are often generated and given meaning from
this context. Significant others, for example, attribute meaning
to the child's actions even before the child itself consciously
knows this meaning. The child can recognize meanings from this
concrete or symbolic context.
Recognition of the support the child gets from this social
activity context is essential for the understanding of specific
actions and learning. Actually, cultural learning processes can-
not be studied apart from their sociocultural activity contexts.
This is one of the shortcomings of the cultural learning theory of
Tomasello et al. They try to conceptualize cultural learning
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without devoting due attention to the activity contexts and their
impact on the learning process. Consequently, they sometimes
have to attribute qualities to the individual child that are
probably just characteristics of the cooperation between the
child and the (real or virtual) others in the activity setting. To
give just one example, it is true that young children can gather
from context what other people might mean, but it is far from
evident that they actually rely on "understanding persons as
intentional agents," as TomasellcTet al. suggest. They offer only
circumstantial evidence in favour of this option; they still seem
to be committed too strongly to an individualistic paradigm of
learning. In many of these cases it is more parsimonious and
consistent (considering the Vygotskian starting point) to assume
that at first children just rely on adults' understanding of persons
(as intentional, mental, or reflective agents). Only after some
context-bound and socially assisted learning can they interiorize
such person concepts.
Collaboration In learning. This leads us into a new problem
with respect to the target article. Learning always implies
collaboration between the child and a more capable other. It is
hard to see how the gradual learning of the person concept can
take place without some sort of collaborative learning. Accord-
ing to the authors, collaborative learning requires an already
highly developed concept of person. This apparent paradox can
be resolved by assuming that the reflexivity (the concept of the
reflective agent) is present from the beginning in the activity
context of the learning child but that this reflexivity is "bor-
rowed" from the adult, who takes care of this part of the
sociocultural activity. Again, this requires that the individualis-
tic style of conceptualizing children's learning processes be
abolished.
It is impossible to provide a comprehensive account of my
view of a Vygotskian theory of cultural learning here (see Van
Oers, in press, for more details). The gist of my argument thus
far has been that both the person concept and the forms of
learning are codeveloping processes within common contexts of
sociocultural activities. Many so-called prerequisites may not be
available at the individual level, but they are always present in
the common activity: At first they are socially represented. The
question now arises, What is the dynamic basis (the "motor")
behind this development?
Leading activities and the development of semtotic activity.
Starting from Vygotsky and Leont'ev, the Russian psychologist
D. B. El'konin offered a theory of child development that could
account for some of the above-mentioned complexities (see for
example El'konin 1972). On the basis of dominating motives in
the child (manipulation, play, learning, etc.), he described
different forms of leading activities that are indicators of stages
in the child's development. As recent research has shown (see
Lisina 1982), within every developmental period the child has
different needs and, accordingly, it communicates and learns
differently. There is a growing mass of empirical evidence from
Russian researchers that shows the possibility of communicating
with young children in a collaborative (play) context so that they
learn to make sense of other persons and also acquire different
strategies for learning and making meaning (or "semiotic activ-
ity" as I will call it). In this cooperative semiotic activity commu-
nication can be made to change from a primarily object-oriented
to an ultimately more person-oriented form (see Lisina &
Kapcelja 1987). In this context the initial forms of learning in
collaboration can be transformed into real discursive learning,
"imitating" the scientific learning process. The common basis of
the development of person concepts as well as all other kinds of
scholarly concepts is the semiotic activity the child learns to
perform and improves in cooperation with others. In my opin-
ion, a theory of cultural learning should be basically a theory of
the cooperative improvement of children's semiotic activity in
sociocultural contexts.
Commentary/TomaseWo et al.: Cultural learning
From intra- to interpsychological analysis of
cognition: Cognitive science at a
developmental crossroad
Boris M. Velichkovsky
Department of Psychology and Knowledge Engineering, Moscow State
University, Moscow 103009, Russia; Department of Psychology, University
of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 1A1
Electronic mail: bmv@chair.cogsci.msu.su; velich@psych.utoronto.ca
The only thing I am really astonished about is why this paper
appears only now. Indeed, the target article presents a much
needed elaboration of ideas that have long been central to the
basic problems of interdisciplinary research on human culture
and cognition. Somehow the emerging paradigm of cultural
psychology has heretofore avoided debate with mainstream
cognitive psychology, although in many respects they are mutu-
ally exclusive. The impression of a peaceful coexistence of the
paradigms was perhaps permitted by a profound ignorance on
the mainstream side. Like several recent analyses of the phy-
logenesis of cognition (e.g., Donald 1991), Tomasello, Kruger &
Ratner's article directly confronts the established views, even on
such seemingly noncontroversial points as early language devel-
opment and the intrapsychological character of our higher-order
thought.
What could the results of this comparison of the paradigms
be? Although biased in favour of hierarchical models and
cultural-historical explanations, I nevertheless think a compro-
mise is in order. There are no doubts on my part about the
reality of the three developmental levels described by the
authors. At the same time, these levels apparently represent
only the tip of the cognitive iceberg and their functions can go
beyond those of social cognition and cultural learning (Ve-
lichkovsky 1990).
Of course, the main problem here is the lack of reliable
methods for the analysis of the interpersonal components. We
need a kind of experimental (and not philosophical - cf. Fodor
1987) psychosemantics which could allow us to say, "Aha! Here
we see this interpersonal character of a person's cognitive
representations, reflecting many perspectives on a state of
affairs, as if it were a stereoscopic view of a situation
shared/coordinated with other actors ("generalised other," Ulric
Neisser, Lev Vygotsky . . .)." Without such a methodology it
will be difficult to argue against well-established explanations,
for instance, those based upon reference to inborn genetic
endowment. Vygotsky (1934/1962) himself tried to develop such
a methodology; there were also some efforts in post-Vygotskian
Soviet psychology that were based on the personal constructs
approach (see, e.g., Shmeliov 1984).
Another problem is the lack of an in-depth logical analysis of
the three stages. Tomasello et al. acknowledge that "the devel-
opmental ordering . . . results in some sense from the logical
dependence of these concepts on one another" (sect. 2.4, para.
6). However, they do not really explore the implications of this
claim. From the neo-Piagetian or information-processing view-
point it could be precisely the growing logical complexity of
underlying mental operations, for example, the emergence of
the recursive use of propositional attitudes or embedded-rules,
that will explain age changes in social-cognitive concepts and
cultural learning (see Zelazo et al. 1992).
Although I enthusiastically support this attempt to address
cultural mechanisms of cognitive development, I have some
reservations about the range of its applicability. Tomasello et al.
suppose that various cognitive systems like those of mathemat-
ics are based on explicit or at least implicit mechanisms of
cultural learning (see especially sect. 6, para. 2). This may be
true developmentally, but in general one's reasons for being
involved in a type of activity are extremely dynamic. On what
grounds does one choose mathematics as a profession? It may
well be a personal affection for a school teacher or an especially
rewarding cooperative atmosphere, but afterwards these con-
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texts can lose their influence as one delves deeper into the
problem domain proper. One of Vygotsky's coworkers,
Leont'iev, called this transformation "the shift of motive to goal,'
a psychological phenomenon known also to Wundt and other
founding fathers of psychology. Even at the advanced stages of a
personal endeavor, our motives and success can depend cru-
cially on other factors, such as our visual pattern-recognition
ability (an ability we actually share with all other higher pri-
mates). Visual perception and aesthetics rather than interper-
sonal pragmatics may dominate some of our higher-order cogni-
tive capacities (see also Bartlett 1932, pp. 230-33; Premack
1991). There is evidence of very early aesthetic influences in
phylogenesis too: Stones that are simply beautiful are found in
endocasts that are old even in comparison with the most primi-
tive tools (Oakley 1981).
If cultural learning - in the social-psychological definition
proposed by the authors of the target article - is the common
denominator of all higher forms of intellectual activity then we
should expect at least some positive correlation between exper-
tise in social communication and in other domains, for example,
mathematics or computer programming. But are experts in
these fields relatively sophisticated in the sphere of interper-
sonal cognition and communications? I very much doubt it
(Velichkovsky et al. 1992). Also, studies of autistic children
(although we know how controversial these results and inter-
pretations are) reveal deficiencies in the interpersonal compo-
nents of competence whereas mechanical problem solving and
even recursive use of such social tools as geographical maps
remain relatively intact (Leslie 1991). In other words, cultural
learning as defined in the target article seems to be the major,
but not the only, gate to higher forms of cognitive development,
which may bypass at least the higher stage of the Tomasello et al.
hierarchy.
A minor historical remark is that Vygotsky (1934/1962) con-
sidered at length the problem of cultural learning with respect
to its contribution to development and especially to reflective
consciousness. His suggestion was to look more closely at the
nature of scientific as opposed to spontaneous concepts, a
strategy the utility of which is at least partially supported by later
cross-cultural research (Scribner & Cole 1981). The notion of
"appropriation" played a central role in the post-Vygotskian
activity research in which definite proposals concerning the
relationship between personality and cultural learning were also
made (Leontiev 1975).
All in all, Tomasello et al.'s discussion of joint attention,
instructional learning, and cooperative interpersonal interac-
tion and their attempt to delineate the developmental sequence
among these phenomena represent a major advance in our
understanding of cognitive development. A clear consideration
of the variability of paths of cognitive development, however,
would relativise the current model somewhat and encourage
further communication between cultural psychology and cogni-
tive science.
Human enculturation, chimpanzee
enculturation (?) and the nature of imitation
Andrew Whiten
Department of Psychology, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife,
KY16 9JU, Scotland
Electronic mail: a.whiten@st-andrews.ac.uk
The central tenet of Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner's analysis of
cultural learning is that the form of an organism's cultural
learning is shaped by its psychological model of those from
whom it learns. This seems to me an insight that deserves a
powerful influence in research efforts in several related fields,
including developmental psychology, evolutionary anthropol-
ogy, and comparative primatology. No less intriguing is the
other side of the coin, that a crucial input to the construction of
individuals' psychological models is provided by social experi-
ence - some, perhaps much, of which may itself involve cultural
learning. In this respect the findings Tomasello et al. marshall
regarding the nature of enculturation in chimpanzees and autis-
tic children are, I suspect, particularly significant and I shall
concentrate on these - although they are far from the only issues
worthy of productive commentary.
Most comparative analyses of "cultural learning" in human
and nonhuman primates have operated at a level where the
question is whether the species has the capacity or not: For some
species of monkey and ape the answer has been thought to be
"yes, in some sense," and for humans "yes, certainly." This
neglects an important possibility, however, namely, that levels
of competence in cultural learning are themselves achieved only
as a result of other crucial learning processes. This is what
appears to be shown by the findings of Tomasello and colleagues
comparing enculturated and nonenculturated chimpanzees.
The former, raised with experiences inherent to those same
human cultures that nurture the ultimate cultural learners —
children - have shown cultural learning (i.e., imitative abilities)
significantly superior to those without benefit of these rearing
experiences. Tomasello et al. are right that most of the impres-
sive records of spontaneous imitation in chimpanzees collated
by Whiten and Ham (1992) are from such human-reared sub-
jects: The extensive studies of wild ("nonenculturated") chim-
panzees have indeed provided no data to match.
There are two problems, however, with this comparison as
Tomasello et al. present it. First, what of the possibility that
imitation as defined by Tomasello et al. indeed has to be a
product of enculturation, but that for wild chimpanzees this is
simply chimpanzee enculturation? For Tomasello et al. en-
culturation is equated with human enculturation: What I am
suggesting is that the development of imitation in young chim-
panzees may need a context in which early attempts at imitation
are reinforced and that it can be elaborated upon through an
extended interaction between the growth of imitative abilities
and contexts which make these rewarding. This could be true in
the wild where subsistence includes such tools as are used in
termite fishing or nut cracking, for example. The reason imita-
tion may be difficult to detect here by observation alone, as
Whiten and Ham suggested, is that the actions involved will
probably be just part of all chimpanzees' eventual repertoires, so
acquisition through individual learning is difficult to rule out. By
contrast, when these apes are reared in human homes, the
copying of novel actions (particularly those like sweeping with a
broom, which have no immediate function for the ape) cannot be
explained away in this fashion. This may mean not that imitation
is actually occurring only within human cultures, just that it is
more easily identified. And is it not possible that the chim-
panzees who have failed to exhibit imitation in experimental
tests have been reared without the richness of normal human or
chimpanzee enculturation?
Whatever may be the role of learning in the ontogeny of
imitative abilities, I take issue with Tomasello et al.'s implication
that chimpanzees are ordinarily not imitative, only becoming
imitative as a result of human enculturation. Could a species for
whom imitation is not part of their "nature" be got to imitate
merely by being subjected to the circumstances which nurture
the development of human imitative ability? Tomasello et al.
and others (Heyes 1993; Whiten & Byrne 1991; Whiten & Ham
1992) agree that imitation rests on specialised cognitive abilities
which transduce others' perspectives into self's. That a certain
natural ability, along with certain experiences, may be necessary
to generate imitation is suggested by the limitations on expres-
sion of imitation by both autistic people and certain hand-reared
monkeys, despite their environment of human enculturation. It
seems odd that chimpanzees should have evolved such a nature,
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unless it is correlated with functional outcomes such as acquisi-
tion of tool use under natural conditions.
In fact, is there not a strange reversal in the logic of Tomasello
ct al.'s argument with respect to enculturation and imitation in
the case of apes and autistic people? Chimpanzees, they argue,
can be given a dose of (human) enculturation and can then
(almost magically) imitate. Yet it seems to be argued that this is
not true for autistic children (why?) and, indeed, that autistic
children cannot get a dose of culture (they "are basically acul-
tural" - sect. 3) because they lack imitative as well as more
advanced social-cognitive abilities.
What is it that is so different about imitation? Two alternatives
were distinguished by Whiten (1992), both being related to the
types of "mindreading" abilities Tomasello et al. discuss: (a) To
imitate certain acts imitators need to be able to recognise
models' purpose in doing what they do; and (b) imitators need to
be able to translate, in three-dimensional space, between the
action performed from the other's point of view (seen from their
own viewpoint) and what it is to perform it from their own point
of view. Tomasello et al. appear to incorporate both of these in
their imitative level, which includes "perspective-taking' as the
social-cognitive ability, and "intentional agent" as the concept of
person. They are quick to demote what they call mere "mimick-
ing," in which actions are copied without an understanding of
goals from their category of imitation. However, such mimicking
would appear to face all the difficulties of perspective-taking
described under (b) above. The experiments of Tomasello et al.
are interpreted as supporting only emulation in "nonencultu-
rated' chimpanzees, but would they claim that chimps can or
cannot mimic? If they can, how do Tomasello etal. see this being
done without some form of visual perspective taking? And if they
arc thought incapable of both mimicking and imitating, how
does this square with recent studies championed by their
authors as offering the best available evidence for animal imita-
tion, in both rats (Heyes et al. 1992) and parrot (Moore 1993)?
Instructed and cooperative learning in
human evolution
Thomas Wynn
Department of Anthropology, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs,
Colorado Springs, CO 80933-7150
Electronic mall: tgwynn@colospgs.bitnet
Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner present a picture of human culture
and cultural learning that can be checked against archaeological
and anthropological evidence. Are instructed and cooperative
learning essential to modern culture? Were they important in
human cognitive evolution?
Archaeology may supply us with evidence of instructed learn-
ing, or at least its social-cognitive basis, fairly early in the
evolution of the genus Homo. About 1.5 million years ago
hominids (probably early Homo erectus) began producing stan-
dardized artifacts, known in archaeological literature as "bi-
faces. ' These stone tools were extensively modified, so that in
most cases the original shape of the stone "blank" was altered.
The amount and location of modification suggests that the
resulting shape (usually almond-like or a pointed oval) was
intentional. Moreover, this shape was repeated again and again
- indeed over hundreds of millennia and millions of square
kilometers. Obviously many, if not all, individuals knew how to
make this artifact and they must have shared some idea of what
shape was appropriate. How could such a shared idea of appro-
priate shape be learned? It is here that the concept of instructed
learning may yield some insights. Perhaps Homo erectus could
conceive "of other persons as mental agents who have . . . their
own individual thoughts and beliefs that guide their behavior"?
This seems to me to be precisely what was required for the
production of standardized shapes. One hominid must have
been able to represent not just what another saw, but what
another believed or understood about what was acceptable and
what was not. I do not think that imitation as described by
Tomasello et al. would have been sufficient. In the absence of an
ability to represent what another believed, one could not have
acquired knowledge of the acceptable range of forms; the notion
of "appropriate" is a belief, not a perception or even a simple
intention. I agree with the authors that chimpanzees do not
demonstrate these social-cognitive abilities. Moreover, stone
tools that date to before the appearance of bifaces did not
require them either; imitation would have been sufficient for
these earlier tools, which have no intentional overall shape, let
alone a shared standard. Homo erectus appears to have been the
first hominid clearly to have employed a concept of mental
agent.
I am reluctant to conclude, however, that Homo erectus must
have learned biface technology through instructed learning.
There is still the problem of language. Was it (and is it) necessary
for intersubjectivity? Or could observational learning have been
sufficient? Admittedly, reconstructing another's belief would
have been easier through linguistic instruction, but it may not
have been necessary. Certainly we cannot simply assume the
presence of language in the behavioral repertoire of Homo
erectus. Indeed, given the largely nonlinguistic way in which
most technology is learned even today (Wynn 1991), language
would seem to be an unnecessary ingredient. In other words, I
think the archaeological record supports the presence of the
social-cognitive underpinnings of instructed learning as early as
Hoino erectus, but not instructed learning proper, which had to
await the acquisition of language.
In sum, when we apply Tomasello et al.'s concepts to the
archaeological record of Homo erectus we can identify certain
features that resemble human culture or at least clearly distin-
guish Homo erectus from chimpanzees. Here, at least, their
scheme has supplied useful ideas for thinking about cultural
evolution. But not all of their ideas are so useful.
Tomasello et al. argue that cooperative learning is a basic
element in the creation of novelties in modern human culture
and is also important to the "ratchet effect,' in which cultural
modifications accumulate over time. This is the least developed
of their arguments and as an archaeologist 1 found it largely
unfounded. My reservations are based primarily on the archae-
ological record itself but also on the anthropological literature
that discusses cognition in apprenticeship.
Innovation and the ratchet effect are not cultural universals.
The archaeological record of modern humans reveals vast spans
of time (often thousands of years) during which the products of
human culture (and specific human cultures) remained un-
changed. Even in the relatively recent times of the Mediterra-
nean Classical Age, change in cultural products was slow or
nonexistent for the vast majority of people. Indeed, it was not
until the industrial revolution that technological change oc-
curred at a rate readily perceivable by an individual in a lifetime.
The "ratchet effect" appears to be an outcome of the industrial
revolution (and Basalla [1988], cited by Tomasello et al., clearly
writes with a bias toward industrial society). It is a local phenom-
enon that is uncharacteristic of most modern human culture.
Given the extragenerational rate of most modern human cul-
tural change, it seems unlikely that cooperative learning could
be a sufficient cause for innovation.
Of course, most technology is not learned through coopera-
tive learning. Anthropological literature on apprenticeship
(e.g., Gatewood 1985; Keller & Keller 1991) indicates that it is
based largely on rote memorization and individual problem
solving. There is much imitative learning and some instructed
learning, but novices are rarely if ever allowed to muddle
through a task together. Cooperative learning is simply not a
component of apprenticeship or, indeed, most traditional forms
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of instruction. And, it is interesting to note, apprenticeship in
European technology often began at precisely the age (6-8) at
which Tomasello et al. recognize cooperative learning.
These two reservations suggest to me that cooperative learn-
ing is not a human universal, but it may well be a true "cultural"
cognition, in which the features are determined largely by the
local cultural milieu. Cooperative learning may be very real and
important in the Western classroom, but it is not a feature of
learning in rural Africa and probably was not during the Upper
Palaeolithic in Spain 19,000 years ago. It appears not to be a
necessary component of modern human culture. However, its
cognitive bases probably are. Understanding other individuals
as reflective agents is almost certainly a feature of all adult social
interaction and might well qualify as one of the defining features
of modern behavior.
What is apparent to me from my consideration of instructed
and cooperative learning is that the important developments in
human cognitive evolution are the social-cognitive abilities like
mental and reflective agency. These appear to be characteristic
of the cognitive abilities of all modern humans; moreover, some
can be recognized early in the human evolutionary record.
However, although instructed and cooperative learning rely on
these cognitive abilities, they themselves appear to be second-
ary phenomena that were unlikely to have been central players
in human evolution.
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Commentators on our target article come from at least
three distinct scientific paradigms: cultural psychol-
ogy, cognitive ethology/primatology, and developmental
psychology. This diversity is a testament to the impor-
tance of issues of culture, intentionality, intersubjectivity,
perspective-taking, imitation, instruction, collaboration,
social learning, and theory of mind in the behavioral and
brain sciences as a whole. Our attempt in the target article
is to conceptualize these issues within the framework of
one coherent model that allows for communication among
all three of the paradigms. As can be seen from the
commentaries, we are only partially successful in this
attempt, but at least it can be said that a productive cross-
disciplinary discussion has begun. We are tempted to
point out in this connection that the diversity of perspec-
tives from which the different commentators approach
our article - and the affinities in many cases among
commentators from within each of the three scientific
paradigms - is strong evidence of human perspective-
taking and cultural learning abilities. But it is enough to
point out that the commentaries may be usefully grouped
into three points of view representing, roughly, culture,
biology, and human ontogeny.
R1. The view from culture. Almost all of the cultural
psychologists who comment on our paper feel that our
approach is too individualistic. Thus, van Oers expresses
the opinion that we "attribute qualities to the individual
child that are probably just characteristics of the coopera-
tion between the child and . . . others in the activity
setting" (para. 4), going on to say that all cultural learning
is cooperative and that reflexivity is present from the
beginning in the activity contexts of the learning child.
Schneuwly claims something similar in stating that "the
unit of analysis for modeling cultural learning can in no
case be the individual organism" (para. 2). Renshaw
attributes to us a "reductionist tendency," meaning a
reduction of the sociocultural to the individual and biolog-
ical. For RogofF, Chavajay & Matusov, "individual, inter-
personal, and sociocultural processes constitute each
other and cannot be separated. . . . There is no boundary
between the individual and the rest of the world. . . .The
focus is on understanding processes of participation in
shared activity" (para. 4). Bruner argues that human
cultures have a deontic side in which children do not just
learn tasks but are subject to normative expectations and
to the strictures of cultural institutions. Forman believes
that we have taken an "abstract, decontextualized per-
spective on social interaction and thought" (para. 6) that
leaves out of account the specific cultural practices of
specific cultural groups. Ingold charges that our article
serves to perpetuate the "pervasive dichotomy between
the individual and the social" (para. 4).
Our response to these charges is that we are, to some
degree, guilty of them all: In its current formulation our
theory focuses on the individual organism as it interacts
with others; it leaves out of account the normative and
institutional structure of cultures and it has little to say
about the cultural contexts of specific cultural activities.
But, in our defense, we would like to highlight two
considerations that place these issues in context. First, in
the paradigm of cultural psychology there is great variety,
with perhaps the major dimension of difference being
precisely the degree to which the focus of interest is the
culture or the individual in the culture (cf. Cole 1989).
The "purists" in the paradigm are those who are attempt-
ing to reformulate psychology - or formulate an alterna-
tive psychology - that does not take as its primary unit of
analysis the individual human being, but rather the cul-
tural collective. We and a number of others, on the other
hand, believe that a cultural psychology can also focus
usefully on the individual in its cultural context. And
certainly for the questions we are interested in - chil-
dren's acquisition of specific skills of language, memory,
problem-solving, argumentation - we believe that the
individual is the appropriate unit of analysis. In the words
of Vygotsky (quoted by Schneuwly): "There is in the mind
of each learner taken individually a sort of internal net-
work of processes which, although they are provoked and
put in motion during teaching/learning, have their own
proper logic of development" (para. 5, our emphasis).
This network of processes is precisely our focus. And
although it is clearly important that the specific cultural
practices of specific cultural groups be addressed in any
theory of cultural learning (which could be done within
our framework), we believe there are some human univer-
sals in terms of which these specific practices and their
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deontic and institutional dimensions may be more fully
understood.
The second consideration that helps to place our view
of cultural learning in context is our concern with nonhu-
man primates. We believe that any adequate theory of
human ontogeny, in any of its important aspects, must be
grounded in an appreciation of human phylogeny. In
looking at our evolutionary roots, it is apparent that not all
animals, or even all primates, are social in a deep sense;
thus it makes absolutely no sense to say in this context that
individuals are constituted by cultures. Talk of that kind
may make sense if we are discussing some types of human
activities and thinking - especially those involving values,
attitudes, and other psychological phenomena dependent
on language and "cultural models" of the world. But there
are other aspects of human development whose roots can
be seen, sometimes more clearly than in the human case,
in our nonhuman primate cousins, outside the human
cultural context. From this perspective, we simply do not
see how a human infant's imitation of an adult's tool use is
collaborative or normative or reflective or anything other
than the social learning of an individual organism. The
learning involved is of a general type practiced by other
primate species, but it also has species-specific qualities
having to do with human perspective-taking, intention-
reading, and the like, as we argue in our paper. The point
is that if human social learning is conceived as always
collaborative and normative and reflective - and individ-
uals are not recognized except insofar as they are cultural
beings - the possibility of cross-species comparisons is
basically eliminated from the outset. We would like to
make such comparisons, and thus Harwood is basically
right in characterizing our paper as an attempt to combine
an "evolutionary grounding with key aspects of the inter-
pretive approach," thus attempting a "rapprochement
between two historically disparate and highly entrenched
schools of thought" (para. 9); so is Velichkovsky, when he
credits us with attempting a "compromise."
R2. The view from biology. If the cultural psychologists
think we reduce cultural learning to something more
individualistic than is appropriate, a number of the more
biologically oriented commentators think our characteri-
zation of cultural .learning has remained all too human, so
that nonhuman animals are left out almost by definition.
Gabora, for example, thinks our use of perspective-taking
and intersubjectivity as the social-cognitive basis for cul-
tural learning is gratuitous, as complex information trans-
fer and cultural evolution can take place without these
sophisticated processes. Midford argues that social trans-
mission in nonhuman animals affects their cognition in
much the same way it affects human cognition. King
points to some of our "anthropocentric assumptions" and
argues that we do not ask what apes can do but only
whether they can do what humans do. And Bard criticizes
us for our "indefensible position that humans are unique"
(para. 3).
Once again, we plead guilty, to a degree, but we would
again like to point out the context and goals of our
attempt, especially our explicitly comparative agenda and
our primary focus on Homo sapiens. There is no doubt
that in many nonhuman species information transfer
occurs in very complex ways. The issue is whether we can
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make meaningful and accurate distinctions in the nature
of the processes by which this is accomplished. To make
such comparisons, there will have to be a standard set of
definitions that can be applied to all of the species being
compared. Recognizing the difficulty, if not impossibility,
of making meaningful comparisons across widely diver-
gent species, what we have attempted to do is to adopt a
common set of definitions only for the family of primates,
especially apes and humans (whose common ancestor
lived relatively recently). This definitional set must of
course be broad enough to include the range of behaviors
exhibited by both apes and humans, and rich enough to
capture the uniqueness of each species (and we would
argue that every species, including humans is, by defini-
tion, unique). But, as we readily admitted in note 10, we
are not attempting a totally "objective" comparison. Our
primary attempt is to explain human culture within an
evolutionary framework. If, to some eyes, ape social
learning ends up looking "deficient" in this comparison,
that is manifestly not our intention. It is just that, in our
opinion, social learning of the type used by chimpanzees
is not the kind that would support culture as it is manifest
in human societies.
We must note that the latter opinion is not one that all of
the commentators agree with. In particular, Boesch
claims that even if our three criteria for a cultural tradition
are accepted, chimpanzees still fit the bill. He reports
that, unlike many of the other behaviors of chimpanzees
that have been claimed as "cultural," nut cracking is
exhibited by virtually all the Tai chimpanzees and leaf
clipping is exhibited by virtually all the adult males of this
group. Moreover, he claims that the techniques used by
different chimpanzees are very similar. The problem in
both these cases is that if there are ecological stimuli
that evoke similar response tendencies in all animals,
and if there is only one way (or a few) to perform the
response given the sensorimotor capabilities of the organ-
ism, then similarity results through individual learning
(cf. Whiten). This is why we do experiments such as those
in which subjects are given problems that may be solved
in more than one way. When such tasks are given to
captive chimpanzees, they show no tendency to copy
techniques. In interpreting these experiments, Boesch
argues that the failure of the captive chimpanzees is
probably a result of their impoverished rearing condi-
tions. This is possible, of course, but until we test wild
chimpanzees experimentally, the case is simply not
proven in our eyes. Finally, as to the accumulation of
modifications over time, we simply do not see that
Boesch s two examples of a change in behavior over time
in any sense consist in an accumulation of changes of
behavior or product in the group.
Perhaps the most controversy was created by our anal-
ysis of imitative learning. Whiten agrees that there are no
really convincing data on imitative learning by wild chim-
panzees, but he argues that this might be either because,
as Boesch argues, the captive chimpanzees of our experi-
ments have grown up in impoverished conditions, or
because imitative behavior is difficult to observe under
natural conditions in which many of the behaviors en-
gaged in are in the normal chimpanzee repertoire. Once
again, we agree that these are possibilities, but given the
experimental findings, we believe the jury is still out.
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Heyes points out interesting data on rat and budgerigar
imitation that would seem to undermine our view. To be
convincing, however, the rat studies need an additional
control, namely, a condition in which the joystick moves
to one side or the other without another rat moving it; in
other words, the rats may not be imitating another rat's
behavior but rather seeing which way the stick moves
preceding food. The budgerigar experiment by Galef et
al. (1985) is more convincing, but it is very likely that
these are not novel behaviors and therefore there is no
learning occurring. Heyes questions the definitional re-
quirement that imitative learning involve novel behaviors
or strategies, but we believe it is important, for two
reasons. First, if our interest is in culture and such things
as the accumulation of modifications over time, we need
to talk about animals acquiring new behaviors. Second,
the process of having an established behavior evoked may
be a very different process from learning a new behavior.
It might be evoked by something like "response facilita-
tion" (see Byrne), or it might arise from the fact that
animals have a tendency to repeat behaviors and the
performance of a behavior by another individual is just as
likely to evoke repetition as performance by oneself
(Piaget 1962). This reasoning underlies our dismissal of
human neonatal (and other animal) mimicking as not truly
imitative learning.
Several commentators discuss interesting theoretical
alternatives to our analysis of imitative learning. First,
Heyes questions the necessity of perspective-taking and
the understanding of intentional agents for imitative
learning. Thus, she proposes action-outcome contingency
learning in which one animal simply sees another individ-
ual's action and its outcome and goes on to "selectively
reproduce those features that are predictive of the out-
come that is desired" (para. 3). This does not seem like a
viable possibility to us because we do not believe that
learners of any species can select out the relevant features
of the model's behavior without knowing the model's goal.
In some cases this may appear to be happening - as in the
rat experiments - but this results from contingency learn-
ing about things in the environment that go together
(e.g., stick movement and food - "learning the correla-
tional structure of the environment by classical condition-
ing" in Byrne's formulation).
Byrne also posits his own theoretical alternative. Point-
ing out that the reproduction of behavior is never exact
(see also King), he argues that since most complex behav-
ior is hierarchically organized, the best way to look at
imitative learning is as "program-level imitation," that is,
behavior that reproduces not the fine details or the
outcome of a behavior only, but the logic of the action at
"the most useful or 'intelligent' level at which to imitate"
(para. 6). This is clearly an important idea, one that is
different from (although related to) emulation learning, in
which a goal is reproduced with idiosyncratic means. We
accept this level as imitative learning if it can be shown
that the program level is still novel for the observer. Thus,
in the Nagell et al. (in press) experiment we looked at the
flipping of the tool and not at such things as which hand
was used to flip it. We found no differences in our
chimpanzees, and if Byrne has found differences in natu-
ralistic observations of gorillas, we would encourage ex-
perimental controls so that other interpretations (that the
materials evoke similar behaviors in all gorillas) can be
ruled out.
Overall, Whiten points out that in our account imitative
learning really requires two things: (i) a recognition of the
model's purpose, and (ii) a translation of the model's
action into the observer's action. We do not deny that
many animals can do the second of these and that some
animals can engage in individual learning that has the
effect of reproducing the results of another's behavior
(emulation learning), but we think that only humans
perceive the actions of others as intentional ("the model's
purpose") and that this makes true imitative learning
possible.
Closely related is the issue of chimpanzee encultura-
tion and what it leads to. Whiten is unhappy that we seem
to equate enculturation with human enculturation. Our
characterization is not meant to be confined to humans
except that it requires instruction, attention encourage-
ment, and reinforcement for imitation from others; if
these are present in the adult behaviors of any species,
there is the possibility for enculturation. We just do not
think, as Whiten proposes, that reinforcement from the
environment alone (e.g., by obtaining food) is enough for
reproducing the behavior of another.
In a different critique of our notion of enculturation,
Heyes wonders why we say that chimpanzees do not have
certain social-cognitive capacities, given that chim-
panzees do develop these capacities under human
tutelage. Does that not mean that all chimpanzees in
some sense have the capacity? Avoiding a philosophical
discussion of the "potential" versus the "actual," we will
simply follow Gottlieb (1992) in noting that many differ-
ent phenotypes may be produced by the same genotype,
especially in flexible animals such as mammals. Our
argument is that in one environment chimpanzees de-
velop in one way and in another they develop in another
way. If one wants to say that they therefore all have the
potential but only those who develop in certain environ-
ments realize that potential, that is fine. Our hypothesis,
however, is that by the age at which enculturated chim-
panzees begin engaging in joint attention and imitative
learning, wild chimpanzees no longer have the potential
to engage in these types of interactions.
It is certainly true, as Gomez points out, that we know
very little about the enculturation process at this point.
We do not agree with his view, however, that symbol
learning and use is the key. The process of socialization-
enculturation is the key, in our view, and symbol learning
is simply one part of that process. The gorilla Muni was
reared as an infant by humans, presumably with rich
interactions involving instruction and reinforcements,
and these conditions were essential, in our view, to the
skills Muni developed. G6mez also points out that the
social-cognitive bases of imitative learning may not be just
any form of intentional agency, but rather the more
detached form of sharing known as "protodeclarative
communication," in which the infant simply points out a
phenomenon to an adult with no immediately present
instrumental goal. We agree that this is the clearest case,
but believe that it does not change much in our account,
because these types of communications emerge in human
children at about the same time as their protoimperative
counterparts.
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With regard to instructed learning, Hauser (see also
King) argues that instruction is much more prevalent than
we believe if the focus is on adult behaviors that have the
function (not just the intention) of supporting the learning
of immatures. A focus on function is important because
"what counts is whether the interaction leads to signifi-
cant fitness consequences" (para. 4). We would argue that
in many cases different proximate mechanisms may have
the same fitness consequences and that it is therefore
important to investigate proximate mechanisms as well.
We do not know what the adaptive consequences of
cultural learning are other than in the context of a broad
"Just So" story about how useful it is to learn things from
the experience of others.
Boesch and Hauser both point to what they believe is a
misunderstanding on our part of what Boesch reported as
teaching in the Tai chimpanzees, but we stand by our
interpretation. In the first reported case in Boesch (1991),
the mother could have been repositioning the nut in
anticipation of her own attempt to crack (which did not
materialize as the child then cracked it). In the second
case the mother used what we presume to be her normal
grip to pound some nuts; it is just that she both assumed
the grip and then proceeded to pound the nuts more
slowly than usual. The mothers in these cases may have
been instructing, but then again they may have been
cracking nuts somewhat differently from their usual way,
which the infants observed. And we must reiterate, in-
struction by itself does not guarantee instructed learning.
With regard to collaboration, Boesch reports some
unpublished observations in which chimpanzees actively
monitor the actions of others in relation to the actions of
the prey. These will be very interesting data to see with
regard to the possibility that they are truly coordinating
mental perspectives. And again, not to be obstinate, but
collaborative learning is another thing still. We do not
have a strong opinion on the adaptive origins of collabora-
tive learning, but Collier's suggestion that it has its origins
in human reproductive strategies is intriguing.
Bard's claim that in our analysis of the collaborative
learning of chimpanzees we focus solely on immature
animals is simply incorrect. The Boesch examples we
discussed all involved adults. And the imitation experi-
ments (about which she implies the same criticism) used
chimpanzees of all ages including adults.
In a very interesting application of instructed and
collaborative learning to current human societies and to
human evolution, Wynn thinks the evidence supports
neither the current universality of these forms of learning
nor their necessity in the evolution of human culture. One
reason for the claim about their marginal status in human
evolution is that Homo erectus did not have a well-
developed language. This may very well be the case, but
the supposed absence of language at this point does not
settle the issue; instructed learning can take place with no
language (as we state at the end of sect. 2.2) or with forms
of communication that are simpler than full linguistic
communication. Wynn goes on to argue that the social-
cognitive bases of instructed and collaborative learning -
conceiving others as mental and reflective agents - are
universal and important in human evolution and that the
emergence of these abilities changes the nature of imita-
tive learning. This dissociation between social-cognitive
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capacities and their deployment in learning situations is
not something we have considered deeply, but it is a very
interesting idea that may help to explain some of the
differences in instructional strategies used in different
cultures (as pointed out by Rogoff et al. and Olson &
Astington - see below).
R3. The view from human ontogeny. The developmental
psychologists who comment on the target article gener-
ally do not bring up either our reductionistic or our
anthropocentric tendencies. They do, however, have a
wide range of opinions on the capacities we attribute to
children at different ages, ranging from Trevarthen, who
believes we have missed much of the innate capacity for
intersubjectivity that characterizes the human infant, to
Lillard, who believes that in most cases we have overat-
tributed social-cognitive capacities to young children. It is
noteworthy that the focus of most commentators is on
infancy.
For Trevarthen and Braten the human infant is
born with innate intersubjectivity in the form of a "vir-
tual other." Trevarthen cites evidence for spontaneous
mother-infant intersubjectivity in fetuses and preterm
neonates and claims that from birth infants perceive the
other as a "voluntary agent." Braten stresses that a "virtual
other" is inherent in the human mind, giving it a dialogic
form of functioning from the outset. We would respond
that although this is certainly a coherent and defensible
point of view, it, like nativism of all types, does not readily
lend itself to refutation. We would thus ask: If it is all there
from the beginning, what develops? Why do neonates
not look where others are looking, make social reference
to outside objects, or use intentional gestures? Trev-
arthen and Braten would presumably respond that some-
thing nonsocial is developing, for example, the infant's
"growing sensibilities and expressive abilities" that allow
us gradually to see their innate intersubjectivity. We can
only respond that this distinction between the infant's
innate intersubjectivity and its developing ability to ex-
press it - a notion reminiscent of Chomsky's competence-
performance distinction to defend his nativism - has a
nonempirical quality that we believe obscures rather than
illuminates which psychological processes are develop-
ing, and how.
Hobson and, in a slightly different way Barresi &
Moore, think we misconstrue the nature of the 9-month-
old infant's abilities and that it is not until 18 months of age
that infants understand others as intentional agents. The
issue is this: We talk about the 9-month-old coming to
understand other persons in terms of their perceptions
and intentions toward the outside world and we claim that
this is a basically cognitive (i.e., social-cognitive) process
of the child attempting to make sense of the behavior of
other persons. Hobson believes that 9-month-olds relate
to others relating to objects in a more direct, "noninferen-
tial" manner based mainly on some type of affective
attunement or ability to enter with others directly into
intentional relations with objects; he thinks it is not until
18 months of age that they have an understanding of
intentional agents. Barresi & Moore agree with this basic
orientation, citing as evidence the joint attention to non-
shared visual space that first happens at 18 months of age,
along with more sophisticated forms of emotion reading
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and mirror self-recognition that first occur at this same
age as well. They go on to point out the possibility that the
social referencing of 9-month-olds is a kind of emotional
"contagion" associated with an object and that joint atten-
tion is simply mimicking an adult's head turning only to
discover an interesting object - that is to say, in both
cases, some kind of noninferential behavior matching plus
conditioning.
Although we agree in general that the human infant's
initial encounters with others rely on noninferential pro-
cesses of perception and emotion (see next section), it is
interesting that neither Hobson nor Barresi & Moore
discusses the fundamental change in the nature of imita-
tion that occurs at 9 months of age, namely, that infants for
the first time imitate the adult's actions on outside objects.
It is possible that this too is some form of mimicry plus
reinforcement, but if this is true, it is hard to see why
6-month-olds should not show the same behavior, for at
that age they can both mimic and be conditioned. We
would also point out, following Lillard, that at 12 to 14
months infants learn to use words via imitative learning;
and they use them in novel yet appropriate circumstances,
which would seem to rule out simple processes of mimicry
and conditioning, thus implying some level of understand-
ing of the intentions of others. Finally, we should say that
we do not see why looking where another is looking should
change in its fundamental nature when the look is behind
the infant; or why there should be posited a fundamental
change in emotional understanding from 9 to 18 months; or
why mirror self-recognition of the face should have any-
thing to do with intentions at all. We do resonate to the
criticism that in some places we may have implied that
children have concepts when we meant to imply some-
thing less cognitive, but we still maintain that something
important is happening at 9 months of age that cannot be
explained without reference to the child's changed under-
standing of the behavior of others.
Several commentators invoke imitation as the underly-
ing cause, not the effect, of growing social-cognitive
competence in infancy. Hobson, Mitchell, and Gopnik &
Meltzoff are particularly articulate in this regard, with
Hobson emphasizing the prereflective nature of the imi-
tative process that then leads to the understanding of
what it means to take another person's viewpoint; Mit-
chell emphasizes more the level of self-awareness inher-
ent in imitation; and Gopnik & Meltzoff emphasize the
process of self/other identification. But because of all the
problems outlined in the previous paragraph, we believe
these approaches need something more. Gopnik & Melt-
zoff go a long way toward supplying that something more
by supplementing their emphasis on infant imitation with
a distinctly cognitive component in the form of "theory-
formation abilities." Gopnik & Meltzoff point out that the
protoconversations highlighted by Trevarthen provide no
basis for a "like me "judgment, which requires some kind
of identification of self and other such as the one inherent
in the process of imitation. Gopnik & Meltzoff recognize,
however, that imitation by itself is still not enough to allow
the 9-month-old to turn to the world of the other. For that
we also need theory-forming abilities. We could not agree
more; indeed, although we perhaps failed to stress the
importance of neonatal imitation and identification with
others as much as we should have, Gopnik & Meltzoff's
articulation of the view point expresses exactly what we
intended: "As the child begins to understand relations
between people and objects at 9 months, the relevant
units . . . for imitation become actions on objects rather
than actions perse. The basic mechanism . . . is the same
but the construal of what the behavior of others is . . . has
become far more sophisticated" (para. 8). This is exactly
what we meant in saying that the infant comes to under-
stand others as intentional agents and that the nature of
imitation changes as a result.
There were also a few comments on our notions of
instructed and collaborative learning. Olson & Astington
point out that we have left out of our account the teacher
and the "theory of mind" that he must possess and that
"the ability to teach is what is critical to cultural develop-
ment, not the ability to learn" (para. 7). Clearly these
commentators do not mean this literally, as they certainly
understand the reciprocity of teaching and learning;
moreover, they understand that not all organisms can be
taught everything. In our view, to overemphasize the role
of teaching would be to underemphasize the activity of
children in constructing their own knowledge. And it
should be remembered that in our account the intentions
of the teacher in eliciting the attention of the child will
necessarily be a part of the perspective of the other that
the child represents.
Olson & Astington's other main point is one also made
by Rogoff et al. They claim that our notion of instructed
learning is a specifically Western notion. There are cul-
tures in which instruction consists mainly in showing and
not telling, relying heavily on intentional modeling and
imitation. Although we may have focused too much on the
verbal form of instructed learning (as did Vygotsky), the
last paragraph of section 2.2 is quite clear that language is
not necessary for instructed learning and that the primary
mode of instruction may be modeling. The crucial ques-
tion is whether in instructional situations children inter-
nalize something of the adult's instructions, which in the
nonverbal case means paying attention to adults' (nonver-
bal) directions and then internalizing their intentions in
giving those directions. If children do this, then imitative
learning is transformed into instructed learning as the
child uses the nonverbal instructions to attend to the task
for purposes of self-regulation.
Uigiris and Goldman, each in their own way, express
the opinion that imitative and instructed learning are
difficult to distinguish. Uzgiris points out that in infancy
imitative learning seldom if ever takes place with an infant
surreptitiously imitating an unknowing adult; rather, it is
most often an interactive process in which the adult
models in specific ways adapted for the child's needs, that
is, the adult instructs. The point is well taken, but in our
definitional scheme, if the child is too young to internalize
something of the adult's instructions we would say that
the child is engaging in imitative learning supplemented
by adult scaffolding. Goldman does not see the difference
between the social-cognitive bases in the two cases, as he
does not distinguish between intentions and beliefs. In
philosophy this may be a problem, but in the study of
infants what we mean by intentions is really something
closer to goals or purposes (see G6mez concerning this
distinction). The young child simply sees the mother
attempting to open a jar (not just her hand moving in a
circular fashion) or the dog trying to get out the door. For
these, no attribution of thoughts or beliefs is necessary.
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Goldman and Lillard both see a problem in relating
collaborative learning to the notion of reflective agent.
They ask why the dialogue characteristic of instructed
learning would not be sufficient for collaborative learning
as well. In response, we can only repeat that the dialogue
one hears when school-age children collaborate is mani-
festly reflective and that, not coincidentally, this is the
first time they seem to learn anything new from collab-
orating with others. We have empirical support for a con-
nection between the reflective dialogue and child learn-
ing in Kruger's (1992) study and we hypothesize that this
correlation is due to children's emerging understanding of
the utterances of others as reflective, which allows them
to form an integrative understanding and representation
in which all points of view are simultaneously present.
Finally, we are heartened that Baron-Cohen and, less
explicitly, Hobson find our account of autism to be
roughly accurate. Although some autistic children do
acquire some language and do produce some material
artifacts, in both cases there is little evidence that the
children are designing them for an audience - suggesting
the possibility that they are acquired by learning pro-
cesses different from those used by typical youngsters.
Baron-Cohen gives a few examples of things that some
autistic individuals do that seem more clearly cultural but
there are important differences in degree of autism among
different individuals that make overall evaluations diffi-
cult. He also points out that cross-cultural studies of
possible differences among autistic children have not
been done.
R4. Questions of process. If our interest is ultimately in
the processes by which immature humans become mem-
bers of cultures there are three key issues that emerge
from the commentaries as a whole. First, although the
issue was not discussed by anyone at length, both Gold-
man and Gopnik & Meltzoff bring up the simulation view
of perspective-taking in which children must have some
notion of intentionality or mentality from their own expe-
rience before they can recognize it in others. This seems
much too metacognitive to us; children do not know their
own thoughts explicitly and conceptually before they can
understand the behavior of others in terms of their (the
others') thoughts. Here we might invoke something like
Barresi & Moore's dialectic between conceptualizations
children can use in behavior and those they can really
know reflectively. Several other commentators touch
upon this distinction as well. Although at this point we
cannot hope for a definitive resolution of this issue - much
more research needs to be done, especially with infants -
we also think that an evolutionary perspective can provide
at least a plausible starting point. In the context of what
we have learned in recent years about the importance to
primates of knowledge of the behavior of conspecifics,
what makes most evolutionary sense with regard to this
question is that humans evolved the capacity to under-
stand and learn from others, which they then applied to
themselves in a reflective move. In combination with a
plausible account of how this reflective move might take
place - in the target article we suggest that cultural
learning turned on the self and its products - it is
incumbent on those who think that children generalize
from their own case to propose a viable evolutionary
alternative.
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A second general issue concerns the origin of the social-
cognitive abilities we posit. Several commentators attri-
buted to us the belief that children need fully reflective
concepts of intentional, mental, and reflective agents
before the corresponding type of cultural learning can
emerge. Although we may not always have been clear
about this in the target article, this is not what we mean.
What we mean is only that at certain ages children come
to understand and interact with others in new ways and
that this does not imply an explicit concept; perception,
understanding, and interaction can take place without
concepts. As Uzgiris, Rogoff et al., and Forman argue,
the interaction comes first, the explicit concept after-
wards. The new levels of social-cognitive understanding
that develop at various points in human ontogeny emerge
out of social interactions of particular types; there is
nowhere else they could come from (Barresi & Moore's
account is also relevant here). In being treated as an
intentional agent, and in being intentionally instructed
and using certain kinds of semiotic mediation, the infant,
for example, begins to understand others as intentional
agents. Indeed, interactions of this type are necessary for
skills of cultural learning to develop, as we specified in our
discussion of the enculturation process for chimpanzees.
Once this new level of understanding develops, social
interaction takes on a different character and this may
then lead to another new level. Interaction is the raw
material out of which the social-cognitive concepts are
constructed, which embeds these concepts in (but does
not reduce them to) the social processes and cultural
practices of the organism's social group. Each of these
steps depends on an organism of a certain type, possess-
ing certain "capacities." We must be careful not to reify
these capacities into explicit concepts.
Finally, we would like to acknowledge the pivotal role
of imitation in understanding social-cognition and cul-
tural learning, as Gopnik & Meltzoff (and Mitchell and
Hobson) in particular stress. It is possible that this ability
by itself leads to much of what we discuss as cultural
learning. We do not believe, however, that anything like
the conceptual analysis necessary to distinguish imitation
from other types of social learning, and to relate them all
in one coherent theoretical framework, has taken place.
In just this target article and the commentaries on it we
counted ten terms: "social facilitation," "response facilita-
tion," "local enhancement," "stimulus enhancement,"
"mimicking," "emulation," "action-outcome contingency
learning," "imitation," "program-level imitation," and
"imitative learning." This means that it is simply not clear
at this point how imitation is related to individual learning
and cognition or to other forms of social and cultural
learning. The other two types of cultural learning likewise
require much work to distinguish imitative learning from
instructed learning, to disentangle such terms as scaf-
folding, instruction, and collaboration, and to discover
whether these forms of learning are indeed universal
across cultures and important in human evolution. To talk
about these different forms of learning productively, a
detailed theory - much more detailed than our general
scheme - will be required.
R5. Conclusion. Because we began our response on the
level of scientific paradigms, we would like to close on that
level with one very important point. Coming from both
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cultural psychology and cognitive ethology some com-
mentators feel that comparisons simply cannot, or at least
should not, be made. According to these commentators,
it is never appropriate to compare the behavior of people
from different cultures, who live in worlds that are funda-
mentally different from ours; nor is it appropriate to
compare different species that live in even more distant
worlds. Each culture and each species occupies its own
Unuvelt and all we can do is to describe that world
naturalistically, either ethologically or ethnographically.
We simply cannot agree with this argument. The presup-
positions of the investigator are just as unavoidable in
naturalistic description as they are in comparisons, or
even in some experiments for that matter. The reductio
ad absurdum of the argument is its application to human
development: May we not make comparisons between
different levels of child functioning because at each age or
stage the child is in a different world - or even individuals
in their own individual worlds? Some of the agenda here is
clearly political. Western researchers at one time had the
view that evolution was a great chain of being leading to its
pinnacle in "mankind," and that human societies formed a
similar chain from the "primitive" to the "modern." We
are no longer subject to thinking in that mistaken way,
however, either in biology or psychology, and making
comparisons does not imply the superiority, in any sense
of the term, of any one of the things being compared.
Comparison is the essence of the scientific method in
many disciplines and to rule it out of court on the basis of
outdated political concerns is in our opinion simply not
productive.
Finally, we would like to express our thanks to the
commentators for their time and perceptive commen-
taries and to apologize for not being able to devote the
amount of attention each deserves in the limited space
available to us here. We hope to continue the discussion in
other forums. To repeat the sentiment expressed at the
end of our target article: We hope we are contributing to a
Zeitgeist.
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